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Abstract 
THE STRUCTURAL RESPONSE AND PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL 
HOSPITALS IN A MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT 
By Denise M. McCollum, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
Medical College of Virginia Campus, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1 998 
Major Director: James W. Begun, Ph.D. ,  Professor 
The study purpose is to link hospital structure, represented by each hospital's 
professional contingent, service mix, and inpatient capacity; and its environment, 
viii 
characterized by the penetration of managed care enrollees. The secondary purpose is to 
test the relationship between hospital structural change and subsequent hospital 
performance. 
The study employs a non-experimental panel design, with a sample of 1 882 
community hospitals (service type: general medical and surgical) .  Environmental 
variables are measured for the base year 1 989. Hospital structural variables are measured 
for 1 989 and 1 994, with change variables computed. Performance variables are 
ix 
measured for 1 989 and 1 995, with change computed for cost measures. Hospital 
structural change is viewed as a dependent variable related to the environment, as well as 
an independent variable related to performance. 
Descriptive data are extracted from the American Hospital Association Annual 
Survey of Hospitals. Hospital cost performance data are from the Health Care Financing 
Administration Prospective Payment System Minimum Data Sets. Hospital mortality 
data for 1 989 are from Medicare Hospital Mortality Information. 
HMO enrollment data are extracted from the Interstudy Edge and aggregated to 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. Market competition data are from the 1 989 
Area Resource File. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is calculated for each 
hospital ' s  MSA. 
Analytical hypotheses are tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. 
Results from Part 1 suggest that where HMO penetration was relatively high, sample 
hospitals tended to contain growth in their registered nurse (RN) staff between 1 989 and 
1 994. Higher HMO penetration is also associated with more stabilization in occupancy 
rates, preventive services, and ambulatory workload. In contrast, market competition is 
associated with changes to a higher Medicare case-mix index (CMI), and increase in 
ambulatory visits. 
Results from Part 2 indicate positive associations between increased RN staff and 
hospital cost growth between 1 989 and 1 995 .  Hospitals which did not experience an 
increased CMI are similarly linked with cost growth. Alternatively, reduction in hospital 
bedsize is  associated with more controlled growth in hospital cost per patient day. 
Several control variables display noteworthy associations with the variables of interest . 
Theoretical and management implications for community hospitals are discussed. 
x 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A recurring objective in American health care policy is adequate health services 
for all citizens. This goal includes appropriate levels of access, cost, and quality care 
within the medical system. Our society, rich in organizations (Scott, 1 992), has 
witnessed the emergence of the general hospital as a social and economic institution, a 
storehouse for sophisticated medical technology and scientific expertise. Rosemary 
Stevens ( 1 989) describes American voluntary hospitals as businesses which 
simultaneously carry American hopes of altruism, solidarity, and community spirit. 
Additionally, the corporatization of hospitals through the emergence of profit-making 
chains introduced capitalism into American medicine on a large scale (Starr, 1 982). 
Recently, however, the tide of American opinion has not favored the continued 
expansion of hospital facilities. Robinson ( 1994) characterizes the hospital as challenged 
by important developments in epidemiology, technology, and economics. Furthermore, 
concern for the tremendous rise in medical spending has propelled public and private 
purchasers to increasingly negotiate payments for hospital services for prospectively 
determined amounts. 
The focus of this study is the community hospital organization and its response to 
a changing economic and market environment. One pivotal change came in the 1 980s 
with the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). According to Eli Ginzberg 
2 
( 1 995), hospitals adjusted to PPS, not by reducing their expenditures, but rather by 
finding new sources of revenues. In the face of declines in hospital occupancy rates from 
the mid-70% level in 1 985 to about 60% in 1 995, relatively few hospitals were forced to 
merge, convert, or close. In 1 988, for example, a peak year for hospital failures, only 70 
closures were identified out of a sample of 1 53 5  nongovernment, short-term, acute care 
hospitals (Ozcan and Lynch, 1 992) . Hospital survival mechanisms included the 
formation of alliances to benefit from economies of scale and increased access to capital . 
Cost-shifting, or transferring the cost of care to another' s  pocketbook (Eastaugh, 
1 992) was also a tactical response from hospitals seeking to maintain customary revenues 
without fundamentally changing their methods of internal operation. 
A second pivotal factor challenging the hospital organization is the emergence of 
managed care companies, which have rapidly grown to dominate specific sectors of the 
inpatient market. In 1 995, 73% of U. S .  workers with health insurance received their 
coverage through managed care in the form of a health maintenance organization (HMO), 
a preferred provider organization (PPO), or a point-of-service plan (Jensen et aI . ,  1 997). 
Fifty million people in the U. S . ,  or 20 percent of the population, were insured through 
HMOs in 1 996 (Dunn, 1 996) . Furthermore, both the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
are developing managed care systems for their covered populations. In 1 995, 
approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in HMOs, representing 
about 8 percent of the Medicare population (Virginia Association of HMOs, 1 997) .  
Clearly, the managed care philosophy, with emphasis on primary care services, 
disease prevention, and cost reduction, introduces several new challenges from the 
hospital ' s  external environment. From the hospital perspective, many questions arise 
regarding new economic and social incentives. Will hospital structures support 
outpatient services and expanded preventive medicine missions? In the labor arena, have 
hospitals retained elaborate numbers of statT, or have they "reengineered" in etTorts to 
focus on core competencies and lucrative product lines? Duke ( 1 996) observes that 
hospitals are struggling to rethink and reorganize what they do, who does it, and how 
everything is financed. The question remains whether thought has been translated to 
action 
Apart from these structural issues, do hospitals operate more efficiently as a result 
of their participation in managed care contracting? To what degree have cost savings 
been achieved? In this new environment of market competition and managed care, have 
hospitals succeeded in maintaining, or improving the quality of care rendered? 
The issues of cost containment and quality in health care are particularly 
important with the projected growth and needs of the Medicare population. As the 
American "Baby Boomers" age, they will lay claim to a national health insurance 
program already considered overburdened in 1 996. People over the age of 64 will total 
1 7 . 5  percent of the population by 2020, up from 12 . 5  percent in 1 990 (U. S .  Census 
Bureau, 1 990). Clearly, considerable demand for medical care will exist for this senior 
population, which currently utilizes inpatient services at five times the rate of those under 
the age of 65 .  The challenge for hospitals will be to deliver patient services and to 
remain viable under new risk-bearing reimbursement methods (Murray and Anderson, 
1 996). 
The managed care contracting model, involving capitated reimbursements and 
assumption of financial risk, could eventually become the dominant payment method for 
general hospital services. By examining those hospitals already immersed in managed 
care delivery systems, this study examines the direction of future structural development 
for the typical community hospital . 
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According to Robinson and Casalino ( 1 996), managed care began as a reform in 
health care financing, but will culminate as a revolution in health care organization. This 
study will assist in determining whether this second revolution has begun. 
Historical Background 
"From cash cow to cost center." This phrase typifies the feeling that the hospital 
sector is due for monumental change, where the acute care hospital could move from the 
center of the health care delivery system to the periphery (Brennan, 1 996; Ginzberg, 
1 995 ;  Goldsmith, 1 989; Robinson, 1 994). 
Foster ( 1 989) claims that American hospitals, known in the 1 9th century as a 
p lace to die, have gone from rags to riches to rags once again. Indeed, during a twentieth 
century buildup, the community hospital evolved from a locally supported charity to a 
complex institution, dependent on sophisticated equipment and highly differentiated 
personnel (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983) .  A downward swing toward hospital destitution 
has not been easy to detect, however. For example, the Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission (PROPAC) ( 1 996) noted record profit margins for American hospitals in 
1 996. 
When the American economy took a downturn in the 1 970s, the cost of health 
care did not. Federal regulation targeting cost containment was enacted in the 1 980s, 
establishing Medicare' s  Prospective Payment System and introducing Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs). Typical hospital response to economic pressures in the 1 980s consisted 
of horizontal and/or vertical integration, diversification, and aggressive marketing (Duke, 
1 996; Ginzberg, 1 995) .  According to Foster ( 1 989), the hospital response to DRGs was 
called "restructuring," where hospitals were subsumed into systems or possibly affiliated 
into confederations. 
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission ( 1 996), observing that the 
hospital industry is operating in an increasingly price-competitive environment, 
characterizes three hospital financial strategies :  controlling costs, seeking alternative 
revenue streams, and expanding market share. Alternative revenue streams are sought 
through broadening the scope of services, such as offering more outpatient surgeries or 
skilled nursing facilities. Strengthening market share, or securing a patient base, often 
occurs through contractual arrangements with provider groups or managed care 
companies. 
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Robinson ( 1  996b ) summarizes five forms of growth and integration in health care 
organizations : increased share of a particular market for a particular product (within­
market horizontal integration); expansion into a new geographic region (across-market 
horizontal integration); development of new services (product diversification); entry into 
new marketing and distribution niches (channel diversification); and l inkages into 
suppliers (vertical integration). Foster ( 1 989) interpreted the movement to systems as the 
disappearance of autonomous hospitals . External changes do not necessarily change 
hospital operations, however, specifically in terms of quality and community service 
(Shortell, 1 988) .  
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Grumbach ( 1 995, p . 1 67) describes an American model of health care which 
fostered the growth and financing of the modern hospital : "focused on specialization, 
technology, and curative medicine, with relative inattention to basic primary care 
services, including such needs as disease prevention and supportive care for patients with 
chronic and incurable ailments. A pluralistic delivery system, which is often fragmented 
and lacking coordination . . .  " From this acute care perspective, hospitals were not 
designed to meet the full spectrum of health care needs for their patient populations. Yet 
the 1 990s appear to be the period when hospital services are redefined for the managed 
care environment. 
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between hospital 
structure, represented by each hospital ' s  professional contingent, service mix, and 
inpatient capacity; and the hospital environment, characterized by the penetration of 
managed care health plans. On a secondary level, the study searches for a link between 
change in hospital structure and associated organizational performance. 
The American hospital is a fascinating subject for organizational research due to 
its blend of tradition, professionalism, regulation, medical technology, human service, 
politics, and economic influence, to name a few distinguishing features. According to 
John Griffith ( 1 989), hospitals are the creations of the society around them. This study 
combines a familiar problem - the most desirable ways to organize - with a prominent 
community element - the community hospital - in order to characterize the current 
challenge of delivering acceptable inpatient care at a reasonable cost. 
Although the observation and analysis of hospital trends are useful to healthcare 
managers, this study primarily seeks to test organizational theory. Collection and 
evaluation of available hospital data allow for empirical application of structural 
contingency theory (SCT) and existing literature in organizational adaptation. 
Statement of the Problem 
Primarily, this study determines whether a selected group of American hospitals 
made significant structural changes during a particularly turbulent period in their recent 
history, from 1 989 to 1 994. Further, the study searches for the strongest environmental 
influences on structural changes. Influence is measured in the following dimensions: the 
degree of managed care entrenchment into the hospital ' s  market, the hospital ' s  
performance record a s  impetus for change, and individual hospital characteristics 
considered inherent to management structure. 
Wherever general hospitals show significant structural changes, the secondary 
study problem is to identify their performance differences after the transition; as well as 
to compare performance between "adaptive" hospitals, and those hospitals which have 
essential ly retained their prototypical structures in spite of environmental change. 
Three major assumptions are made in approaching this study. First, community 
hospitals in 1 987, fresh from weathering prospective payment reform, are generally 
assumed to be a poor "fit" with the values, objectives, and financial incentives of the 
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managed care revolution. Second, community hospitals are observed in their reactive 
capacity only :  hospital response to the managed care movement is being studied rather 
than hospital influence over the environment. Third, from a theoretical perspective, it i s  
assumed that the study hospitals will always seek a better fit with their environment and 
that better performance will result from better fit. These assumptions will be further 
developed in the review of the literature as well as the theoretical framework for the 
study. 
Goals and Objectives 
This study is undertaken as a systematic assessment of organizational realignment 
in the midst of tremendous industrial turbulence. The study is designed to : 
1 .  Detect prominent structural changes in hospitals participating in managed 
care markets, as well as those hospitals comparatively unaffected by 
managed care. 
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2 .  Quantify specific structural changes in community hospitals observed over 
the study period; and determine whether there is an association between 
hospital structure, environment, and performance outcomes. 
3 .  Identify trends in the availability of hospital services, as well as the 
utilization of medical professionals, in defining the community hospital of 
the 21 st century. 
The practical steps needed to progressively accomplish this project are: 
1 .  Formulation of a conceptual study model, where hypotheses may be 
explicitly and vigorously tested. 
2. Operationalization of study variables, based on the selected 
theoretical framework of structural contingency theory. 
3 .  Selection of reliable sources for data. 
4 .  Appropriate exploratory and confirmatory analysis of hospital and 
managed care data. 
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5 .  Definitive interpretation of analytic results, i n  reference t o  the 
hypotheses, as well as the study' s  contribution to the literature and 
introduction of additional research questions. 
Scope of the Study 
This research effort is directed toward nonfederal general medical and surgical 
hospitals, where organizational survival is  closely related to operating patient revenues. 
Although the main study focus is upon community hospitals, a broad sample within this 
base will provide comparative data for various geographic regions and hospital bedsize. 
With the use of selected control variables, hospital environment and structure will be 
representative of the community hospital population within the United States. 
This study includes hospitals in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) only. 
MSAs are defined as having a city with a popuiation of at least 50,000 or an urbanized 
area with a population of at least 1 00,000 (Area Resources File, 1 996). The geographic 
dispersion of rural hospitals and their long-distance trauma and emergency patient 
transport systems make sparsely populated regions inappropriate for a study including 
measures of hospital competition and local medical services. Furthermore, the continued 
survival of a rural hospital might be determined by policy considerations rather than that 
hospital ' s  economic viability. For example, in 1 99 1  the Health Care Financing 
Administration funded demonstration projects to stimulate rural hospital care delivery 
and grow healthcare networks in remote areas (Burke, 1 99 1 ) . 
A data base directed toward metropolitan statistical areas is advantageous for 
analyzing hospitals in large urban areas, where market competition is potentially 
powerful in shaping management strategies (Cleverly and Harvey, 1 992b) . 
Conceptual Framework: Contingency Theory 
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Perhaps Williamson stated it most succinctly when he observed that "organization 
form matters" ( 1 985, p. 274). According to Pfeffer ( 1 982), the dominant approach to 
explaining organizational structures in the sociological and business school literature has 
been structural contingency theory (SCT), with its emphasis on efficiency. SCT argues 
that the design of the organization depends on various contextual factors. Prominent 
study factors include task uncertainty, size, strategy, and environment (Donaldson, 1 995) .  
Galbraith ( 1 973 , p. 2) summarizes structural contingency in the following way: 
1. There is no best way to organize. 
2. Any way of organizing is not equally effective. 
The first statement challenges theorists who have attempted to develop general 
principles applicable to organizations in all times and places. The second statement 
challenges the economic view that organizational structure is irrelevant to organizational 
performance (Scott, 1 992) . Scott adds a third maxim to this contingency theory: 
3. The best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which 
the organization relates. 
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This study follows the consonance theory of SeT, with the premise that there is  
an effectiveness or efficiency-seeking orientation on the part of organizational managers 
that attempts to produce congruence between organizational designs and the contextual 
factors that affect the appropriateness of those designs (Pfeffer, 1 982). As an example, 
Perrow ( 1 970) states: 
We must assume here that, in the interest of efficiency, organizations wittingly or 
unwittingly attempt to maximize the congruence between their technology and 
their structure. 
Drazin and Van de Ven ( 1 985) summarize the premise that context and structure 
must somehow fit together if the organization is to perform well. This research combines 
two specific forms of contingency theory in the following propositions. Primarily, in the 
congruency proposition, a simple unconditional association is hypothesized to exist 
among variables in the model. For example, the greater the task uncertainty, the more 
complex the structure. Secondly, in the contingency proposition, a conditional 
association of two or more independent variables with a dependent outcome is 
hypothesized and can be directly subjected to an empirical test (Fry and Schellenberg, 
1 984). In an example of this proposition, the "fit" between task uncertainty and 
organizational structure could be hypothesized to determine the organization' s efficiency. 
Organizational Context and Structure 
Organizational characteristics may be viewed as structural and contextual. 
Structural dimensions describe the internal traits of the organization, while contextual 
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dimensions describe the organizational setting that influences those structural dimensions 
(Daft, 1 992). 
In the research literature, three elements of context have been frequently 
investigated : organizational size, technology, and environment (Pfeffer, 1 982). The 
environment, a subset of context, includes all elements outside the boundary of the 
organization, such as the industry, government, customers, and suppliers (Daft, 1 992). 
Contingency research often considers the environmental dimension of 
uncertainty, sometimes measured as change, and sometimes including a component of 
complexity (pfeffer, 1 982). Lawrence and Dyer ( 1 983) offer two broad categories of 
environmental factors : information complexity and resource scarcity. In health care, the 
information domain might consist of explosions in medical knowledge, regulation, drugs 
and treatments, new technologies, and competition. The domain of resource scarcity, on 
the other hand, may be represented by the availability of capital and the rise of third-party 
payments. Customers, competitors, government, and labor forces are all recognized as 
impacting on resource availabil ity. 
As an illustration of balance between two domains, post-World War II hospitals 
experienced extravagant growth in technology and services, predominantly financed by 
government programs and private insurers (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983) .  One might see 
that information complexity rose in the form of expensive technologies and product 
variation, while resource scarcity was low. However, since 1969 when President Nixon 
declared a "national crisis" in health care costs, resource constraints have increased in the 
form of regulated health planning and utilization review (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983) .  
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Since 1 983, the preliminary implementation date for DRG regulation, hospitals 
have been curtailing their inpatient services by shortening their average length of stay and 
eliminating elaborate diagnostic procedures. Lawrence and Dyer ( 1 983) mention other 
indicators of increasing resource constraint: renewed interests in hospital management, 
collaborative efforts between hospitals, and medical services delivered outside of hospital 
walls .  
Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1 978) use a similar set of factors to characterize the 
environment : degree of concentration of resources, scarcity or munificence of resources, 
and degree of interconnectedness among organizations. 
Once the environmental context has been adequately described, researchers 
attempt to relate an organization' s structure to its context. Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967) 
developed the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the degree of 
environmental uncertainty and the degree of flexibil ity in a unit ' s  organizational form. 
They described the two fundamental ingredients to organizational flexibility as 
differentiation and integration (or coordination). Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967), working 
at the sub-system level and the organizational level, found that differentiation and 
integration are antagonistic states, resolved by more effective organizations. They argued 
that each organizational subunit would develop a structure matching its own 
sub environment, thereby posing more problems for integrating and coordinating the 
entire system. 
Pugh et at. ( 1 969) found clear relationships between organizational structure and 
the contextual elements of size, technology, and location. The contingency of size refers 
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to the scale of the organization, especially the number of its members (Donaldson, 1 995). 
The expanding size of organizations gives rise to increasing complexities in subdivision 
of responsibilities, structural differentiation, and coordination (Blau, 1 970). 
Technology has been defined as the tools, techniques, and actions used to 
transform organizational inputs into outputs. Technology is the organization' s 
production process, and it includes machinery and work procedures (Daft, 1 992) . In her 
studies of manufacturing technology, Woodward ( 1 965) observed that different 
technologies impose different demands on organizations, demands which must be met 
through an appropriate structure. 
In studying location, Blau and Scott ( 1 962) found that geographical, cultural, and 
community setting can influence an organization, thereby suggesting a requirement for 
study controls in these areas. These elements are developed in Scott ' s  ( 1 992) ecological 
level of analysis, where the organization is a collective factor functioning in a larger 
system of relations. Scott expands this concept by identifying four sublevels within the 
ecological level: 1 )  the organizational set, or group of roles undertaken by one 
organizational unit, 2) the population of organizations, or aggregate of organizations 
which are alike in some respect, 3) the areal organizational field, or collection of 
organizations within a specific geographic area, and 4) the functional organizational field.  
Basic Models of Organizational Structure and Performance 
While determinants of structural features are interesting to students of 
organizational theory and administration, a concern for the consequences of hospital 
structure will be shared among providers, patients and policymakers (Flood and Scott, 
1 987). Flood and Scott ( 1 987) arrive at a synthetic model to summarize their 
investigation of technology, structure, and performance in hospitals (Figure 1 ) .  At the 
center of their model is hospital structure, including the dimensions of size, staff 
qualifications, and resources. Hospital performance is measured by service efficiency, 
morbidity, and mortality rates. 
Figure 1. Synthetic Model of Hospital Structure and Performance 
(Source: Flood and Scott, 1 987, p. 26). 
Environment I� Services (Efficiency in / Performance) Hospital Structure 
1/ 
(size, staff, resources) 
Technology � Outcome (performance 
Effectiveness) 
Kimberly and Zajac ( 1 985) proposed a more complex model, linking 
organizational environment, strategy, structure, and behavior, with all interrelationships 
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influencing organizational performance (Figure 2). This model, consistent with strategic 
adaptation literature, focuses on the interrelationships that directly affect performance. 
Going one step further, however, performance becomes a central variable; with feedback 
from prior performance stimulating strategic adaptation (Kimberly and Zaj ac, 1 985) .  
Kimberly and Zajac ( 1 985) also emphasized that both macro environmental 
changes and micro behavioral changes must be considered in their impact on managerial 
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decisions within the health care firm. The determinist and volunteeristic perspectives 
come together here to comprise the organization 's  context. 
Figure 2. Model of Strategic Adaptation 
(Source: Kimberly and Zajac, 1 985, p. 281 ) .  
Environmental! 
Strategy 
The study at hand incorporates elements from the models depicted in Figures 1 
and 2. Both models are specifically oriented to the health care industry. Furthermore, the 
authors have considered the accumulated knowledge and contributions of prior studies. 
The consummate goal is  to pattern institutional response to significant environmental 
shifts, allowing for a variety of conditions and contingencies. 
The American hospital may be likened to an organization at the epicenter of an 
unpredictable earthquake (Shortell et aI . ,  1 995). Rapid and fundamental changes threaten 
to push the hospital to the margins of the health care system (Robinson, 1 994) . This 
inquiry seeks to describe these disruptive forces, and to discover whether American 
hospitals have indeed undertaken significant changes to reinvent themselves. 
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Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
In Chapter 2, the Literature Review, studies concerning the effects of managed 
care and market competition upon the hospital industry are reviewed, along with 
economic evaluations of hospital behavior under various reimbursement policies. 
Methods for measuring market competition are presented and discussed. Hospital 
performance in terms of efficiency and quality, the subject of a multitude of studies, is 
also reviewed. All references to the literature are discussed in relation to the variables 
and measures selected for this study. 
Chapter 3, the Theoretical Model, presents a more detailed framework for this 
study, including Donaldson' s  ( 1 987) Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit (SARFIT) and 
Child ' s  ( 1 972) assessment of the environment' s  impact on organizational 
decisionmakers. The concepts of "fit" and "structure" are discussed as preludes to 
model formulation. The study hypotheses are stated. 
Chapter 4, Methodology, describes the research design. Methods of data 
collection, variable measurement and analysis are presented and regression models are 
specified according to the study hypotheses presented earlier. 
Chapter 5, Results, summarizes descriptive statistics and comparisons, bivariate 
analysis, and regression model estimations for the hospital sample. Part 1 evaluates 
hospital change variables as dependent variables, while Part 2 considers the same change 
variables as independently affecting hospital performance at a later point in time. 
Chapter 6, Discussion, evaluates the results in relation to the original hypotheses 
and considers whether results may be generalized to a broader population. Implications 
of the study are enumerated, and design limitations are listed and discussed. Topics and 
methods for future research are identified, and overall conclusions are made. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this review is to summarize existing commentary and research on 
the managed care environment surrounding the study hospitals. Specifically, the post­
PPS managed care movement is described in some detail, with emphasis on the growth of 
HMOs, or health maintenance organizations, and their impact on the acute care hospital 
of the mid- 1 980s.  The rise of market competition among hospitals is reviewed as an 
integral subset of the managed care environment confronting hospitals. Additionally, 
studies are presented which investigate hospital performance issues throughout the 1 980s 
and 1 990s. Literature pertinent to defining and measuring hospital contextual factors is 
useful in determining an appropriate analytic model of hospital response. 
Hospitals in a Managed Care Environment 
In 1 994, the United States spent close to 14 percent of its gross domestic product 
on health care (Reinhardt, 1 996) while all other industrialized nations had maintained a 
ratio below 1 0  percent (Schieber et aI . ,  1 994). The largest single element of national 
health expenditures (NHE) in 1 994 was hospital care at $33 8 . 5  billion, or 3 5 . 7  percent 
Eighty-eight percent of all hospital care in 1 994 was delivered in short-term, acute care 
community hospitals, and 63 percent was for inpatient services alone (Levit et aI. ,  1 996). 
Various efforts in controlling costs generated by hospital providers have been 
attempted, including the shift of economic risk from payors to physicians and hospitals 
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(Horowitz and Kleiman, 1 994) and the momentous reduction of inpatient bed-days fueled 
by this country' s  insurance industry (Reinhardt, 1 996) . Efforts in cost control do not 
necessarily address issues such as access, quality, or efficiency, however. While cost 
containment is the central issue for health care policy in the 90' s, the concept of 
efficiency must include quality as well (Rice, 1 992). 
Table 1 summarizes information on national health care spending between 1 980 
and 1 994, depicting an overall decline in growth. Costs for hospital care were 
particularly constrained in 1 993 and 1 994. Figure 3 represents the hospital ' s  portion of 
national health care expenditures in 1 994. The acute care hospital remains a relevant 
object of health care study, due to its prominent position in the health service industry. 
Table 1. National Health Expenditures Aggregate Amounts (in Billions of Dollars) and 
Average Annual Percent Change by Type of Expenditure* Selected Years 1 980-
1 994. 
(Source: HCF A, Office of the Actuary ( 1 997). 
Type of 1 980 1 985 1 990 1991  1 992 1 993 1 994 
Ex�nditure 
National Health 247.2 428.2 697.50 761 .30 833 .60 892 .30 949.40 
Expenditures ( 1 1 .6) ( 10.2) (9. 1 )  (9.5) (7) (6.4) 
Health Services and 235.6 4 1 1 . 8  672.9 736.3 806 863 . 1  9 19 .2 
Supplies ( 1 1 .8) (10.3) (9.4) (9.5) (7. 1 )  (6 .5)  
Personal Health 2 17.0 376.4 6 14.7 676.2 739.8 786.5 83 1 . 7  
Care ( 1 1 .6) (10 .3) ( 10) (9.4) (6.3)  (5 .7)  
Hospital Care 102.7 168.3 256.4 . 282.3 305.3 324.2 338.5 
(10.4) (8.8) (10.1) (8. 1) (6.2) (4.4) 
Physician Services 45.2 83.6 146.3 1 58.6 1 74.7 1 8 1 . 1  1 89 .4 
( 1 3 . 1 )  ( 1 1 .8) (8.4) ( 10 . 1 )  (3 7) (4 6) 
Dental Services 13 . 3  2 1 .7 3 1 .6 33 .3  37 39.2 42.2 
( 10.2) (7.8) (5.6) ' ( 1 1 ) (6) (7.6) 
Other Professional 6.4 16.6 34.7 38.3 42. 1 46.3 49.6 
Services (2 1 .2) ( 15 .8) ( 10.4) ( 10) ( 10) (7 . 1 ) 
Home Health Care 2.4 5.6 13 . 1 16. 1 19 .6 23 26.2 
( 18.9) ( 18.4) (22.4) (22 .3)  ( 1 7 . 1 )  ( 1 3 . 8) 
*Percent increase is average annual percent change from previous year shown 
Figure 3. The Nation' s  Health Dollar: 1 994. 
(Source: HeF A, Office of the Actuary, 1 997). 
THE NATION ' S  HEALTH CARE DOLLAR 1 994: WHERE IT WENT 
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Managed care may be defined as the control by organizations and institutional 
arrangements of choices traditionally made within the patient-physician relationship 
(Rodwin, 1 995). In other words, managed care organizations use various methods to 
change the decisions of doctors and providers (Hurley and Freund, 1 993) .  Essentially, 
managed care combines the delivery and financial dimensions of medical care in a 
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number of ways, such as utilization review, preadmission certification, case management 
and capitation agreements (Anderson and Fox, 1 987). 
A prominent form of managed care came into existence when the Medicare 
prospective payment system (PPS) placed hospitals under financial risk for services 
provided to their Medicare patients. PPS basically changed the financial incentives 
facing hospitals but left physicians and patients unaffected, initiating conflicts in cost 
containment efforts (Glandon and Morrisey, 1 986). 
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As Medicare cost-plus reimbursement shifted in the mid- 1 980s to the prospective 
payment system (Ginzberg, 1 995), other managed care initiatives proceeded to pressure 
hospitals .  First generation managed cCl:re practices relied on price discounts, while second 
generation managed care incorporated stricter forms of utilization management. Third 
generation managed care models utilize capitated payment that place providers at overall 
financial risk for the care of enrolled populations (Shortell , et aI . ,  1 995). Capitation has 
been called the most rapidly growing form of managed care (Tab bush and Swanson, 
1 996). With only 7 percent of the revenue of hospitals and medical groups capitated in 
1 995,  Bader and Matheny ( 1 994) projected growth to reach 1 7  percent by 1 996. 
Zwanziger et al . ( 1 996) studied the effects of reimbursement shifts upon 
California hospitals between 1 983 and 1 988 .  Two measures of hospital service mix were 
used : specialization and differentiation. The new reimbursement mechanisms studied 
were the Medicare PPS and the growth of selective contracting plans. Other hospital 
data, such as its level in the market, ownership, and bedsize were also collected. Their 
results indicated that the competition among hospitals tended to increase differentiation, 
while  higher financial PPS pressure was associated with increased specialization. 
Additionally, they concluded that hospitals tended to adopt some high visibi l ity services 
offered by their competitors. 
The forementioned study incorporates several elements of the intended research, 
including the evaluation of hospital characteristics, in the form of service mix, amid a 
drastic change in reimbursement systems. In their California study, however, hospital 
response is examined throughout two concurrent financial contingencies, whose effects 
may have interacted with one another. 
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The proposed study period takes place after hospital implementation ofPPS in 
order to more fully isolate and characterize other managed care influences. Furthermore, 
the intended study is on a national rather than state level ; involving a broader sample, but 
sacrificing the specific measurement advantage obtained in the California research. 
HMO Growth 
In an effort to quantify the managed care environment surrounding American 
hospitals, the proposed study focuses on the growth of health maintenance organization 
(HMO) enrollment within the insured patient population. Health maintenance 
organizations have changed the health care market by integrating the functions of 
insurance and health care provision (Christianson et aI . ,  1 99 1 ) . HMOs may be defined as 
groups of physicians and other health care professionals who provide a wide range of 
services to subscribers and their dependents on a prepaid basis (McDonnell et aI . ,  1986) .  
Individuals who enroll in an HMO contract for health service delivery from a 
l imited panel of providers for a fixed period and fee (Luft, 1 98 1 ) . Because of the risk 
involved in capitated premium payments, HMOs have an economic incentive to monitor 
service utilization and costs. HMOs are organized in various models according to 
physician affiliation, including staff, group, network, and independent physician 
association arrangements (McDonnell et aI . ,  1 986). 
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A major competitor to the HMO has been the preferred provider organization, or 
PPO, where a limited panel of physicians and hospitals also delivers health care services 
to a defined group of patients. Compared to HMOs, PPOs are distinguishable by their 
use of negotiated fee schedules and greater consumer choice of providers (Lissovoy et aI . ,  
1 986). 
According to Shelton (! 989), the more HMO and PPO plans dominate the 
insurance-health plan market, the more hospitals are likely to compete on the basis of 
price, assuming that HMOs and PPOs are more price-sensitive in contracting than prior 
fee-for-service insurance payors. Furthermore, growth in the market share of HMOs and 
PPOs limits the degree to which hospitals can cost-shift their contracted and government 
business to charge-paying customers. It is highly likely that PPS implementation did not 
initially bring about structural change in hospitals, specifically due to hospitals '  freedom 
in shifting charges to non-Medicare payors. 
Shelton ( 1 989) observes that HMO market penetration, in relation to all health 
insurance products and in relation to PPO market penetration, may be the most important 
determinant of price competitiveness deriving from selective contracting. 
Although HMOs are not a recent phenomenon, they became an important part of 
federal policy with the passage of the Health Maintenance Organization Act (Dorsey, 
1 975) .  After assisting HMO development between 1 973 and 1 983 with loans and grants, 
the federal government promoted further HMO growth by supporting their enrollment of 
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Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
of 1 98 1  gave states substantial flexibility to contract with HMOs for their Medicaid 
programs. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1 982 redefined 
HMO participation with Medicare, as well as establishing attractive new payment rates 
for HMOs enrolling Medicare beneficiaries (Christianson et aI . ,  1 99 1 ) . 
Amid these environmental changes, the number of HMOs grew rapidly, from 234 
plans in December 1 98 1  to 626 plans in December 1 986; followed by a leveling off from 
1 986 to 1 988 and a slight decline from 1 988 to 1 989. Total HMO enrollment climbed 
steadily for the entire period between 1 978 and 1 989, however (Christianson et aI . ,  1 99 1 ) . 
Annual rate of growth in HMO enrollment averaged 1 6 .2  percent between 1 990 and 1 995 
(V AHMO, 1 997). By 1 994, HMO enrollment reached 50 million (GHAA, 1 995);  and 
according to 1 995 surveys more than one in five Americans (58 .2  million) were enrolled 
in HMOs (V AHMO, 1 997). 
Hospital involvement in HMO contracting will expand as HMOs enroll more 
Figure 4. National Medicare HMO Growth. 
(Source: V AHMO, 1 997) . 
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seniors. In 1 995, approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries (8 percent of the 
Medicare population) were enrolled in HMOs (See Figure 4). 
Studies of Hospital Response to HMO Growth 
Previous research has examined the relationship between hospitals and health 
maintenance organizations. Feldman et al . ( 1 990) analyzed four communities and 1 02 
contract forms to determine HMO strategies in hospital selection. As prepaid plans 
competed for market share in the 1 980's, it was assumed that they would increasingly 
attempt to reduce the cost of hospital services. Study results indicated that in HMO 
contracting, hospitals were selected because of their affiliation with HMO physicians, 
convenience to plan employees, and hospital reputation over service cost. 
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Once the HMO-hospital contract has been established, an important research 
question is whether HMO affiliation will induce hospitals into price competition, or 
greater efficiency. Feldman et al. ( 1 986) assessed the impact of HMOs on revenue, cost, 
and net income per admission in Twin Cities hospitals from 1 979 to 1 98 1 .  Some HMOs 
had obtained negotiated discounts from hospitals. The researchers found that hospitals 
which gave larger discounts did not have lower costs per admission. Similarly, hospitals 
with a large share of patients from HMOs or government Medicare and Medicaid 
programs did not have lower costs per admission than other hospitals. Another important 
observation was that neither HMO market share nor discounts had an adverse effect on 
hospital profits. This study concluded that HMOs are only one agent in the market, and 
that HMO-induced competition did not contain expenditures in the subject hospitals . 
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Various research efforts have explored the relationship between HMO market 
share and associated hospital utilization. Chernow ( 1 995) studied the impact of non-IPA 
HMOs on the number of short-term general hospitals in the American Hospital 
Association data base from 1 982 to 1 987. His results indicate that a 1 0-percentage point 
increase in the non-IPA HMO market share will reduce the number of hospitals by 4%, 
causing an approximate 5% reduction in the number of hospital beds. No statistically 
significant relationship was found between non-IPA HMO penetration rates and hospital 
occupancy rates. 
Robinson ( 1 996a) studied HMO market penetration and hospital utilization in 
private nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in California between 1 983 and 1 993 . The 
growth of HMO penetration in local hospital markets was measured from patient 
discharge abstract data. Outcome measures included hospital closures, changes in bed 
capacity, changes in acute care admissions, length of stay, inpatient days and ambulatory 
visits. 
Robinson' s ( 1 996a) results indicated that during the study period, hospital 
expenditures grew 44% less rapidly in markets with high HMO penetration than in 
markets with low HMO penetration. Reductions in volume and service mix accounted 
for 28% of reduced growth in hospital expenditures, decreased bed capacity accounted 
for 6%, and changes in intensity (services per patient day) accounted for 1 0%. 
Robinson' s  conclusion was that managed care is shifting the acute care hospital from the 
center to the periphery of the health care system. 
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The intended study measures HMO penetration and resulting hospital utilization, 
and some outcome measures are similar to those in Robinson' s  ( l 996a) research. The 
intended work has a national scope, while Robinson ' s  sample was l imited to California 
hospitals. The intended study spans the years 1 989 to 1 995, where Robinson gathered a 
decade of data through the year 1 993 . Managed care penetration, in the form onIMO 
enrollment, i s  common to both studies, but subject to different methods of measurement 
Finally, the intended study analyzes hospital outcomes in staff ratios as well as 
Robinson' s  variables of hospital costs and service utilization. 
In a more specific analysis of hospital critical care, Angus et al . ( 1 996) studied the 
effect of managed care insurance on ICU resource use in Massachusetts state hospitals in 
1 992. A Massachusetts cohort was selected because Massachusetts is  one of the most 
highly penetrated managed care markets in the country (Zinner, 1 995) .  In 1 992, 1 9  
managed care companies provided care for 3 5% of the population and 1 9% of the adult, 
non-childbirth-related hospitalizations (Massachusetts Assoc. of HMOs, 1 996). It should 
be noted, however, that enrollment figures, rather than managed care intensity, constitute 
this definition of market penetration. 
Angus et al. ( 1 996) compared ICU hospitalizations covered by four payer groups: 
commercial fee-for-service, commercial managed care, traditional Medicare patients, and 
Medicare-sponsored managed care. ICU length of stay (LOS) was the main outcome 
measure selected for ICU resource utilization. It was acknowledged that this measure i s  
somewhat crude, and that managed care organizations may have reduced ICU 
expenditures through decreased daily resource use (Angus et aI . ,  1 996). 
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Findings from this study indicated that patients covered under managed care 
consume fewer leu resources, primarily due to a difference in the patient-related factors 
such as age, severity of principal illness, co morbidity and reason for admission. Payor 
status had no independent effect on leu LOS. The conclusion was that as managed care 
case mix changes in the future to include sicker and older patients, the initial advantages 
of reduced resource consumption may diminish (Angus et aI . ,  1 996). 
S ince leu services are estimated to comprise 30% of hospital costs in the United 
States (Halpern et aI . ,  1 994) this study and another leu research effort by Rapoport et al . 
( 1 992) are relevant to the issue of managed care contracting and hospital utilization. 
Both studies employ a broader definition of managed care penetration than the intended 
study, however. 
The accelerated growth of managed care organizations and arrangements has 
added new dimensions to environmental turbulence surrounding hospitals, and generated 
a structural revolution in the financing and del ivery of health care (Brooke, 1 992). In one 
example, hospitals may structurally integrate physicians into administrative activities in 
an attempt to improve organizational efficiency and lower costs. 
Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988) evaluated five integrative strategies for 
physicians and resultant hospital costs. The five dimensions of hospital-physician 
integration included measurements in general administrative participation, participation 
in hospital governance, salaried hospital-based physicians, employment of admitting 
physicians, and management-oriented medical staff committees. The dependent variable 
of hospital cost was measured as the total 1 982 expenditures for the hospital per adjusted 
discharge. Their findings suggested that physician involvement in the administrative 
structure of the hospital, at least through administrative positions and clinical 
employment, is associated with increased, rather than decreased hospital costs. 
In addition to variables for hospital-physician integration, Alexander and 
Morrisey ( 1 988) incorporated hospital control variables for case mix, production output 
volume (in dollars), wage rate, hospital size, medical staff size, teaching/nonteaching, 
hospital control, and regional location. Development of a full model including these 
hospital control variables led to the conclusion that physician participation in hospital 
governance did not affect hospital costs when other cost function variables were held 
constant . 
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The intended study has several features similar to Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988), 
namely sampling from an AHA survey of hospitals, measurement of the dependent 
variable of hospital cost, and inclusion of hospital control variables for case mix, size, 
teaching status, hospital control, and regional location. Additionally, the intended study 
includes a measure for the number of physicians employed by the hospital as a 
percentage of the entire hospital statT This investigation, a form of update to the 
physician integration issue, attempts to determine whether hospitals have indeed sought 
to employ more physicians and thereby exert greater organizational cost control. Past 
data have suggested that more than 70% of all expenditures on health care are directly 
influenced, if not controlled, by the medical profession (ReIman, 1 980). 
In summary, the managed care environment surrounding American hospitals i s  
comprised of multiple delivery systems, with primary focus on utilization and financial 
controls to affect cost (Boland, 1 993). With managed care establishing itself as a 
"moving target" (Boland, 1 993), the intended study has selected an HMO-based 
measurement of managed care penetration to indicate the environmental contingency 
faced by the subject hospital organizations. 
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While hospital studies have demonstrated a change in capacity and utilization in 
response to HMO presence (Robinson, 1 996a), changes in hospital staff mix and service 
scope have not been thoroughly examined. Addition of these elements in the intended 
study could possibly develop further insight into the nature of the managed care 
contingency. 
Market Competition and Hospital Efficiency Studies 
Hospital behavior amid competition has been studied and measured from many 
perspectives since the 1 980s. One major research question was whether procompetitive 
policies promoted efficiency in individual hospital operations (McLaughlin, 1 988) .  A 
second series of studies examined external hospital strategies, such as formation of 
alliances, mergers, and even closure, in dealing with competitive change (Will iams et aI . ,  
1 992). Established measures of  market competition and previous studies of  hospital 
response are important in formulating a foundation for the current proposal. 
Competition may be defined in business as rivalry for customers or markets, with 
competitors being more or less evenly matched (Webster' s  Dictionary, 1 966). "Perfect 
competition," a term used in economics, is a market structure in which there are ( I )  
numerous buyers and sellers, (2) perfect information, (3) free entry and exit, and (4) a 
homogeneous product (Folland et aI . ,  1 993). When these basic assumptions are violated, 
economists generally acknowledge that the market fails to achieve an efficient outcome. 
Market failure provides an opening for public interventions in the market (Johannes son, 
1 996). 
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Many have criticized the applicability of ideal market conditions in the health care 
sector (Folland et aI . ,  1 993) .  Although procompetitive policies in health care markets 
were being promoted as cost containment strategies during the 1 980s, McLaughlin ( 1 988) 
observed that few of these markets were competitive or moving toward maximum 
efficiency. 
The concept of efficiency may be related to competitive markets through the First 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, stating that competitive markets under 
certain conditions are economically efficient (Folland et aI . ,  1 993). Vilfredo Pareto 
defined efficiency as an economically optimal outcome in society, where it is impossible 
to improve the lot of any person without hurting someone else (Folland et aI . ,  1 993) .  
McLaughlin ( 1 988) interpreted production efficiency as choosing the optimal 
combination of inputs to produce a given output in the least costly way. An expected 
outcome of increased price competition in health care was production efficiency; yet 
McLaughlin suggested that the response to HMOs and other changes in the financing and 
delivery of health services was increased nonprice competition, or rivalry. McLaughlin 
( 1 988) made the concession that in 1 988, it was possibly too early to see the cost 
containment effects of increased efficiency caused by competitive pressures .  
In a related study, Robinson et al . ( 1 988) hypothesized that hospitals competed 
with other nearby hospitals, but on a nonprice rather than price basis .  This idea was 
translated into the working hypothesis that competitive pressures encourage hospitals to 
accommodate patient and physician preferences for longer lengths of stay. 
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In  a study of  747 nonfederal short-term hospitals, Robinson et al . ( 1 988) 
compared measures of hospital concentration and competition with length of stay for ten 
surgical procedures. Competition-related percentage increases in length of stay (7% to 
23%) were identified for all procedures. It was concluded that there was a strong positive 
association between the number of hospital competitors in the local market and the 
average length of stay in U .S .  hospitals. 
The notable distinction in this study is the timing of its data sources :  1 982. Prior 
to the implementation ofPPS, this well-controlled study suggested that hospitals under 
competitive pressure were destined to have a difficult time in adjusting to prospective 
reimbursement. Physicians would have to be convinced to alter their practice styles, and 
patients would have to live with shorter acute care postoperative recovery time in order to 
shorten the average length of stay (Robinson et aI . ,  1 988) .  
More recently, Jones ( 1 990) argued that 10 years of competition in the employer­
based private health insurance system did not achieve appreciable containment of costs. 
Specifically, policy toward competition consisted of multiple choice of health insurance 
plans for employees and HMO development through the 1 980s. Jones ( 1 990) suggested 
that the multiple choice in health plans must be curtailed or heavily managed for risk 
selection in order to lower health care costs. 
Chilingerian ( 1 992) focused these issues in health service efficiency upon the 
individual hospital, and further upon the physician staff. With a prediction that in the 
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1 990s, 60% of all employees and their dependents would be enrolled in some kind of 
managed care indemnity plan like an HMO or PPO, Chilingerian ( 1 992) urged hospitals 
to retain physicians whose experience and judgement reduce the amount of unnecessary 
tests, drugs, and patient days in the hospital. Where in the past, physician judgement was 
not questioned, hospital price variation was beginning to be attributed to physician 
practice patterns. 
Changes in reimbursement policy and resultant hospital utilization rates were 
evaluated under the Medicare Competition Demonstration from 1 984 (Rossiter et aI . ,  
1 988) .  Analysis was conducted which compared service use and cost experience of  
participating HMOs and competitive medical plans (CMPs). The measure for efficiency 
in this study was hospital days per 1 000 person years. Medicare enrollees in the 
demonstration experienced a median of 1 95 1  hospital days per 1 000 person years, 57  
percent of  the median of 3432 days per 1 000 i n  the local market from which the plans 
drew enrollment. Independent practice associations (IPAs) experienced higher hospital 
use rates than staff and group model HMOs. These comparisons were not adjusted for 
various risk factors, but it was predicted that further adjustment would favor the 
demonstration plans. 
The National Medicare Competition Evaluation (Rossiter et aI . ,  1 988) analyzed 
the economic aspects of patient care in terms of cost and utilization, with results 
indicating that competitive health plans in the Medicare sector could reduce health care 
costs through production efficiency. One important comparison to be made, however, 
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was quality of  care between demonstrations and fee-for-service providers. The intended 
study includes a quality measure as an integral element of hospital performance. 
Hospital cost inflation between 1 982 and 1 986 was a subject of study by 
Robinson and Luft ( 1 988), where data on 5490 nonfederal, short-term general hospitals 
were used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of regulatory and market-oriented cost­
control policies on hospitals. AHA data was the primary source of cost, utilization, and 
other individual hospital measures. The effects of various cost-control strategies among 
several state programs were evaluated using a multivariate statistical approach that 
controlled for hospital-specific changes in patient mix, wage rates, volume of services 
provided, and other relevant factors. Additionally, the researchers examined how the 
effects of various strategies differed for private nonprofit, public, or investor-owned 
hospitals .  
Robinson and Luft ( 1 988) found that California' s market-oriented cost-control 
policy reduced inflation rates by 1 0. 1% compared to a control group of 43 states. 
Hospitals with large percentages of patients insured by Medicare' s  prospective payment 
system experienced cost inflation rates 16 . 1 % lower than hospitals with small 
percentages of Medicare patients. Investor-owned hospitals experienced rates of cost 
increase 1 1 . 6% higher that private nonprofit hospitals and 1 5% higher that public 
hospitals .  These results support the hypothesis that rate regulation in the form of 
competition can yield desirable effects in controlling hospital costs. 
The intended study does not review state regulatory policies; however its 
emphasis on competitive mechanisms and resulting hospital expenses is similar to 
Robinson and Luft ( 1 988). It is interesting to note the following study observation, 
describing the local nature of hospital services: 
Hospital markets are inherently local rather than national in character, 
given the unwillingness of physicians and patients to travel large 
geographic distances except for the most complicated of hospital services . 
Buyers can thus only exploit cost and price differences within local 
markets, not among different local markets. (Robinson and Luft, 1 988, p. 
268 1 )  
I n  their study of pro-competition policies, Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) also 
concluded that such policies could indeed increase hospital cost containment and move 
hospital competition to the price-based arena. Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) grouped 
California' s short-term hospitals according to the level of competition within their 
markets .  After controlling for the effects of the Medicare prospective payment system 
program, the rate of increase in cost per discharge for hospitals in highly competitive 
markets was 3 . 53% lower than the rate of increase for hospitals in low competition 
markets during the period from 1 983 through 1 985 .  
The study design presented by Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) was in three 
analytical steps, with the first step using analysis of variance (ANOY A) to compare 
36 
hospital behavior before and after the introduction of selective contracting and Medicare 
PPS .  Selective contracting refers to the procedure whereby a third-party payer can 
legal ly exclude providers from their list of participating providers without significant 
threat of antitrust prosecution. Under the selective contracting law, both public and 
private payers can negotiate terms and conditions with each specific provider whom they 
will reimburse for services to their subscribers (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1 988) .  
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The second step used multivariate regression analysis to  test whether there were 
significant differences in the behavior of hospitals, depending on the competitiveness of 
the market in which they were located. Measures of hospital cost, revenue, and use were 
analyzed for hospitals in high-competition and low-competition markets. 
In the third step of their study, Melnick and Zwanziger ( l 988) estimated the 
separate effects of the Medicare PPS program, selective contracting, and increased 
competition upon hospitals. The results from previous multiple regression analyses were 
used to quantify the effects of the PPS program on urban hospitals for three measures of 
performance: cost per discharge, total inpatient costs, and number of inpatient discharges .  
The estimated regression coefficients were multiplied by the corresponding values of the 
independent variables to calculate the rates of change for hospitals under different market 
conditions. 
This study is important because it supports conclusions that after PPS and 
selective contracting implementation, greater competition among hospitals led to reduced 
hospital costs. Similarities with the intended research include a characterization and 
measurement of market competition, as well as measures of hospital cost and volume, 
representing hospital behavior. While the Melnick and Zwanziger (1 988) study was 
concerned with PPS and selective contracting as policy issues, the intended study intends 
to fol low up on a time period following PPS implementation. The Melnick and 
Zwanziger ( \ 988) research study collected financial data from the state of California 
only; with the idea that California foreshadowed a trend due in other states. In the 
intended study, data are collected on a national level. 
In the forward march of managed care, the closure of hospital beds was a central 
consideration in cutting the excess hospital capacity (Cerne and Montague, 1 994). 
Another hospital resource that could be reduced, discussed by Hadley et al. ( 1 996), was 
hospital staff. Using data from the American Hospital Association and the Medicare 
Program, researchers analyzed the effects of financial pressure and market competition 
on changes in several measures of performance of 1435 acute care hospitals between 
1 987 and 1 989. 
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It was observed that the least profitable hospitals constrained their growth in total 
expenses to half that for the most profitable hospitals ( 1 3 . 3% versus 27.6%) by limiting 
the growth of their staffs and their total assets. These changes were associated with a 
reduction in inefficiency of 1 . 8% compared with a very slight increase in inefficiency for 
the highest profit group. Additionally, hospitals in highly competitive markets appeared 
to control expenses relative to those in the least competitive areas. No evidence was 
found to suggest that financial pressures created by either low profits or market 
competition resulted in hospitals engaging in cost-shifting. 
The study by Hadley et al. ( 1 996) is similar to the intended study in its use of 
AHA and Medicare data, its measurement of hospital staff size as an indicator of hospital 
response, and its focus on competitive pressures and resulting efficiency between 
hospitals .  There are some differences, however: Hadley' s  indicators of hospital revenue 
growth and profit are not included as performance variables in the intended study. 
Wickizer et al . ( 1 996) estimated the impact of hospitals '  various managed care 
strategies on the cost per hospital discharge. Thirty-seven member hospitals of seven 
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health systems were surveyed, with separate cross-sectional regression analyses 
performed on inpatient data from 1 99 1  and 1 992. The multivariate model was estimated 
with hospital cost per discharge as the dependent variable. Pooled discharge data 
indicated three dimensions of hospital managed care strategy that consistently related to 
lower costs per hospital discharge: the proportion of hospital revenues derived from per 
case or capitation payment, the hospital ' s  mechanisms for sharing information on 
resource consumption with clinicians, and the use of formalized, systematic care 
coordination mechanisms. 
This study by Wickizer et al. ( 1 996) is similar to the intended study, due to its 
emphasis on managed care strategies, specifically the "fixed price" hospital incentives, 
and also in measuring the efficiency variable as hospital cost per discharge. With only 3 7  
hospitals surveyed, the authors limited the generalizability of their sample; however, with 
over 40,000 discharges analyzed for the research period and individual hospital surveys 
completed on managed care strategies, a smaller number of hospitals allowed for detailed 
evaluation. 
Market Competition and Hospital Quality Studies 
Melnick and Zwanziger ( 1 988) suggested that further studies look at the effect of 
competition on quality in hospitals. This area was pursued by Shortell and Hughes 
( 1 988) who examined the influence of regulation of hospital rates, state certificate-of­
need programs, competition, and hospital ownership on mortality rates among Medicare 
inpatients in 1 983 and 1 984. Their results indicated no statistically significant 
association between mortality rates among inpatients and the degree of competition, 
represented by the number of hospital s located in the market area. 
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Shortell and Hughes ( 1 988) sought to test the hypothesis that hospitals facing 
severe regulatory constraints and payment controls, operating in highly competitive 
markets, would be particularly prone to lower their technical performance, resulting in 
adverse patient outcomes. Their study also held an underlying assumption that hospitals 
located in states where HMOs have enrolled a higher proportion of the population face 
more pressure to compete with each other for patients on the basis of price. The intended 
study carries a similar hypothesis :  that HMO dominance will stimulate hospital 
competition based on price, and that hospital quality should be examined as a result . 
Methods for Measuring Market Competition 
The method of measurement of market competition is crucial in evaluating the 
behavior of competing hospitals. A common measure in econometric models of hospital 
performance is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHl), defined as the sum of squares of 
market shares, expressed as a percent, held by each firm in an industry. The maximum 
value is 1 0,000 and the minimum approaches zero. The HHl has been considered a good 
measure because it captures the size distribution of firms: larger firms get more weight 
(Folland et aI . ,  1 993). 
Some criticism has also been presented regarding the HHl. White and Chirikos 
( 1 988) reported statistical bias in using the HHl as an exogenous variable in hospital 
regressions, with other demographic and economic hospital characteristics as possible 
confounders. 
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Robinson et al . ( 1 988) measured the number o f  competing hospitals i n  each local 
market according to the latitude and longitude coordinated for each of the country ' s  
nonfederal, short-term general hospitals . Next, a computer algorithm searched for all the 
neighboring institutions within a 24-kilometer (km) radius of the subject hospitals .  
Straight-line distances between hospitals were calculated from latitude and longitude 
coordinates. Markets were defined according to whether they included 0, 1 through 4, 5 
through 1 0, or more than 1 0  neighboring hospitals within a 24-km radius. 
Phibbs and Robinson ( 1 993) further refined the measurement of hospital 
competition in their variable-radius measure of local hospital market structure in 
California. Hospital discharge abstracts from 1 983 were used to measure the radii 
necessary to capture 75 percent and 90 percent of each hospital ' s  admissions. With radii 
used to define each hospital ' s  service area, two measures of local market structure were 
calculated : the number of other hospitals within the radius and a HHl based on the 
distribution of hospital bed shares in the market. 
The calculated radii were used as the dependent variables in regression models, 
with corresponding hospital characteristics as the independent variables. Estimated 
parameters of market radii were then used to predict local market structure for all federal, 
short-term, general hospitals in the continental United States. 
Although the Phibbs-Robinson variable-radius method appears most desirable in 
an extensive hospital market analysis, its 1 983 calculations of hospital competition levels 
were not collected within the time period necessary for the intended research project. 
The intended study utilizes the HHl approach to measuring competition within a 
hospital ' s  market. The HHI is well known and generally accepted in the health care 
industry, it is a relatively straightforward measure, and its data sources are available for 
analysis . Furthermore, the limitations of the HHI wil l  be acknowledged and examined 
within the context of this research design. 
Control Variables: Measuring Hospital Strategic Behaviors 
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In addition to measuring market competition among hospitals, the intended 
research intends to measure hospital behaviors in response to a more demanding 
economic environment. From the organizational standpoint, hospitals have been studied 
in several external transitions: forming alliances, merging into existing systems, or even 
closing. 
Alliance networks were original ly formed to offer hospital members the same 
buying clout available to national health care systems, as well as the opportunity to 
contract on a national level (Larkin, 1 989). These objectives could be considered 
reactive behaviors amidst increased market competition, offering hospitals more cost 
efficiency and contracting control. Alliances studied in the 1 990s, on the other hand, 
have considered changing their method of health care delivery and developing 
community-based, integrated networks (Smith and Trout, 1 992). Some administrators 
have been successful in voluntary collaboration: eliminating duplicative services and 
technologies (Johnsson, 1 99 1 ) . 
One variable in the intended study will identify whether the subject hospitals are 
all iance members, since alliance membership could be considered a control element in 
the structural indicators measured. 
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System membership is also an organizational feature which should be recognized 
in a study of hospital behavior. In a study of multihospital systems (MHS), Alexander 
and Morrisey ( 1 988) developed a model to explain the affiliation patterns of hospitals .  
They assessed the role of a hospital ' s  market, management activity, and mission 
compatibility with the system as predisposing conditions of MHS affiliation. The model 
was tested on a sample of 306 affiliated and 9 1 8  nonaffiliated hospitals under conditions 
of market equilibrium and disequilibrium, and for hospital entry into both non-profit and 
investor-owned multihospital systems. Results on the study factors suggested variable  
impact on MHS entry, according to the hospital ' s  market and the type of system with 
which the hospital affiliated. 
The intended study contains research elements similar to the model from 
Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 988), including variables classifying the subject hospitals as a 
system member, non-profit, or investor-owned. Although market measurements are not 
the same between studies, both analyses seek to characterize the market surrounding the 
hospitals . The main topic under consideration for Alexander and Morrisey, however, is 
what kind of market conditions cause hospitals to affiliate, while the intended study 
compares the structural behavior of system versus non-system hospitals in varying 
competitive markets. 
A survey by Bogue et at. ( 1 995) evaluated the postmerger uses of 60 AHA 
hospitals between 1 983 and 1 988 .  Survey topics included the premerger competition 
between hospitals, competition in their environment, and what happened to the hospitals 
after their merger. Mergers often served to convert acute, inpatient capacity to other 
functions, with less than half of the acquired hospitals continuing acute services after 
merger. Bogue et aI . ( 1 995) concluded that mergers may reflect two general strategies: 
elimination of direct acute competitors or expansion of acute care networks. 
44 
The intended study is primarily directed toward the acute, inpatient capacity and 
staffing of the study hospitals in response to a competitive environment . Hospital 
mergers represent an organizational response not specifically being studied, yet they are a 
common form of hospital reorganization which must be considered in researching 
structural change. 
A well documented hospital response to the managed care payment environment 
is closure. Williams et aI . ( 1 992) investigated hospital closures occurring in 1 985 
through 1 988, after the implementation of Medicare' s  PPS .  They found that a hospital ' s  
financial status and mission or community standing were determinants o f  hospital 
closure. Closed hospitals were much less likely to be publicly owned, but more likely to 
offer fewer facilities and services, and have fewer cases. Competition appeared to affect 
the odds of closure through its effects on the number of cases. Additionally, hospitals in 
areas with small or declining population were more at risk than other hospitals in both 
urban and rural areas. 
The intended research will track the hospitals closed in the study period, in order 
determine whether their loss could introduce bias into the study sample. 
In summary, procompetitive policies from government and other third party 
payors have caused various strategic hospital responses, both internal and external to 
each organization, and stimulated studies in hospital efficiency and quality. Among the 
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analytic challenges are the measures which characterize the hospital ' s  market, as well as 
hospital behavior. 
Hospital Performance Studies in Efficiency 
According to this study's model of organizational structure, poor economic 
performance places pressure on the organization ' s  rulers, the dominant coalition, to 
reorganize (Donaldson, 1 987). Therefore, in addition to environmental factors impacting 
on hospital structure, individual organizational performance should be considered as an 
exogenous factor in a hospital ' s  structural changes. The intended study considers two 
dimensions of performance as instrumental in promoting hospital change strategies :  
financial success and quality care. 
In the evaluation of hospital financial success, the literature provides various 
research concepts and study methods which aid in the development of the current 
proposal . Scott and Shortell ( 1 988), for example, defined efficiency as the ratio of 
outputs to inputs :  the number of products andlor services provided by a given supply of 
resources. Capital, labor, and equipment are three categories of inputs, and they are 
generally measured in dollar value. "Productivity" refers to a special subclass of 
efficiency measures that emphasize outputs as related to labor inputs (Scott and Shortell, 
1 988) .  
The intended study measures productivity with hospital labor inputs as indicators 
of structural change. Additionally, the measurement of cost - per patient day serves to 
represent hospital efficiency in a more comprehensive manner. 
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Gooding and Wagner ( 1 985) defined organizational performance in input-output 
terms in their meta-analysis of 3 1  published field studies. Their purpose was to review 
the relationship between organizational size and performance, with productivity and 
efficiency representing the performance dimension. Productivity measures were defined 
as those measuring absolute output, while efficiency measures involved the calculation of 
a ratio of outputs to inputs. 
Although initial meta-analysis failed to substantiate an overall size-performance 
relationship in the 3 1  studies, Gooding and Wagner ( 1 985) identified three moderating 
variables in subgroup meta-analyses. First, level of analysis differences (organizational 
versus subunit analysis), second, differences in operationalizing the "size" variable 
(employees, log of employees assets, transactions, etc. ), and third, differences in 
operationalizing the "performance" variable (productivity versus efficiency) . 
These measurement moderators served to clarify relationships between 
organizational size and performance. For example, a positive relationship was found 
between organizational size and productivity, but no positive relationship was found 
between organizational size and efficiency, suggesting the absence of net economy of 
scale effects (Gooding and Wagner, 1 985) .  
These findings are significant to the current proposal because they emphasize the 
critical operationalization of organizational structure and performance. Even the 
straightforward construct of organizational size may be considered as multidimensional 
(Kimberly, 1 976). Additionally, organizational and subunit studies have yielded different 
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results, according to the level of analysis employed. The intended study utilizes variables 
for size and performance exclusively at the organizational level. 
In their study of 1 60 hospitals in eight states, Watt et al . ( 1 986) sought to compare 
how hospital operating strategies might affect their relative success in a price-conscious 
market. Their research question was whether significant differences existed between the 
economic performance of investor-owned chain and not-for-profit hospitals . Data were 
obtained from the AHA survey, Medicare cost reports, and Medicare case-mix indexes 
for 1 980. 
This study employed an interesting sampling method by matching 80 investor­
owned chain general hospitals with similar not-for-profit general hospitals. Matches 
were made on the basis of location, scale of operation, services offered, and average 
length of stay. 
Indicators of economic performance in this study included gross inpatient 
charges, total costs for inpatient services, hospital revenues (costs to patients and third­
party payers), productivity in use of personnel and physical assets, charge-to-cost 
markups, and capital-structure financial ratios, such as net fixed assets per adjusted bed. 
Of particular interest to the intended study, Watt et al . (1986) recorded hospital 
efficiency under the category "Use of Personnel and Physical Assets." Measures 
included FTE per adjusted average daily census, salary and benefits per adjusted day, and 
patient care square feet per adjusted bed. 
The intended research similarly utilizes AHA and Medicare data sources, as well 
as measures in FTE utilization and facility cost per adjusted patient day. Watt et al . 
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( 1 986) sampled hospitals from only eight states; however their sample was carefully 
selected to represent 70% of the nation's  for-profit hospitals . The intended study i s  more 
l imited in its definition of successful hospital performance, yet broader in its sampling 
method. 
The measurement of hospital cost per adjusted patient day does not capture some 
important aspects of hospital cost structure, according to Grannemann and Brown ( 1 986). 
In their nationwide study of 867 non-federal, short-term U S .  hospitals, they specified a 
multiple-output cost function, with separate measures of inpatient days and discharges, 
emergency department visits, and outpatient visits. Case-mix measures for both inpatient 
and outpatient care were also deemed important. 
With data from the AHA' s 1 982 Ambulatory Care Survey, supplemented by 
AHA's Annual Survey and the Area Resources File, Granneman and Brown ( 1 986) 
performed basic regression with ordinary least squares analysis for the cost function. 
They recommended separating the cost of a discharge from the cost of a patient day, 
primarily in order to avoid distortions that could arise across hospitals in average length 
of stay. A hospital stay was viewed as ( 1 )  a quantity of medical services associated with 
the admission or discharge (such as lab tests and other ancillary support), plus (2) daily 
services (including routine nursing and hotel services) associated with the time spent in 
the hospital (Grannemann and Brown, 1 986). 
Because of this important distinction, the intended study will include variables for 
cost per adjusted patient day and also average cost per discharge as indicators of hospital 
performance. 
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In studying the financial performance of hospitals, Friedman and Shortell ( 1 988) 
built their cost equation on one dependent variable: patient care expense per adjusted 
admission, divided by the area wage index. Financial performance was measured in two 
ways :  net operating margin before taxes as a portion of patient care revenue, and net 
income margin after estimated federal income taxes as a proportion of total income. 
Beyond the measurement of hospital costs, the hospital industry does not carry a 
standard definition of financial success. Up until 1 987, the literature that covers financial 
performance measures as independent variables generally focuses on hospital failure as a 
relevant outcome (Glandon et al . ,  1 987). Unlike firms in other industries, hospital 
performance is not easily compared through financial ratios. Hospitals experience 
multiple, competing objectives, they often lack the profit goal, they have a clear 
separation of ownership and management of assets, and they have no organized market 
for the equity of the firm (Glandon et aI . ,  1 987). 
Valdmanis ( 1 990) acknowledged difficulty in comparing public and nonprofit 
hospitals from lack of an accurate performance gauge. She applied nonparametric 
analysis to hospital production data, using Farrell ' s  ( 1 957) measure of technical 
efficiency. In Farrell ' s  framework, a firm is considered technically efficient if it is 
operating on the best practice production frontier. The efficiency measure of each 
hospital is  assessed as to what is the minimal input necessary to stil l  produce the given 
output level (Valdmanis, 1 990). 
Data were obtained from the 1 982 AHA Survey of Hospitals, with the sample 
l imited to acute-care general hospitals (of 200 or more beds) located in Michigan 
(metropolitan areas of 500,000 or more) . Outputs were defined as the number of acute 
inpatient days and intensive care unit days, number of surgeries, and number of 
ambulatory plus emergency room visits. Inputs consisted of the number of active and 
associate physicians, number of medical residents, number of FTE nonphysician labor 
and nurses, and capital defined as net plant assets (i .e . ,  capital value after asset 
depreciation) . 
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Findings from Valdmanis '  nonparametric analysis ( 1 990) indicated that sample 
public hospitals were more efficient relative to the sample not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals. 
Upon further investigation, the NFP hospitals appeared to offer more special ized surgical 
services, such as open-heart surgery, requiring more sophisticated labor and capital than 
public hospitals . 
Although the intended study does not use a nonparametric methodology, its 
design is influenced by the inputs and outputs selected in Valmanis' ( 1 990) measures of 
technical efficiency. Specifically, variables representing the professional contingent in a 
hospital are similar to labor inputs, while the number of adjusted patient days and 
discharges could be interpreted as outputs. The intended study includes a measure for 
hospital bedsize; however the bedsize variable is used to indicate change in hospital 
capacity rather than formulate a capital input in an efficiency model . 
Vita ( 1 990) evaluated the behavior of hospital costs, using a translog function and 
data from a sample of 296 short-term, general care hospitals in California. The 
dependent variable was a cost variable, defined as the total operating expenses of the 
hospital. Outputs consisted of medicaVsurgical discharges, obstetric discharges, pediatric 
discharges, outpatient and emergency room discharges, all other discharges, and 
corresponding length-of-stay variables. Payroll data were used to compute five input 
prices :  management and supervisory wage rates, nursing wage rates, non-physician 
medical practitioners and technicians wage rates, auxiliary personnel wage rates, wage 
rates for all other personnel, and the number of beds (a fixed input) . Control variables 
included an index of casemix complexity, as well as indicators for system membership 
and for-profit/not for profit organization. 
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Vita ( 1 990) found that the translog function was useful for assessing the degree of 
overall scale economies at the sample mean. The "overall scale economies" refer to the 
proportional increase in all outputs that would result from a proportional increase in all 
inputs. Vita ( 1 990) was testing a cost function for determining optimal size in hospitals. 
The intended research utilizes similar concepts in cost and outputs, however there is no 
emphasis on detailed price inputs or scale economies. 
The intended study will consider hospital financial performance, in the form of 
cost, as both an exogenous variable and an endogenous variable, for the purpose of 
tracing the relationship between hospital performance and structural change. 
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) sought to examine the l inkage between executive 
strategies and hospital performance amid 1 025 U.S .  hospitals in large urban areas in 
1 988 .  With the idea that competitive forces are shaping the management strategies in the 
health care industry, they compared and contrasted performance indicators of a large 
group of successful versus unsuccessful hospitals. Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) found 
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that cost control was the most important factor influencing financial performance. Other 
factors of importance included market share, diversification, and financing policy. 
The data were obtained from the Healthcare Financial Management Association' s 
(HFMA) Medicare Cost Report, which provided information on virtually every U .S .  
hospital operating i n  a large urban area during 1 988 .  To  summarize the analysis, a high-
performance group and a low-performance group of hospitals were identified, and their 
composite financial average financial ratios were compared. Next, a multiple regression 
equation was fitted to the entire data set of 1 025 hospitals, using Return On Asset 
Investment (ROI) as the dependent variable, and other strategy variables as the 
independent variables. 
Cleverley and Harvey' s  ( 1 992b) definitions of market share and successful 
performance hold particular significance in formulating the intended hospital study. 
Primarily, market share was defined as the percentage of total net patient revenue, both 
inpatient and outpatient, to total net patient revenue in the county in which the hospital 
was located. This method of measuring market share appears to be a step toward 
calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, an indicator of market competition, 
assuming that one could substitute hospital beds for net patient revenue in determining 
percentages. Secondly, Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) used a financial criterion for 
defining a successful hospital. Return on Asset Investment (ROI), the hospital 
performance measure, was defined as follows : 
Net Income + Interest 
Total Assets 
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Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b) found cost control to be highly influential in 
hospital financial performance, and they named four strategies that seemed particularly 
effective in improving hospital ROI : relatively low length of patient stay, often achieved 
through physician profiling, high labor productivity, represented by FTEs per adjusted 
patient day, overhead cost control, and high capital expense ratios, possibly due to labor­
saving equipment. 
The intended study, influenced in many respects by Cleverley and Harvey 
( 1 992b), defines successful hospital performance as cost control and examines the 
strategies of length of stay and labor productivity. The intended research in hospital 
competition, structural change, and hospital performance shares other issues with 
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992b), such as hospital diversification, or service scope, and 
patient selection, or case-mix. 
Molinari et al . ( 1 993) studied the relationships between "insider" board 
participation and hospital viability. In their research, financial ratio analysis was chosen 
for measuring hospital financial performance. Major dimensions of performance included 
hospital operating margin, net income to patient revenues, return on total assets, hospital 
occupancy rate, and net plant, property, and equipment per bed. "Insiders" were defined 
as medical staff members or the CEO of each hospital. Relationships were studied cross­
sectionally. Measures included the presence or absence of insiders on the board, and 
financial viability (with controls for the organizational factors of system affiliation, 
ownership, size, region, and corporate restructuring). Through multiple regression 
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analysis, the authors found significant relationships between insider participation and all 
outcomes, with the exception of occupancy rate. 
Molinari et al . ( 1 993) set out to compare the theories of agency and 
managerialism in hospital governance, which is clearly distinguished from the intended 
research; however, their use of financial performance measures and their study design 
provide a standard for further empirical evaluation of organizational structure in 
hospitals . 
The major data sources for Molinari et aI . ( 1 993) consisted of the California 
Health Facilities Commission Financial Disclosure data set and the AHA governance 
survey, a total of 1 90 respondents out of 426 short-term general non-Kaiser hospitals . 
Results were limited in generalizability to the state of California. The intended research 
samples a much broader national spectrum of hospitals, lending strength to the 
generalizabil ity of its results. 
Wan ( 1 995) utilized linear structural relations (LISREL) to analyze the 
relationships between hospital efficiency, hospital financial viability, and hospital 
characteristics, such as bed size, staff mix, HCFA case-mix index, and number of hospital 
competitors. The sample consisted of 85 short-term acute care hospitals in Virginia. In 
this study, data were drawn from the AHA' s 1 986 and 1 987 files, the Federal Register, 
and the 1 987 Health Services Cost Review Council .  
Wan ( 1 995) defined hospital efficiency as  the cost of  inputs used in production of 
outputs, a concept closely related to productivity. "When a procedure minimizes the cost 
for producing a specific output, efficiency is  achieved (Wan, 1 995) ." In his study, Wan 
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further delineated three efficiency variables: cost efficiency, represented by average cost 
per patient discharge, process efficiency, measured by average length of stay (ALOS), 
and technical efficiency, calculated through data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA 
calculation was made using a relative ratio of patient care outputs to labor inputs. 
Wan ( 1 995) found that hospital efficiency was linked to hospital size, severity of 
patient treated, and metropolitan size. Hospitals with a large bed size, with more severe 
patients in special units, located in large metropolitan areas, tended to be less efficient . 
Although the sample size was limited, the study emphasized the importance in contextual 
factors, such as market forces and population size, as organizational factors affecting 
variation in hospital performance. The intended study has adopted a similar focus on the 
determinants of hospital structure, with resultant hospital efficiency. 
To summarize this collection of hospital performance studies, financial success 
may be considered a result of strategic behaviors exhibited by individual hospitals in 
response to their environment, market conditions, and control features. The intended 
study seeks to evaluate hospital financial performance at two different times, in order to 
test the influence which past financial performance has upon hospital structural strategies. 
Variables including operating costs, labor inputs, and bedsize indicate the resources 
dedicated to patient stays, presenting a cost view of efficiency in the measurement of 
successful hospital performance. 
Hospital Performance in Quality 
In addition to cost containment, data on patient outcomes have increasingly been 
considered in judging hospital performance. This trend, coupled with the move toward 
more capitated arrangements, places greater emphasis on providers ' efficiency and 
outcomes (Baskin and Shortell, 1 995). The literature provides many insights into 
defining and measuring hospital quality; however the analysis of quality in health care 
continues to present substantial methodological challenges. 
Scott and Shortell ( 1 988) viewed hospital quality as individual institutional 
effectiveness in the provision of health services in the short run. Although the type and 
amount of health services provided to the patient were also seen as important for long­
term health, the manager and the institution were judged to have little control over these 
factors. After reviewing several studies on tradeoffs between efficiency and 
effectiveness, Scott and Shortell ( 1 988) concluded that a higher quality of care, on the 
average, is  not associated with higher costs, although the cost/quality relationship may 
differ for specific situations. 
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Donabedian ( 1 966) categorized indicators of quality care into three groups :  
structure, process, and outcome. Structural indicators refer to  the characteristics of  
providers, their tools and resources, and the physical and organizational setting in which 
they work. Process indicators refer to the set of activities that go on between the 
providers and the patient, such as patient histories or physical exams. Outcomes indicate 
the changes in a patient' s health status that can be attributed to receiving health care, such 
as postsurgical infections, death, and satisfaction with the care process itself 
Various studies have associated hospital characteristics with quality outcomes. In 
relating hospital quality to teaching status, Flood and Scott ( 1 978) reported no or mixed 
evidence that teaching status was associated with lower mortality. Flood et al. ( 1 984b) 
also found strong and consistent support between volume of cases treated and lower 
mortality for a variety of surgical and medical patient types. 
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Further developing the question of volume and quality, Kelly and Hell inger 
( 1 985) studied four surgical procedures in 373 nonfederal hospitals in 1 977.  They tested 
whether individual surgeon volume or hospital volume was more closely associated with 
better outcomes. They concluded that the relationship between volume and mortality is 
held at the institutional level, supporting the argument that organizational factors, not 
physician factors, are involved. 
In their study of a single special procedure, Freeland et al . ( 1 987) observed that 
selective contracting in local areas can potentially decrease duplication of services, 
reduce cost to purchasers, and lower expected mortality and morbidity for some patient 
groups. However, the argument can be made that these gains must be evaluated against 
reductions in continuity of care and access to care. They collected data from 3 7  
California hospitals that performed coronary artery by-pass graft surgery (CABG). They 
found that in the study region, 1 9/3 7, or half, of the hospitals had an annual volume of 
less than 1 50 CABG operations per year. 
In relating the qualifications of physicians and quality of hospital care, Rhee 
( 1 977) analyzed data from 454 physicians and their 2500 patients in 22 short-term 
general hospitals, utilizing the Physician Performance Index to measure quality in the 
physician process. He found that hospitals, variable in their degree of structured control 
over practice, were more predictive of quality than were the physicians' qualifications. 
In support of these results, Flood et al . ( 1 982) analyzed data on 500 surgeons treating 
8000 patients in 15 hospitals and utilized adjusted measures of morbidity at seven days 
following surgery and mortality at forty days following surgery for quality care 
indicators. They found no relation between physicians' qualifications and quality 
outcomes. 
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Quality in nursing care was investigated by Wan and Shukla ( 1 987), who studied 
60 community hospitals in 1 98 1 .  They utilized hospital incident rates (reports 
concerning errors in medication, intravenous line administration, patient falls and 
injuries, inappropriate diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, etc .) as indicators for 
hospital quality. Independent variables were contextual factors, such as poverty level, 
education level, and age of the patients; and organizational characteristics, such as size, 
efficiency of support systems, nursing staff skill mix, staffing levels, case-mix index, and 
patient acuity index. Multiple regression analysis was performed for each type of incident 
rate, using the contextual and organizational variables as explanatory factors. Data was 
collected from the Health Area Resources File, hospital surveys, and the Federal 
Register. 
Wan and Shukla ( 1 987) observed that contextual variables are attributes of the 
hospital ' s  region and community, which vary by location, and are largely beyond the 
hospital ' s  control. Organizational variables were further classified into structural and 
design variables. Structural variables, such as type of hospital, number of beds, and case 
mix, were viewed as relatively outside the control of operational managers. Design 
variables, such as nursing structure, staffing patterns, and management systems, were 
seen as individual hospital developments and well within operational control . 
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The most notable findings from Wan and Shukla ( 1 987) were threefold. First, 
hospitals located in areas with high bed/population ratios had significantly lower rates of 
medication errors, suggesting that competitive forces have a positive effect on quality of 
care. Second, hospitals located in areas where a higher percentage of the population was 
over 65 years old had significantly higher rates of patient falls and patient injuries .  Third, 
and perhaps most striking, is that nursing skill mix (registered nurse hours and licensed 
practical nurse hours per patient day), nursing model, and nursing resource consumption 
were not significantly related to any of the incident rates. The conclusion was that 
nursing competence is more important than nursing staff skill mix in affecting the quality 
of nursing care. 
The intended study incorporates several predictor variables from Wan and Shukla 
( 1 987), including the factors of hospital competition, hospital size, case-mix index, and 
nursing staff ratios. The intended study gathers data from a broad institutional base, but 
does not offer measures calculated from separate survey, such as patient acuity level, 
nursing hours per patient day, or support system efficiency. The most prominent 
difference between Wan and Shukla' s study ( 1 987) and the intended research is their 
choice of hospital incidence rates versus the mortality measures to indicate hospital 
quality. Both measures have inherent weaknesses for the purpose of gauging institutional 
performance, yet neither should be rejected without acceptable substitutes. 
Keeler et aI . ( 1 992) employed three sets of criteria fOT comparing quality in 
hospitals :  explicit criteria, implicit review, and sickness-adjusted outcomes (mortality 
within 30 days of admission). A total of 1 4,008 elderly patients with one of five diseases 
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(congestive heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, stroke, or hip fracture) 
were randomly sampled from 297 hospitals in five states. Two time periods were used 
for sampling: 1 98 1  to 1 982 and 1 985 to 1986. Hospital types were defined according to 
the structural characteristics of size, ownership, urban or rural setting, state, size of 
training programs, city-county hospitals, and proportion of Medicaid and Medicare 
patients seen. 
Explicit criteria for measuring hospital quality were developed from process 
measures, reviewed by experts and developed into five process scales: physician 
cognitive diagnostic, nurse cognitive diagnostic, technical diagnostic, technical 
therapeutic, and monitoring with the intensive care unit or telemetry. The five scales 
were then combined into one explicit process scale. A stratified random sample of 1 0% 
of the included medical records were selected to undergo implicit review, which was 
reweighted to match the explicit review sample in demographic and hospital 
characteristics. Five physician reviewers were trained in review and they used a 
structured form to rate medical records. 
With the aid of a computerized recursive partitioning algorithm, hospital quality 
regression trees were constructed to analyze the data. Results consisted of comparisons 
across measures of quality care, as well as measures across types of hospitals .  For 
virtually all 19 l isted hospital characteristics, there was agreement among the three 
measures of quality. Poor explicit and implicit process was consistently associated with 
excess mortality. In terms of hospital type, hospitals in bigger cities and certain states 
showed better average quality. Better quality was also associated with more teaching, 
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private ownership, and bigger hospitals. Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals were reported 
to provide similar quality. 
The importance of this study is its ability to link clinically detailed data on 
process and outcomes, with remarkable consistency across hospital categories (Keeler et 
aI . ,  1 992). The results clearly lend validity to the researchers' formulation of hospital 
"excess mortality," that is, the difference between their predicted mortality rate and the 
observed mortality at each hospital . The intended study utilizes HCF A data of predicted 
and observed hospital mortality in order to establish its performance measure of quality. 
The relationship between hospital cost and quality has been explored, with 
inconsistent results (Fleming, 1 990). Burstin et al. ( 1 993) studied the link between 
hospital financial characteristics, patient payer mix, and the incidence of negligent 
medical injuries. They performed a retrospective medical record review of 30, 195  
records in 5 1  acute care hospitals i n  New York in  1 984. Negligence was reported a s  the 
percentage of adverse events due to negligence, thereby using adverse events as a control 
for the intensity of patient care. Adverse events were interpreted as injuries caused by 
medical management, as opposed to the underlying disease process. 
Hospital financial information was obtained from 1 984 cost reports, and hospital 
operating information was collected from the 1 985 AHA Guide to the Health Care Field. 
Financial data were presented per discharge. Hospitals were grouped into quartiles 
according to inpatient operating costs per hospital discharge. Through regression 
analysis, it was found that the likelihood of negligent medical injury was highest in those 
hospitals with the lowest inpatient operating costs per hospital discharge. Further 
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analysis indicated that financially distressed hospitals (those with fund balances or assets 
in the lowest quartile) had a higher mean negligence rate than the other hospitals . 
In measuring hospital negligent medical injuries, the study by Burstin et ai . ( 1 993)  
incorporated an interesting measure for hospital quality, avoiding bias from patient risk 
factors. Record review for over 30,000 patients was thorough, yet sampling from acute 
care hospitals in New York State in 1 984 places definite limitations on the 
generalizability of results . The variable for hospital financial performance, inpatient 
operating costs per discharge, is utilized in the intended study, as well as several 
multivariate methods selected to analyze hospital data. 
Harkey and Vraciu ( 1 992) investigated the link between hospital profitabil ity 
(defined as net operating income divided by net operating revenues) and quality 
(perceptions of quality by patients, physicians, community residents, and employees) . 
They analyzed the financial data for 82 small and medium-sized hospitals in 2 1  states. 
Factor analysis was used to identify a broad quality factor as an independent variable, 
which was then related to hospital operating margin in regression equations. 
In the quality factor analysis, variables that loaded on the quality factor included 
items from the patient, employee, and physician surveys, suggesting that all three 
perspectives shared similar definitions of quality. In the regression analysis, significant 
predictors were the quality factor, percent Medicare and percent managed care, together 
accounting for 29 percent of variance in operating margin. Other environmental and 
reimbursement-linked variables were tested but did not prove significant : population size, 
hospital bed size, population income, and competitive environment . 
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Although Harkey and Vraciu ( 1 992) focused on hospital profitability and the 
intended study measures hospital cost versus quality, the inclusion of an independent 
reimbursement variable appears to be appropriate for both models. The literature clearly 
suggests that percent Medicare volume is as important as HMO penetration data in the 
influence of hospital structure and performance. 
Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992a) studied a small sample of eight HCFA high­
mortality hospitals and found that these "poor quality" hospitals were also less profitable .  
In testing the association between quality and profitability, two measures of profitabi l ity 
were used : operating margin and return on total assets. All eight hospitals had operating 
margins that were lower than the median value for their regionlbedsize peergroup . 
Carrying their analysis one step further in economic investigation, the authors 
found that poor quality hospitals had prices and costs-per-discharge which were lower 
than the norm. On the other hand, their occupancy rates were comparatively high, 
defying the hypothesis that only high -perceived quality will generate greater patient 
demand and subsequent increased volume. 
The study reported by Cleverley and Harvey ( 1 992a) spurred Levitt ( 1 994) to 
explore the relationship between hospital investment in property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE) and quality of patient care. In Levitt' s  research, quality was measured by hospital­
specific confirmed failure rates from Peer Review Organization (PRO) Generic Quality 
Screens (GQS), including 26 screens of medical care. 
The advantage to measuring cash investment in PPE is that hospital cash flows 
are evaluated over multiple years, providing a robust measure of financial activity (Kane, 
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1 99 1 ) . Financial variables were taken from the Massachusetts hospitals audited financial 
statements spanning fiscal years 1 984 through 1 989. Hospital-specific GQS confirmed 
failure rates were calculated from the Massachusetts PRO "review abstracts" of patients 
discharged between 1 April 1 989 and 30 September 1 990, including 65,523 reviews at 87  
hospitals . 
Multivariate models were used to test for possible confounders, such as 
Herfindahl index, Medicare and Medicaid payer mix, case-mix severity, bed size, 
occupancy, and teaching hospital status. For comparison, hospitals were divided into two 
groups: those with higher versus those with lower median confirmed fai lure rates. Next, 
multivariate analyses were performed, using weighted least squares regression models .  
Results indicated that those hospitals that invested more money per bed over the six-year 
period had lower confirmed failure rates. 
The intended study is similarly concerned with cost and quality, although 
different measures are used. The intended study also attempts to capture hospital 
performance over a period longer than one year, although a six-year financial measure is 
not available, and emphasis is generally on hospital labor costs rather than capital 
investment. 
In conclusion, ample literature is  available in the topics of managed care 
penetration, health care market competition and hospital performance. Past research has 
l inked these concepts with some success, generally limited to specific timeframes 
(immediately post-PPS, for example) and regions (California, Massachusetts). The 
intended study is  designed to build on prior techniques and discoveries and investigate 
the association between economic context, structural change and performance in 
American hospitals. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Introduction 
This chapter provides more detail to the theoretical framework of the study, 
beginning with contingency theory in general and describing Donaldson' s  SARFIT 
(Strategic Adjustment to Regain Fit) model. The theoretical dimensions of environment, 
fit, and structure are discussed in relation to the study model; and hypotheses relating 
these constructs are introduced. In further hypotheses, hospital performance is related to 
the organization ' s  environment as well as its ability to change. 
This research effort is based on previous works in contingency theory, directed 
toward the relationships between environment, organizational structure, and 
organizational performance. Thompson ( 1 967) proposed that the organization is shaped 
by the environment. This foundational concept has been further developed into the 
following observation: the environment of each organization poses a particular challenge 
to that organization, which in tum must determine a response. The organization can be 
seen as dependent upon the environment to surVive or grow (Donaldson, 1 995) .  
This  expanded concept of dependency is consistent with Scott ' s  open systems 
perspective. Scott ( 1 992) stresses that "reciprocal ties . . .  bind and relate the organization 
with those elements that surround and penetrate it ( 1 992, p.93) ." Buckley ( 1 967) further 
defines an open system as one where environmental interchange is an essential and 
underlying factor to system viability. 
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Donaldson ( 1 995) considers three mechanisms by which the organization deals 
with its environment. The first method is for the organization to be an effective 
competitor through superior organizational performance. The second method is to 
influence the environment through co-opting powerful environmental organizations. The 
third method is to alter the environment through merger between organizations. This 
research project focuses on the first mechanism, taking into account the internal structure 
of the subject organization and its success in framing superior performance. 
Organizational research in environmental selection does not typically study the 
fai lure of an entire organization. Rather, organizations often adapt to their environments 
by means of structural or behavioral modifications. Organizational change must 
therefore be examined for selection at the population level (between competing firms), 
and also at the organizational level (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1 976) . 
The main prevailing theories of structural change are contingency determinism 
and strategic choice (Donaldson, 1 987). In contingency determinism (Figure 5), a 
specific change in contingency promptly leads to structural change in the organization. 
As an example, Blau ( 1 970) generalized that increased organizational size generates 
structural differentiation, resulting in greater sized administrative components for 
coordination. Burns and Stalker ( 1 96 1 ), Chandler ( 1 962), Woodward ( 1 965), and 
Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967) are other prominent contingency theorists in organization 
structure. 
Figure 5. Contingency Determinism 
(source: Donaldson, 1 967, p .274) . 
Contingency 
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The strategic choice model, associated with Child ( 1 972), also portrays the 
organization in its attempt to match structure with contingency; except with added 
complexity. Child introduces the concept of political process within the organization, 
whereby the "dominant coalition" re-establishes structural forms, but also manipulates 
environmental features in order to achieve fit . 
To improve upon these contingency approaches to organization structure, 
Donaldson ( 1 987) presents a model based on structural-functional theory. This type of 
theory assumes that a state of equilibrium is disturbed by an exogenous force, leading to 
disequilibria, ineffectiveness, and eventual restitution through the adoption of a different 
structure. Donaldson' s  SARFIT model, or structural adjustment to regain fit ( 1 987), 
properly validated, is offered as a refinement of the contingency idea and a more accurate 
model of structural functional logic. In contrast to contingency determinism, the 
S ARFIT model is a more elongated set of processes which occur over time. 
The conceptualization of variables in contingency theory has been criticized. For 
example, analysts say that the theoretical concepts are not clear (Tosi and Slocum, 
1 984). Furthermore, the relationships between concepts are not seen as adequately 
specified (Schoonhoven, 1 98 1 ). Tosi and Slocum ( 1 984) name three key dimensions that 
must be sharpened in order to discover empirical relationships in contingency : 
effectiveness, environment, and congruency. The intended research seeks to clarify these 
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dimensions through the use of the SARFIT model. SARFIT has addressed contingency 
theory weaknesses in conceptual clarification and specification. 
Under SARFIT (Figure 6), the need for structural change in the organization 
arises from the substandard performance, coming from a mismatch between structure and 
contingency. "Mismatch" is further defined as the misfit between the new value of the 
contingency variable and the old structure (Donaldson, 1 987). Mismatch produces a 
range of dysfunctional behaviors in the organization, leading to low economic 
performance. Poor performance places pressure on organizational leaders (the dominant 
coalition) to reorganize. However, low performance only leads to structural change if the 
environment is adverse, or "ill iberal" (Child, 1 972). 
Figure 6. Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit (SARFIT) General Model. (Source: 
Donaldson, 1 987, p.4). 
+ I Misfit I Structural ---. <III Adjustment 
1-
/ Environmental 
I Perfonnance <III Illiberality 
In comparison to the SARFIT model, the intended study model incorporates the 
concepts of contingency and organizational performance as precursors to organizational 
change. According to the intended study, the arrival of the managed care era was a 
tremendous change in contingency to community hospitals .  Unlike Donaldson' s  
SARFIT example, however, structural misfits are not directly identified among the 
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subject units. In the intended study, substandard hospital performance is presumed to be 
a consequence of poor fit with the managed care contingency. Performance is measured 
and related to structural adjustments made by each hospital at a later point in time. 
Measures for managed care infiltration and past hospital performance therefore 
assume the role of major independent variables; and changes in hospital structure are 
dependent variables. To account for SARFIT's condition of environmental illiberality, a 
variable for market competition is included as a possible moderator to one or both of the 
independent variables. 
Theoretical Dimensions 
Environment 
The studies of Burns and Stalker ( 1 96 1 )  and Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1 967) 
analyzed how the characteristics of market and technological environments affected the 
internal structure of an organization. Later research described environmental factors in 
more general terms, such as certainty -or complexity; without reference to specific sector 
source, such as the market or the government (Tosi and Slocum, 1 984). 
Tosi and Slocum ( 1 984), seeking to frame the environment in a more precise way, 
specify environmental sectors as (a) users of output, (b) input sources, and (c) external 
regulators. Examples are customers, capital sources, raw product supplies, and 
technology and science. 
In health care organizational research, the focus has often been on how 
organizations react to a complex and uncertain regulatory environment, or to a new 
competitive environment. The environment is perceived as a force which restricts the 
range of organizational action (Kimberly and Zajac, 1 985) .  
More recently, researchers have suggested perspectives which reach beyond 
traditional structural contingency theory. For example, the firm has been interpreted to 
adapt its environment to the organization, rather than make internal structural changes 
(Child, 1 972). Or an adaptive firm has been interpreted as reactive to its individual 
model of the environment, a perceptual bias which is not necessarily appropriate for 
successful adaptation. Other relatively new theoretical approaches in structural 
contingency include the change in organizational boundaries to gain environmental 
control, and the interactive environmental dimensions of uncertainty and resource 
dependence (Grandori, 1 987). 
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This study is based on Child ' s  ( 1 972) argument for the environment, which states 
that the maintenance of organizations depends upon some degree of exchange with 
outside parties. Three environmental conditions are highlighted as important: ( I )  
environmental variability, o r  the degree o f  change which characterizes environmental 
activities relative to an organization 's  operations, (2) environmental complexity, referring 
to the range of environmental activities relevant to an organization' s operations, and, (3) 
environmental illiberality, or the degree ofthreat that is imposed by external competition, 
hostil ity, or even indifference. 
Although Child ( 1 972) recognizes that environmental conditions can be regarded 
as a source of variation in organizational structure, he also considers strategic and 
political factors, whereby organizational decision-makers may define the product, 
geographic location, organizational boundaries, customers, and other environmental 
l imits to organizational operations. There is a proposed link between the decision­
makers ' evaluation of the organization 's  position in the environment and the action they 
take regarding internal structure. 
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In the intended research model (Figure 7), the environmental contingency is  
represented by the infiltration of HMO insurance plans into the revenue streams of the 
community hospitals under study. A growth in managed care plans indicates an increase 
in environmental uncertainty for individual hospitals. Community hospitals in 1 986 were 
facing a new paradigm in managing care, including capitated reimbursement methods, 
preventive medicine, patient education, and other efforts to reduce hospitalization for 
enrolled populations. 
The intended study model includes a variable for market competition as an 
element of the hospital ' s  managed care environment. With reference to environmental 
i l l iberality in the SARFIT model, hospitals also encountered some degree of stringent 
business conditions in maintaining their occupancy rates. This situation is indicative of 
competitiveness (Williamson, 1 970). Thus, market competition plays a role in 
moderating the effect of each hospital' s  perfomiance variable. Low performance is 
predicted to lead to structural change, only if the environment is competitive. 
One may note that the SARFIT model is a loop of events: once a misfit has been 
detected and resources found to be scarce, correction in organizational structure i s  
predicted, with additional changes made until performance improves. The design for the 
intended study demonstrates the cyclical nature of the original model, and further 
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analysis could measure structural and performance variables over numerous time periods 
for the subject organizations. 
Figure 7. Study Model Describing Hospital Structural Responses to Managed Care 
Penetration and Their Effects on Hospital Performance. 
Hospital Control Characteristics 
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Fit 
Fit, or congruency, between the environment and the organization, is a basic 
theme in most contingency studies. Improving congruency between the environment and 
the organization is proposed to improve effectiveness (Tosi and Slocum, 1 984; Yasai­
Ardekani and Nystrom, 1 996). Sophisticated theories of natural selection predict that 
when firms operate in highly competitive markets in which large numbers of firms are 
dependent on the same scarce resources, organizational structures that fit the environment 
will outperform less fit forms (Grandori, 1 987). 
Donaldson' s application of the SARFIT model ( 1 987) defines organizational 
strategy as the theoretical contingency which acts upon organizational structure. Product 
diversification is the strategy selected for measurement and analysis of fit with four levels 
of structural decentralization: functional, functional with subsidiaries, product divisional, 
and holding company. A simple matrix arrangement of various categories allows a 
c1earcut decision of "match" or "mismatch" based on literature from Chandler ( 1 962), 
Mintzberg ( 1 979), and others. 
The intended study will adopt its analysis of fit from Drazin and Van de Ven 
( 1 985) ,  who associate good organizational performance with good structural fit. They 
present three different conceptual approaches to fit : the selection, interaction, and 
systems approaches. Depending on the approach, each concept refines the meaning of 
contingency theory and the expected empirical results (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1 985) .  
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In the first approach, the selection approach, basic fit is presumed to be a 
congruence between context and structure, and is represented by correlation or regression 
between singular variables. 
The second approach to fit, the interaction method, considers interactions between 
pairs of context-structure factors, and predicts that such interactions will affect 
organizational performance. Residual analysis of context-structure relationships 
indicates organizational fit, and deviations from this fit indicate low performance. 
The third approach to fit is the systems approach, which seeks to avoid the other 
methods' reductionism of organizational factors. Advocates argue that only by 
simultaneously addressing many contingencies, structural alternatives, and performance 
criteria can researchers holistically understand organizational design (Drazin and Van de 
Ven, 1 985) .  Systems analysis focuses on differences in pattern profiles, which account 
for several variables at one time. Analysis of variance, multiple analysis of variance, 
formulation of ideal unit values, and correlation of unit distance scores with associated 
unit performance values constitute a few methods for testing fit in the systems approach. 
The intended study will utilize the selection approach for determining fit between 
the managed care environment and existing hospital structures. 
Structure 
Three integral elements of hospital structure were selected for the study: 
professionalism, service scope, and inpatient capacity. All three dimensions are 
important to the hospital ' s  core competencies, and they are fundamentally connected with 
resource utilization in the hospital ' s  production function. These dimensions act as 
benchmarks in tracking hospital change and adaptation to a managed care environment .  
Galbraith ( 1 973) incorporated several dimensions of structure in his  contingency 
theory on organizing for effectiveness: ( 1 )  rules and programs, or standardization, (2) 
hierarchical referral, or centralization of decision making, (3) professionalization, (4) 
creation of slack resources, (5) creation of self-contained tasks, (6) creation of vertical 
information systems, and (7) creation of lateral relations. 
In regard to professionalization, Galbraith suggested that organizations, in an 
effort to control behavior in job-related situations, select responsible workers who have 
the appropriate education, skills and attitudes. As a consequence, the work force will 
make task-relevant decisions without sacrificing control over outcome quality. 
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In a study of acute care hospital operating room suites, Schoonhoven ( 1 98 1 )  
found that greater specificity in Galbraith' s contingency arguments allowed for stronger 
empirical support in relating uncertainty to professionalization. In Schoonhoven' s study, 
. uncertainty was measured by variation in operating room schedules. Professionalization 
was measured by the initial level of training (B .S .  degree and R.N. ratio), and current 
professional activities, such as membership in professional organizations and journals 
read. 
One major structural dimension of the intended study is professionalization within 
the subject hospitals. Under economic pressure from a managed care environment and 
directed toward greater efficiency, poor performing hospitals are predicted to change 
their professional mix to suit the new conditions. 
In the intended study, the dimension of professionalism summarizes the number 
of salaried physicians, dentists and nurses comprising the hospital personnel base. The 
purpose of evaluating the constituency of the core hospital staff is to detect any shifts in 
the professional framework over the study period. A measure for total FTEs indicates 
whether hospitals are indeed "downsizing" their staff elements. It is imperative to 
determine if hospitals are changing their human resource base, a major organizational 
input, in response to the demands of the managed care environment . 
S ignifying structural change, hospitals could possibly have employed more 
physicians to help control independent practitioners ' utilization of hospital services. 
Physicians have been estimated to control up to eighty cents of the national health care 
dollar by specifying hospital services, diagnostic procedures, drugs, and therapies. 
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The study' S  professional dimension also includes measures for RNs, LPNs, and 
RN/(RN+LPN) ratios, as indicators for any professional downsizing or substitutions that 
take place in bedside patient care. In Fesponse to managed care incentives, RN' s, or 
registered nurses could have been cut from hospital staffs or replaced by nursing 
assistants (Lumsdon, 1 995). 
HI : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or 
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, wil l  increase their 
number of salaried physicians and decrease their number of registered nurses. 
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The second structural dimension in the study, change in services, relates to the 
abil ity of organizations to change their boundaries. In the case of hospitals, the transition 
is  predicted to move from the acute-care, inpatient settings to outpatient visits and 
ambulatory services associated with preventive care. 
The dimension of service change reflects specific programs in health promotion 
which may have been undertaken by hospitals in order to attract managed care business. 
Promotion of outpatient services signifies the hospitals '  ability to change its structure, 
specifically in providing outpatient visits, outpatient surgeries, patient education, fitness 
promotion, women' s  health programs, occupational health, and geriatric screening 
programs. This change in service scope indicates yet another aspect of the hospital ' s  
adaptation toward organizational survival. 
H2: Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or 
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their 
ambulatory, preventive, and screening services. 
The third structural dimension in this study, hospital inpatient capacity, i s  related 
to the concepts of organizational size and the management of slack resources. Hospital 
inpatient capacity was widely publicized in the 1 980s as the number of inpatient days 
steadily decreased in the United States. In terms of plant size, the average community 
hospital simply maintains fewer beds than it did prior to the implementation of the 
Medicare Prospective Payment system and other reimbursement changes. Hospital 
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bedsize, occupancy rate, and case-mix have been reliable indicators of hospital workload 
and throughput. These study measures can quantify the downsizing, or reduction in acute 
care capacity, undertaken by the subject hospitals. 
H3 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or 
operating in a more pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their 
inpatient capacity. 
Hospital Performance Measures 
The intended study model (Figure 7) includes two performance dimensions: one 
as a stimulus to structural variation, and another as a result of structure. According to 
Child ( 1 972), a theory of organizational structure has to take account of performance, 
with performance treated as an input as well as an outcome. In other words, structural 
variables would depend upon decisions made with reference to some standard of required 
performance, as well as some prediction of how structural change will affect performance 
levels .  
To measure organizational performance in contingency theory, researchers often 
use the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1 978) define 
effectiveness as an organization 's  ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions. Tosi 
and Slocum ( 1 984) offer three dimensions, or outcomes, that have been used to measure 
effectiveness :  efficiency, referring to the way in which resources are arranged to produce 
a unit of output, some outcome preference of organizational membership such as job 
satisfaction or pay, and some general, social ly responsible outcome. Tosi and Slocum 
suggest that managers and researchers exercise their values in selecting desirable 
outcomes, and that effectiveness in one area may involve a tradeoff somewhere else. 
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In this study, the theoretical construct of hospital performance is initially 
represented by dual dimensions of facility efficiency and quality. The efficiency 
dimension stems from various studies in financial performance of health care institutions 
(Cohen and Dubay, 1 990; Friedman and Shortell, 1 988; Manheim et aI . ,  1 989). 
Efficiency is defined here as a productivity ratio, with facil ity expenses divided by patient 
output. Two ratio measures are taken: the facility-wide expenses divided by adjusted 
patient days, and the facil ity expenses divided by the number of adjusted inpatient 
discharges. 
Measures of quality are seen as helpful in formulating a balanced profile of 
hospital performance. With managed care becoming a prominent influence on hospital 
systems, evaluation of outcomes encourages external review, accountability and 
continuous improvement in hospitals (Shortell et al., 1 995) .  In the interest of analyzing 
available, hospital-level quality data, each unit ' s  adjusted mortality rate is  collected for 
performance evaluation. 
Hospital Performance as a Result of Structural Change 
Miller and Friesen ( 1 984) suggest that organizations are complex entities, where 
elements of structure, strategy and environment have a natural tendency to coalesce. The 
connection between structural change and performance in hospitals is  therefore an 
appropriate and necessary focus of study. When sales growth and profitabil ity (return on 
equity) were used as performance measures for a sample of 89 Canadian and Australian 
firms, more successful firms changed structural variables in a dramatic, rather than 
incremental, way (Miller and Friesen, 1 984). 
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The study approach by Miller and Friesen i s  particularly successful i n  focusing on 
relationship clusters, because organizational change is evaluated over time (Kimberly and 
Zajac, 1 985) .  The intended study intends to create a similar effect by incorporating 
variables of change over a period of five years. 
Child ( 1 972) raises two questions for a theory in organizational structure. 
Primarily, he asks how performance standards and their achievement may act as a 
stimulus to structural variation. Secondly, he considers how that structural variation will 
affect later performance levels. In the second case, Child suggests that organizational 
decision-makers do believe that structural design has some consequences for 
performance. Child also names other strategic possibilities, such as choice of 
environment, choice of market strategies, or selection of operating scale and technology, 
as significant influences apart from structural design. 
The intended study investigates the causal link between hospital structural change 
and performance, with variable measurements identified earlier in this chapter. 
Application of the SARFIT theory calls for collection of performance measures at a later 
point in time, following hospital structural changes. 
H4 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community 
hospitals which increase their number of physician staff and decrease their 
proportion of registered nurses will demonstrate better performance than 
those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
82 
H5 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community 
hospitals which increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening 
services will demonstrate better performance than those hospitals which do 
not make such changes. 
H6 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community 
hospitals which reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better 
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
Hospital Characteristics as Controls 
An underlying dimension in determining the organization ' s  structure is  added to 
the SARFIT model : basic characteristics of hospital size, location, Medicare 
reimbursement, Medicaid reimbursement, and administrative control. These conditions 
are often included in studies of hospital environmental response. Selected hospital 
characteristics, depending on their strength and magnitude, could possibly be viable 
forces in promoting or impeding any structural innovations. 
Hospital administrative control characteristics include strategic decisions which 
hospitals had made prior to 1 989 or 1 995,  such as system membership, alliance 
participation, physician liaison contracting and management contracting. The influence 
of contextual elements over corresponding organizational structure and performance have 
been estimated elsewhere (Astley, 1 985;  Flood and Scott, 1 987; Pugh et aI . ,  1 969). 
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For the purpose of this study, the individual hospital unit is seen as appropriate for 
analysis .  Despite the recent prominence of hospital mergers and alliances, individual 
hospital units, unlike those in other industries, must accommodate the unique needs of the 
surrounding community. Hospitals are relatively site-bound, and they must answer to 
local conditions (Lawrence and Dyer, 1 983) . Even though organizational design may be 
evaluated as a means of satisfying those who in charge, the reconciliation of economic 
and social criteria is foremost (Child, 1 972). 
Together, the dimensions of managed care environment, hospital structure, and 
hospital performance constitute this inquiry into strategic contingency and the response 
pattern of successful hospitals. A summary of the study hypotheses is given in Table 2 .  
Table 2 .  Summary of  Study Hypotheses. 
H I  Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition o r  operating i n  a more 
pervasive managed care environment, will increase their number of salaried physicians and 
decrease their number of registered nurses. 
H2 Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a more 
pervasive managed care environment, will increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening 
servIces. 
H3 Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a more 
pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their capacity. 
H4 In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which 
increase their physician staff and decrease their registered nurses will demonstrate better 
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
H5 In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which 
increase their ambulatory, preventive, and screening services will demonstrate better 
performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
H6 In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals which 
reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better performance than those hospitals which 
do not make such changes. 
CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the study' s research design, data sources, sampling 
approach, variable measurements and methods of analysis. Variable definitions provide a 
detailed description of the model components to be tested. 
Research Design 
The study employs a non-experimental panel design in determining whether a 
managed care environment could significantly influence change in hospital structure. The 
study design could be described as correlational, involving data collection on multiple 
variables and exploring the relationships between them. An advantage of the 
correlational design is the ability to investigate complex relationships between several 
variables in a single study (Grady and Wallston, 1 988). Competing hypotheses about 
variable relationships may be tested at once, allowing foi- future studies in causality. 
A major disadvantage to correlational designs is that causality may not be 
assumed from demonstrated relationships. However, if findings from correlational 
studies can be replicated and supplemented with other data, a convincing argument for 
causality can be made. Such an argument would include covariance between key 
variables, predictor variables preceding the criterion, or dependent variable, in time, and 
the absence of alternative explanations of the relationship (Grady and Wallston, 1 988) .  
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The study incorporates a longitudinal approach. Longitudinal surveys collect data 
on more than one occasion from sample members of the population of interest. The 
purpose of this collection method is to measure change, and to insure data accuracy. 
Longitudinal data, also known as panel designs, often describe variations in population 
characteristics that are sensitive to changes in time (Cox and Cohen, 1 985) . Longitudinal 
designs can establish a temporal relationship between variables, in which one variable 
precedes and predicts some other variable (Grady and Wallston, 1 988). The design 
provides potential for causal conclusions, because predictor variables are measured in a 
time period prior to the criterion, or dependent variable. 
Specifically, variables constituting the hospital ' s  environment are measured in the 
base year 1 989. Variables for hospital response indicate the degree of structural change 
demonstrated over a five-year period, from 1 989 to 1 994. Hospital performance 
following structural change is measured in 1 995 .  This design places structural change as 
a central focus, both dependent and independent in its relationship with other hospital 
factors and other places in time. 
The base year of 1 989 assumes that the study hospitals had fully implemented 
PPS rules, and their PPS transition period was ended. 1 989 was a peak year for hospital 
spending, as well as continued growth in HMO memberships. Both factors are important 
in determining the sensitivity of hospital response behaviors. From that base year of 
1 989, the following five years register structural transition and associated significant 
change. A five-year period is also limited so as to avoid the widespread mortality of 
community hospital organizations from the original study sample. 
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According to contingency theory, some lag time between observations in 
structural change and organizational performance is desirable. To establish this effect in 
study design, hospital performance is measured in the survey year 1 995 and related to 
structural changes from 1 989 to 1994. 
Data Sources 
Data are collected from three sources :  the American Hospital Association Annual 
Survey of Hospitals Data Base, Health Care Financing Administration Datasets 
(Minimum Cost Data), and the Area Resources File (ARF). 
The American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals Data 
Base is a derivative of the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals . This survey has been 
conducted annually since 1 946, and it is widely utilized by researchers as a 
comprehensive source of individual hospital data. AHA surveys from 1 989, 1 994, and 
1 995 are utilized in this study. 
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) constructed its Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) VI Minimum Data Set from HCFA Form 2552-85, util ized for 
hospital cost reporting and utilization data from 1 October, 1 988 through 1 October, 
1 989. Similarly, PPS XII Minimum Data Set is available for the reporting period I 
October 1 994 through 1 October 1 995 .  Both data sets are offered for public use. 
HCFA's mortality files are compiled from Medicare Hospital Mortality 
Information and from the MedicarelMedicaid Accreditation System (MMACS) .  This 
administrative data is available for public use. HCF A' s 1 989 mortality files are used in 
the study. 
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The Area Resources File (ARF) maintains regional census data and health 
resource information from 1 976 to the present. This study utilizes the ARF for HMO 
membership statistics, population data and market data on a countywide basis for the year 
1 989. 
Data on HMO membership were reported in the ARF and collected by the 
Interstudy Edge census for 1 989, with data as of 1 July 1 989. HMO membership i s  
calculated to  include Pure Members (renamed in  1 992 as  Traditional HMO Enrollment) 
and Open-ended Enrollment . Supplemental Medicare and Other HMO Enrollment 
figures are not included. 
In this study, market data collected from the ARF are aggregated to the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level established by the Office of Management and 
Budget in 1 994. These metropolitan areas are a revision of previous standards, and they 
use demographic data drawn from the 1 990 Decennial Census. An area is defined as an 
MSA if there is a city with a population of at least 50,000, or if there is an urbanized area 
of at least 50,000 population with a total metropolitan population of at least 1 00,000. In 
addition to a central city, an MSA may include other counties having close economic or 
social ties to the central county (ARF, 1996) . 
Study Sample 
The selection of a study sample defines the relevant product and geographical 
markets for the hospitals of interest. Although some hospitals produce specialized 
services such as psychiatric or orthopedic programs, most hospitals may be viewed as 
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multi-product firms offering a multitude of diagnostic and therapeutic services (Santerre 
and Neun, 1 996) . 
With the American Hospital Association providing the study frame from its 1 989 
Annual Survey of Hospitals, this study' s  unit of analysis is the community hospital with 
service type described as general medical and surgical . The community hospitals under 
study include local government, not-for-profit, and for-profit institutions. By definition, 
community hospitals are not units within other institutions (American Hospital 
Association, 1 990). Moreover, the sample hospitals did not provide nursing home 
services in the base year 1 989. Such restrictions allow for homogeneity in the type of 
hospital services provided, although a few hospitals added nursing home units over the 6-
year study period. This development is utilized as a control in 1 995 financial 
performance measures. 
The study' s exclusion of federal hospitals is a method of selecting those units 
with revenues closely linked to the volume of patients served; however teaching hospitals 
are included in the sample if they meet other sample criteria. Patient stays within the 
study hospitals are defined as short-term, but hospital bedsize is not restricted. Only 
those hospitals reported as operational for the entire 1 2-month survey period are included 
in the original 1 989 sample. 
Once the relevant product market, or cluster of inpatient services, has been 
defined, a logical step is to determine the relevant geographical market (RGM). An 
appropriate geographical area reflects both the travel costs involved and the ability of 
patients to switch to alternative suppliers when price or quality is  variable. Many 
researchers have based the RGM on boundaries such as counties, metropolitan areas, or 
cities, due to data availability and practical concerns (Santerre and Neun, 1 996) . In this 
study, major emphasis is upon market competition between hospitals; therefore only 
those units in areas classified as MSAs (metropolitan statistical areas) are sampled. 
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The timeframe for hospital structural change is taken from AHA survey years 
1 989 and 1 994. Hospitals which are deleted from the AHA Summary of Hospitals for the 
years between1 989 and 1 994 are also deleted from the study sample. Reasons for AHA 
deletion include hospital closure, change to an outpatient facil ity, or merger into another 
hospital (American Hospital Association, 1 990). Similarly, those hospitals added to the 
AHA Summary after 1 989 are not included in the study sample. Additions are usually 
due to demergers, mergers, and new survey participants. The study sample retains  
additions to the AHA's registered and unregistered files  when subject hospitals were 
merely moved between those two categories and were present in the 1 989 group. 
Other deletions to the study sample are due to two or more hospitals sharing one 
Medicare Provider Number, as some systems will report; and specific hospitals which 
changed their service type during the study period. 
By selecting a group of integral hospital units and following their internal changes 
over a period of five years, the study provides some control in maintaining consistent 
organizational identities. Despite the exclusion of federal and rural hospitals, the national 
study sample is  extensive, varied, and largely representative of the target population: 
acute-care, general-purpose community hospitals .  Operational definitions and sources of 
variable measurements are listed in Table 3 .  
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables. 
Variable Definition Treaunent in Anal:[sis Sources of Data 
Environment 
Managed Care 
Environment 
HMOPEN89 Percent HMO enrollees Continuous variable ARF 1 988, 1 990 (for 
(traditional and open- population); 
ended) in the MSA ARFlInterstudy Edge 
population 1989 (for HMO 
enrollment) 
HHIDC89 Market competition: Continuous variable AHA 1989 
HHIPD89 Herfindahl lndex 
measures, calculated 
from the number of 
admissions and IP days 
for nonfederal 
medicaVsurgical 
hospitals in MSA 
MSASTGH9 Market competition: Continuous variable ARF 1 989 
Sum of short-tenn 
general hospitals in MSA 
Past Performance 
CSTDAY9 Expenses per adjusted Continuous variable HCFA 1 989 PPS VI, 
patient day, corrected for 10/1/88- 10/1/89 (for 
wage index and case-mix expenses); HCFA Wage 
Index Survey 88; 
HCFA Case-mix Index 
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CSTDISC9 Expenses per adjusted Continuous variable HCFA 1 989 PPS VI, 
patient admission, 10/1/88- 10/1/89 (for 
corrected for wage index expenses); HCFA Wage 
and case-mix Index Survey 88; 
HCF A Case-mix Index 
89 
MORT30 Observed mortality rate Continuous variable HCF A Mortality files, 
divided by expected 1 989 (Also see 
mortality rate, within 30 Appendix A, "HCFA 
days of admission, for all Diagnostic and 
HCF A diagnostic and Procedure Codes") 
procedure codes 
CUMDIFF Hospital specific excess Continuous variable HCF A Mortality files, 
in mean survival over 1 989 
180 da:[s 
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont .) 
Variable Definition Treaunent in Anal sis Sources of Data 
Hospital 
Response 
Professionalism 
DIFITE Difference in the total Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
FIEs between 1 989 and 
1 994 
DIFMD Difference in physician Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
and dentist FIE totals 
between 1 989 and 1 994 
DIFRN Difference in RN FIE's Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1 994 
between 1 989 and 1 994 
DIFLPN Difference in LPN FIE's Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
between 1 989 and 1 994 
DIFNURS Difference in Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
RN/(RN+LPN) ratios 
between 1 989 and 1 994 
Services 
DIFAMB Difference in OP visits Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
between 1 989 and 1 994 
DIFSURG Difference in OP Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
surgeries between 1989 
and 1 994 
DIFPREV Difference in scores Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
reflecting hospital (Also see Appendix E, 
services in patient "Scoring for 
education, fitness Preventive Services") 
centers, women's  health 
programs, occupational 
health programs and 
geriatric assessment 
programs, 1 989- 1 994 
Inpatient Capacity 
DIFBED Difference in number of Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
staffed beds between 
1989 and 1 994 
DIFOCCRT Difference in the ratio of Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1994 
average daily census to 
staffed beds between 
1 989 and 1 994 
DIFCMI Difference in Medicare Continuous variable HCF A Case-mix index 
case-mix between 1 989 files, 1 989, 1994 
and 1 994 
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Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont .) 
Variable Definition Treatment in Anal�sis Sources of Data 
Later 
Performance 
CSTDAY5 Expenses per adjusted Continuous variable HCF A PPS XII, 
patient day, corrected for 10/1/94-10/1 /95 (for 
wage index and case-mix expenses); HCF A 
Wage Index 
SurveyAug.95 ;  HCFA 
Case-mix Index 94 
CSTDISC5 Expenses per adjusted Continuous variable HCF A PPS XII, 
patient admission, 10/1/94- 10/1/95 (for 
corrected for wage index expenses); HCF A 
and case-mix Wage Index Survey 
Aug.95; HCFA Case-
mix Index 94 
DIFCSTDY Difference in cost per Continuous variable HCFA PPS XII, 
patient day, 1 989- 1995 10/1/94-10/1 /95 (for 
expenses); HCFA 
Wage Index Survey 
Aug.95; HCFA Case-
mix Index 94 
DIFCSTDS Difference in cost per Continuous variable HCF A PPS XII, 
admission, 1989- 1995 10/1/94-10/1 /95 (for 
expenses); HCF A 
Wage Index Survey 
Aug.95; HCFA Case-
mix Index 94 
Control 
Variables 
ADC Average daily census Continuous variable AHA 1 989, 1995 
MHSMEM System member Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no AHA 1 989, 1995 
ALL Alliance member Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no AHA 1 989, 1995 
CONPHY Contract with physician Dichotomous, l=yes O=no AHA 1989 only 
to liaison with staff 
MNGT Contract managed Dichotomous, I =yes O=no AHA 1989, 1995 
LOCSYS Belongs to system shared Dichotomous, 1 =yes O=no AHA 1 989, 1 994 
by at least one other 
hospital in MSA 
MAPP8 Member of Council of Dichotomous, I =yes O=no AHA 1 989, 1 995 
Teaching Hospitals 
HMCR Medicare Continuous HCFAPPSVI 1 989, 
discharges/Hospital total HCFA PPXII 1 995 
discharges. 
HMCD Medicaid discharges! Continuous HCFA PPSVI 1 989, 
Hosl!ital total discharses HCFA PPXII 1 995 
Table 3. Operational Definitions of Indicator Variables (cont .) 
Variable 
SUNITS 
PUB 
FP 
ANOVA Variables 
REGION 
CNTRL 
Definition 
Maintains a separate 
nursing-home unit 
Public hospitals (RCF A 
Control codes 8-13) 
For-profit hospitals 
( HCF A Control codes 
3-6) 
Region/state code 
HCFA code for 
ownership/control 
Treatment in Analysis  
Dichotomous, I =yes O=no 
Dichotomous, l =yes,O=no 
Dichotomous, l =yes,O=no 
I -New England 
2-Mid Atlantic 
3 -South Atlantic 
4-East North Central 
5-East South Central 
6-West North Central 
7-West South Central 
8-Mountain 
9-Pacific 
I -Voluntary, NP, Church 
2-Voluntary, NP, Other 
3-Proprietary, Individual 
4-Proprietary, Corporate 
5-Proprietary, Partnership 
6-Proprietary, Other 
8-Government, City-County 
9-Government, .County 
IO-Government, State 
I I -Government, Hospital 
D.istrict 
12-Government, City 
13-Government, Other 
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Sources of Data 
AHA 1 989, 1995 
HCFA PPS VI 1 989 
HCF A PPSXII 1 995 
HCF A PPS VI 1 989 
RCF A PPSXII 1 995 
AHA 1 989 (See 
Appendix C, "AHA 
Region Codes, 1989") 
HCF A PPS VI 1 989 
HCFA PPSXII 1995 
With the stated restrictions in mind, the original 1 989 sample consists of 2 1 88 
observations. Hospital changes due to closure or merger are responsible for 255  
observations lost between 1 989 and 1 995.  Other sample adjustments as mentioned 
earlier (-5 1 )  bring the final population size to 1 882 community hospitals. 
Variable Measurements 
Independent Variables 
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In the study model, the hospital environment is represented by variables for 
managed care penetration and past performance, both moderated by market competition. 
Managed care penetration is measured by percentage of HMO enrollees in the hospital ' s  
MSA population during 1 989. The variable for past performance i s  represented b y  three 
measures:  cost per patient day (1989), average cost per discharge (1989), and RCF A 
mortality ratio (1989). 
The standardized mortality ratio is frequently used to measure hospital 
performance (Knaus et aI . ,  1 986). Information for the RCFA mortality rate was collected 
from Medicare beneficiaries discharged from over 5000 acute care hospitals in the United 
States (RCFA, 1 993). Seventeen diagnoses were included in mortality statistics (see 
Appendix A) . For these diagnoses, each hospital ' s  standardized mortality ratio was 
calculated by dividing the observed mortality rate by its predicted rate. Predicted 
mortality rates were determined from multivariate RCF A models based on age, gender, 
prior hospitalizations, reason for admission, and the presence of specific comorbid 
i llnesses identified by ICD-9-CM (International Classification of Diseases Clinical 
Modification) codes (RCF A, 1 993) .  Mortality ratios less than 1 .0 indicate better than 
expected performance, while ratios higher than 1 indicate performance below the 
expected level. 
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In accordance with the SARFIT model, the effects of past performance upon 
hospital structural response is modified by environmental illiberality, which is 
represented by a variable for market competition or concentration within a market area. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is the most commonly used method of measuring 
the degree of concentration in the market. The HHI is derived by summing the squared 
market shares, expressed as percentages, of all hospitals in the defined market, or 
N 2 
HHI = L Si 
;=1 
where O<HHI ::; 1 0,000 and S; stands for the percentage market share produced by the 
ith hospital . When a market area is dominated by one hospital, the HHI value i s  1 0,000. 
As the value ofHHI approaches zero, the industry is considered to be less structurally 
concentrated, or more competitive (Santerre and Neun, 1 996). 
In this study, two hospital output indicators are used in calculating the market 
share and establishing HHI values: number of admissions and number of inpatient days. 
For scaling purposes, HHI variables are divided by a factor of 1 0,000 so O<X<l . For this 
study, hospital admissions and inpatient days, indicators of utilization, are considered 
more appropriate measures of market share than hospital bed-size, also commonly used 
in the Herfindahl formula. A third measure for market competition is the sum of all 
short-term general hospitals in each hospital ' s  MSA. 
Dependent Variables 
Hospital response, or the structural changes made by each hospital in response to 
the managed care environment, is represented by three dimensions and a number of 
96 
variables. Change in professional contingent is measured by the difference in total FTEs 
(full-time equivalents) employed between 1989 and 1 994 . Hospital physician and dentist 
FTEs from the 1 989 AHA survey are compared with 1 994 figures. Similar data are 
collected and change is computed for RN FTEs (registered nurses), LPN FTEs (licensed 
practical nurses) and nurse ratio RN/(RN+LPN) measures from 1 989 and 1 994 . 
In capturing hospital changes in services, hospital workload volume is collected 
for outpatient visits and outpatient surgeries between 1 989 and 1 994. The differences in 
these two measures over the study period indicate hospital shift from inpatient to 
ambulatory care. Other preventive services in patient education, fitness, women' s  health, 
occupational health, and geriatric assessment are combined into an overall preventive 
score, indicating the change in hospital provision of those services between 1 989 and 
1 994. Preventive service scoring is described in Appendix B .  
While expanding ambulatory services, hospitals are viewed as  reducing their 
inpatient capacity in response to their managed care environment . Measures in bed size 
and occupancy rate indicate the changes made in downsizing the inpatient capability 
between 1 989 and 1 994. The HCFA case-mix index is also measured over the structural 
change period, for determining any shift in case intensity. 
Since structural change in hospitals is predicted to affect performance, the later 
performance measures are patterned after initial measures of hospital efficiency . 
Unfortunately, HCF A mortality measures for hospitals were no longer reported by 1 995 .  
Hospital performance in 1 995 is therefore defined a s  the cost per patient day and cost per 
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patient discharge between 1 989 and 1 995, as well as the difference between the 1 989 and 
1 995 costs, adjusting for case-mix and wage index differences between hospitals. 
Data Analysis 
Preliminary analysis includes a descriptive statistical summary of all indicators 
and a check for their normality in distribution, using the SAS Univariate Procedure. 
Observations with very extreme values are deleted. For those continuous variables which 
are not normal and are retained in the research model, appropriate transformation is 
considered to correct for skewness and kurtosis in distributions. A chi-square analysis is 
used to compare the original 1 933 study hospitals (those which retained their identity 
over the entire study period) with the 255 hospitals which were attritions in the form of 
mergers, de mergers, or closures. The z-test for proportions (Wassertheil-Smoller, 1 990) 
is performed to determine whether ownership/control is similar between the sample 
group and the attrition group. 
The dependent variables from Part I are tested to see if there is a significant 
. change in these measures between 1 989 and 1 994. Once this inquiry has been answered, 
the effects of hospital region and ownership are separately evaluated with all dependent 
variables, through analysis of variance (ANOVA). The purpose is to determine whether 
the categorical variables of hospital location and ownership/control are significant in the 
study models for hospital change and subsequent hospital performance. 
Correlation analysis is employed to indicate univariate relationships between 
independent and dependent variables. Specifically, significant correlations between 
independent and dependent variables are desirable. In contrast, independent variables are 
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evaluated for collinearity with one another, which will only provide duplicate information 
and interfere with accurate regression estimates. Decisions are made to eliminate those 
independent variables which demonstrate collinearity. Such variables threaten to hinder 
the interpretation of regression model coefficients (Canavos and Miller, 1 995) .  
The analytical hypotheses are tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
technique. After controlling for several organizational characteristics, this multivariate 
technique measures the impact of the managed care environment on hospital structure. 
Analysis is performed twice for each dependent structural variable. First, the 
independent effects of market competition are measured along with all other independent 
variables. Second, the theoretical interactions between hospital performance variables 
and market competition are tested as independent variables. The general l inear regression 
model (Neter & Wasserman, 1 974) for these relationships follows : 
where : 
/3o , /3p . . .  /3P_I are parameters 
XI . .  , X, p - I  are known constants 
&i are independent N(O, a2 ) . 
i = 1 ,  . . . n 
The OLS model is applied to study hypotheses as follows: 
HI : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a 
more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their number of salaried 
physicians and decrease their number of registered nurses. 
Where: 
Y I  = change in salaried physicians 
Y2 = change in RN s 
Xl = HMO penetration 
X2 = past performance 
X3 = market competition 
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H2 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a 
more pervasive managed care environment, will increase their ambulatory, preventive, 
and screening services. 
Where 
YI = change in outpatient visits 
Y2 = change in ambulatory surgeries 
Y3 = service scale, 0-6, 0= no new services 
6= all new services 
Xl = HMO penetration 
X2 = past performance 
X3 = market competition 
H3 : Poorly performing community hospitals, experiencing competition or operating in a 
more pervasive managed care environment, will reduce their capacity. 
Where 
Y I = change in bedsize 
Y2 = change in occupancy rate 
Y3 = change in case-mix index 
Xl = HMO penetration 
X2 = past performance 
X3 = Market competition 
Analysis follows Drazin and Van de Ven's  selection approach to fit ( 1 985), where 
regression is used to test the congruence relationship between specific variables. 
Additional estimation equations for interaction in hypotheses H I  through H3 
introduce the variable of market competition as a moderator to the effects of HMO 
penetration and past performance, so that Xl = (HMO penetration * market competition), 
and X2 = (past performance * market competition). 
For hypotheses H4 through H6, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used 
to test hospital change measures and their independent effects upon hospital performance. 
H4 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals 
which increase their physician staff and decrease their registered nurses will demonstrate 
better performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
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H5 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals 
which increase their ambulatory, preventive and screening services will demonstrate 
better performance than those hospitals which do not make such changes. 
H6 : In a more competitive or pervasive managed care environment, community hospitals 
which reduce their inpatient capacity will demonstrate better performance than those 
hospitals which do not make such changes. 
Where: 
Y 1 = change in performance, 1 989- 1 995 
XI  = HMO penetration 
X2 = past performance 
X3 = market competition 
X4 = change in salaried physicians 
X5 = change in registered nurses 
X6 = change in outpatient visits 
X7 = change in ambulatory surgeries 
X8 = change in service scale 
X9 = change in bedsize 
XIO  = change in occupancy rate 
XI I = change in case-mix 
In addition to the variables of interest, control variables representing hospital 
characteristics are included in regression equations. These controls include measures in 
hospital size, local system membership, alliance membership, physician l iaison 
contracting, management contracting, percent Medicare discharges and percent Medicaid 
discharges. 
Limitations in Study Design 
The study is necessarily limited by the reliability of its data, most notably in 
measuring managed care penetration and hospital market competition. In general, all 
measures appear to be available and reasonably reliable for the target population. 
HeF A's 1 989 mortality indicator for hospital performance appears to provide sufficient 
variabil ity in support of analysis within the target sample. Hospital mortality data are not 
avai lable from 1 995, however, and a satisfactory substitute measure in hospital quality 
was not found. 
1 0 1  
Analytic results may be  somewhat limited by  the heterogeneity of  the sample 
hospitals in regard to size. Generally, larger hospitals tend to treat more complex cases 
and provide a much broader spectrum of care, while a patient day in a small hospital is 
very different (Eastaugh, 1 992) . In order to partially compensate for this condition, 
hospital performance measures are adjusted according to their associated ReF A case-mix 
index. Nonetheless, the overall diversity of the sample contributes to extensive ranges 
displayed within the dependent variables of change. 
CHAPTER v. RESULTS 
This chapter summarizes analytic results of the study, including various 
assessments of the hospital sample, descriptive statistics of the study variables, bivariate 
correlations of all variables, and OLS model-building estimates.  An analytic test for fit 
between context and structure is also constructed, using measures from 1 989.  The 
regression models in Part 1 evaluate hospital change variables as dependent variables; 
while regression models in Part 2 consider the independent effects of structural change 
upon hospital performance. 
Comparison of Final Sample Observations with Attritions 
The original study population of nonfederal, community hospitals was comprised 
of 2 1 88 observations in AHA survey year 1 989. From this group, 255 hospitals did not 
maintain their 1 989 AHA identification throughout the survey year 1 995 .  In Table 4, a 
chi-square analysis compares the retained sample and the attrition sample in terms of 
region, AHA ownership/control, and bedsize. 
Prominent regional differences are shown in New England, where 28 hospitals 
dropped out of the sample instead of an expected 16 .  State hospitals ( l loss observed, 5 
expected) and county hospitals (5 losses observed, 1 0  expected) did not experience 
proportionate attrition. For-profit corporate hospitals experienced an excessive attrition 
during the study period (64 lost, 43 expected). In reference to bedsize, where the chi-
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square value was highest, those hospitals with less than 200 beds were overrepresented in 
the attrition group, while larger hospitals of 300 or more beds were underrepresented. 
Table 4. Comparison of Sample Hospitals ( N= 1933)  With Attritions ( N=255)  
Occurring between 1 989 and 1 995.  
Region Sample Sample Attritions Attritions Chi-Sguare 
(AHA Categories) Frequency Cell Frequency Cell Value 
Observed/ Chi- Observed/ Chi- (p-value) 
Expected Square Expected Square 
1 .  New England 1 08 / 1 20 1 .23 28 / 1 5 . 8  9 .3 1 
2. Mid- Atlantic 320 / 3 1 2 . 2 12  33 / 4 1 . 1  1 .6 1  
3 .  South Atlantic 327 / 332 . 08 1  49 / 43 . 8  . 6 1 2  
4 .  East N .  Central 346 / 339 . 1 34 38 / 44 .8  1 . 02 
5. East S. Central 1 26 / 1 22 . 1 37  1 2 / 1 6. 1  1 . 04 
6. West N. Central 95 / 94. 5 .002 1 2 / 12 . 5  . 0 1 8  
7 .  West S .  Central 252 / 254 .023 36 / 33 .6  . 1 77 
8 .  Mountain 78 / 75 . 1 . 1 12 7 / 9. 9 1  .853  
9 .  Pacific 28 1 / 284 .024 40 / 37 .4 . 1 79 
1 6 .77  ( .033)  
Ownership/Control 
(AHA Categories) 
1 2 .  state 45 /40.6  .468 1 /5 . 36  3 . 54 
1 3 .  county 77 172.4 .287 5 /9 .56 2 . 1 7  
14 .  city 46 /44.2  .076 4 /5 . 83 . 573 
1 5 .  city/county 1 0 1 10 .6  .034 2 11 .40 .259 
1 6 .  hospital district 1 1 2 1 1 09 . 1 02 1 1  / 14 .3  . 776 
2 1 .  church 30 1  /296 .086 34 /39 .0  .65 1 
23 . other NFP 1 0 1 6 / 10 14  . 003 1 32 / 134  .024 
3 1 .  FP individual 2 /2 .6  . 1 60 1 . 0 1. 349 1 .2 1  
3 2 .  FP partnership 1 8 / 16 . 8  .088 1 .0 /2. 2 1  . 666 
3 3 .  FP Corporation 306 /327 1 .3 3  64 /43 . 1  2 .93 
22.62 ( . 007) 
Bedsize 
(AHA Categories) 
6-24 10 1 1 5  1 .67 7 /2 .0  12 .7  
25-49 99 1 104 .264 1 9 / 1 3 . 7  2 .00 
50-99 257 /263 . 149 4 1 /34 .7  1 . 1 3  
Table 4. Comparison of Sample Hospitals ( N=1933)  With Attritions ( N=255) 
Occurring between 1 989 and 1 995 . (cont .)  
Region Sample Sample Attritions Attritions Chi-Sguare 
(AHA Categories) Frequency Cell Frequency Cell Value 
Observed/ Chi- Observed/ Chi- (p-value) 
Expected Square Expected Square 
Bedsize 
(AHA Catelwries) 
1 00- 1 99 502 /5 1 8  . 53 1 85 /68 .4 4 .02 
200-299 430 /430 .000 57 /56. 7  .001  
300-399 283 /266 1 . 1 0 1 8 /3 5 . 1 8 . 32  
400-499 1 55 1 147 .378 1 2 / 19 . 5  2 . 86 
500+ 1 97 1 1 88 .4 14  1 6 /24. 8  3 . 1 3  
1 04 
38 . 69 ( . 00 l )  
General Description of Sample Hospitals 
The final study sample consisted of 1 882 observations, with the greatest 
frequency (339) in the East North Central Region, the second highest frequency (322) in 
the South Atlantic Region, and the third highest frequency (3 1 1 ) in the Mid-Atlantic 
Region. The remaining observations (48% of the total) were dominated by the Pacific 
and West South Central Regions. Table 5 presents the frequency and percentage 
breakdown for each of the regions. The states included in these AHA regions are l isted 
in Appendix C. 
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Table 5. Distribution of Final Sample Hospitals (N=1 882) According to AHA Region 
Region Frequency Percentage 
I .  New England 1 06 5 . 6  
2 .  Mid-Atlantic 3 1 1  1 6 . 5  
3 .  South Atlantic 322 1 7 . 1  
4 .  East N. Central 339 1 8 . 0  
5 .  East S .  Central 1 20 6 .4 
6 .  West N. Central 94 5 . 0  
7.  West S .  Central 24 1 1 2 . 8  
8 .  Mountain 74 3 . 9  
9 .  Pacific 275 14 .6  
The final sample of  hospital observations varies in  ownership/control between the 
years 1 989 and 1 995 .  Table 6 details the HCF A categories and percentages for hospital 
ownership/control at the beginning and ending of the study period. The frequency of 
various hospital types show some difference between hospital samples from 1 989 and 
1 995 ;  however the percentage of each hospital type remains fairly constant between the 
survey years. The Z test for comparing two proportions (Wassertheil-Smoller, 1 990) 
indicates that group sizes from 1 989 may be considered statistically the same as group 
sizes from 1 995, with the exception of Group 6 (proprietary, Other, where Z=-2 . 66) .  
Voluntary, nonprofit hospitals dominate the sample with 69% of the total '95  
observations. Proprietary hospitals comprise 1 7%, and local government hospitals 
comprise 1 4% of the total observations. 
Table 6. Distribution of Final Sample Hospitals According to HCF A 
Ownership/Control. 
Control Code 1 989 1 989 1 995 
Frequency Percentage Frequency 
(N=1 843) (N=1 8 1 9) 
1 .  Vol. NP, Church 340 1 8 .4 308 
2 .  Vol .  NP, Other 9 1 1 49.4 94 1 
3 .  Proprietary, Individual 5 . 3  I 
4. Proprietary, Corporate 296 1 6 . 1 288 
5 .  Proprietary, I I  . 6  2 1  
Partnership 
6. Proprietary, Other* *  1 6  . 9  4 
8 .  Government, City- 34 1 . 8 26 
County 
9. Government, County 78 4 .2 79 
10 .  Government, State 4 1  2 .2 45 
I I .  Government, Hospital 68 3 . 7  72 
District 
1 2 .  Government, City 25 1 .4 2 1  
1 3 .  Government, other 1 8  1 .0 1 3  
1 06 
1 995 
Percentage 
1 6 . 9  
5 1 . 7 
. 1  
1 5 . 8  
1 . 2 
. 2  
1 . 4 
4 . 3  
2 . 5  
4 .0  
1 .2 
. 7  
** Z value I S  Significant at the .05 level for reJecung the hypotheSIS that the '89 Group= '95 Group 
Measurement of Hospital Structural Changes 
A preliminary concern in the research study is whether the sample hospitals 
displayed definitive change in the selected structural measures during the time period 
1 989 to 1 994. Change variables were calculated by subtracting the variable' s 1 989 value 
from its 1 994 value. This difference was subjected to the Student ' s  t value for testing 
that the population mean is 0 (SAS Institute, 1 990). All variables indicating change in 
structure were found to be statistically significant, as shown in Table 7 .  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and T-Test Results for Variables of Change (Dependent 
Variables, Part I ) .  
Variable 1 989 1 994 Change ' 89-'94 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
N N N 
FTE 1 026 1 143 1 1 7 * * *  
(Full-time equivalents) (975) ( 1 079) (308) 
1 880 1 880 1 880 
FTEMD 12 .8  1 8 . 1 5 .25 * * *  
(Full-time equivalents, (53 .9) (57. 1 ) (5 1 . 5) 
Doctors and dentists) 1 882 1 882 1 882 
FTERN 255 284 29.3 * * *  
(Full-time equivalents, (245) (273) ( 1 03 .4) 
registered nurses) 1 882 1 882 1 882 
FTELPN 47.2 38 . 5  - 8 . 6  * * *  
(Full-time equivalents, (48 . 1  ) (40 .0) (26 .8) 
l icensed practical nurses) 1 882 1 882 1 882 
NURS . 8 1 1 . 853  . 04 1 7* * *  
Ratio ofFTERNI (0. 1 2 1 )  ( . 1 00) ( . 0830) 
(FTERN+FTELPN) 1 882 1 882 1 882 
AMB 85,757 1 1 5 ,743 29,986* * *  
(Ambulatory visits) (95, 554) ( 1 24, 1 84) (73 ,857) 
1 880 1 880 1 880 
SURG 3 1 90 4053 863 * * *  
(Outpatient surgical (2793) (3 527) (2063) 
procedures) 1 8 8 1  1 881  1 8 8 1  
PREV 2. 1 9  1 . 74 - .442* * *  
(Preventive service score) ( 1 . 1 7) ( 1 .26) ( 1 .26) 
1 882 1 882 1 882 
BED 261 253 -7. 59 * * *  
(Staffed beds) ( 1 9 1 )  ( 1 92) (63 .6) 
1 882 1 882 1 882 
OCCRT . 632 . 588  - .0437 * * *  
(Occupancy rate) ( . 1 67) ( . 1 66) ( . 1 23)  
1 882 1 882 1 882 
CM! 1 . 30  1 . 38  . 0832  * * *  
(Medicare Case-mix index) ( . 1 72) ( .2 1 9) ( . 1 1 5) 
1 875 1 875 1 875 
***Student s t-test shows a p-value < .00 1 for difference vanable of change . 
lO8 
Structural change statistics indicate that the mean number of hospital FTEs 
increased by 1 1 7 during the five-year study period.  Within the measures of 
professionalism, the mean number of physician and dentist FTEs increased by 5 . 25 ,  the 
mean number ofRN FTEs increased by 29. 3 ,  and the mean number of LPN FTEs 
decreased by 8 .6 .  The ratio for nursing staff, RN FTEs/(RN+LPN FTEs), reflected these 
changes with a mean increase of .04 1 7 . 
Outpatient services were greatly increased, with the mean of ambulatory visits 
raised by almost 30,000 per year, and the mean of outpatient surgical services expanded 
by 863 procedures per year. Contrary to expected growth trends, however, the mean of 
the overall preventive service score decreased by .44 for the study hospitals. 
Inpatient capacity measures changed in their expected directions over the study 
period, with the mean number of staffed beds decreasing by 7. 59, the mean of hospital 
occupancy rates decreasing by . 0437, and the mean of hospital case-mix index values 
increasing by .0832.  
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in Part 2 
Dependent variables in Part 2 were measured as regular hospital expense ratios 
for 1 995 .  Additionally, the changes between expense ratios from 1 989 to 1 995 were 
computed. Descriptive statistics for these variables are displayed in Table 8. Most 
notable is the limited growth in hospital expenses over six years, averaging 4 .4% per year 
in cost per day and 1 .6% per year in cost per discharge. Differences in cost per day and 
109 
cost per discharge exhibit a large standard deviation, indicating broad variabil ity in the 
sample data (Zolman, 1 993) .  
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, Part 2 .  
Variable Name N Mean Standard Deviation 
CSTDAY5 1 793 7 1 0  247 
(Cost per patient day, 1 995) 
CSTDISC5 1 793 387 1  1 288 
(Cost per discharge, 1 995) 
DIFCSTDY 1 77 1  148 250 
(Difference in cost per day 
between 1 989 and 1 995) 
DIFCSTDS 1 77 1  3 3 2  1 3 1 1  
(Difference in cost per discharge 
between 1 989 and 1 995) 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Table 9 summarizes descriptive statistics for independent continuous variables in 
the study, including variables of interest and control variables. In the environmental 
category, HMO penetration has a mean of l4 . 75, which appears appropriate, considering 
the exclusive use of metropolitan statistical areas in collecting the hospital sample. The 
means for both types of Herfindahl index are almost identical . With a value of . 1 7, the 
average Herfindahl index is associated with market conditions of oligopoly (McCue and 
Ozcan, 1 992). The oligopolistic market is characterized by a few dominant firms, 
presenting barriers to entry for potential competitors (Santerre and Neun, 1 996) . The 
third measure of market competition, the number of short-term general hospitals in each 
hospital ' s  MSA, has a mean value of 29. 5 .  
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Continuous Variables, Parts I and 2 .  
Variable Name N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variables of Interest Included in Parts 1 and 2 
HMOPEN89 1 882 14 .75 1 5 .65 
(HMO penetration, 1989) 
HHIDC89 1 882 . 1 736 . 1 705 
Herfindahl index for hospital discharges, 1989) 
HHIPD89 1 882 . 1 730 . 1 702 
(Herfindahl index for hospital patient days, 1989) 
MSASTGH9 1 882 29.5 30.3 
(Short-term general hospitals in MSA, 1 989) 
CSTDAY9 1 8 1 9  563 . 1 50 .  
(Cost per patient day, 1989) 
CSTDISC9 1 8 1 9  3548.  953 .  
(Cost per patient discharge, 1989) 
MORT30 1 876 1 .005 . 1 826 
(Mortality index at 30 days after discharge) 
CUMDIFF 1 874 - .2496 2 . 86  
(Hospital specific excess in  mean survival over 1 80 
days) 
Control Variables, Part 1 
BDTOT89 1 882 26 1 1 9 1  
(Total staffed beds, 1989 ) 
ADC89 1 882 1 8 1  1 5 8  
(Average daily census, 1 989) 
HMCR_89 1 843 .341  . 1 30  
(% of  discharges sponsored by  Medicare, 1989) 
HMCD_89 1 843 . 1 I 7 . 1 I 5 
(% of discharges sponsored by Medicaid, 1 989) 
Control Variables. Part 2 
BDTOT95 1 882 247 1 87 
(Total staffed beds, 1 995) 
ADC95 1 882 1 58  144 
(Average daily census, 1 995) 
HMCR_95 1 8 1 9  .382 . 1 45 
(% discharges sponsored by Medicare, 1 995) 
HMCD 95 1 8 1 9  . 1 54 . 1 30  
(% discharges sponsored by Medicaid, 1995) 
Financial variables for past performance reveal an average cost per day of $563 
and average cost per discharge of $3 548 for the hospital sample in 1 989. Performance 
quality is  represented by the mean mortality ratio at 30 days ( 1 . 005), indicating that 
observed performance was slightly better than expected. The average for hospital­
specific excess in mean survival over 1 80 days is calculated at - .2496, showing slightly 
negative hospital performance. 
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In this sample, Medicare ' s  portion of hospital discharges has a mean of 34% for 
1 989 and 3 8% for 1 995 .  Medicaid 's  portion of discharges has a mean of 1 2% in 1 989 
and 1 5% in 1 995 .  On the average, these payors insure approximately 50% of the patient 
volume in the sample hospitals. 
Table 10 summarizes descriptive statistics for categorical control variables in the 
study. Hospital alliance membership was reported among 32% of the sample in 1 989 as 
well as 1 995 .  In 1 989, 35% of the sample hospitals contracted for a physician l iaison to 
interface with the medical staff Figures for 1 995 were not available. Membership in 
hospital systems with other local hospitals was reported by 27% of the sample in 1 989 
and 34% in 1 994 . System membership in general was more common, with 44% of the 
sample reported as system members in 1 989 and 50% reported as system members in 
1 995 .  Membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals was reported by 1 2% of the 
sample in 1 989 and 1 1  % of the sample in 1 995 .  Contract management was reported by 
8% of the sample hospitals in 1 989 and 5 . 6% of the sample in 1 995 .  
Table 10.  Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Control Variables, Parts I and 2 
(N= 1 882, unless otherwise stated). 
Variable Name Description Fre_quency Percent 
ALL89 Alliance member (89) 597 3 1 . 7 
ALL95 Alliance member (95) 603 32 .0  
CONPHY89 Physician liaison for 660 3 5 . 1 
medical staff (89) 
LOCSYS89 Local system member (89) 5 1 2  27 .2  
LOCSYS94 Local system member (94) 634 3 3 . 7  
MAPP889 Member of Council of 23 1 1 2 . 3  
Teaching Hospitals 89 
MAPP895 Member of Council of 2 1 2  1 1 . 3 
Teaching Hospitals 95 
MHSMEM89 System member (89) 83 1 44. 2  
MHSMEM95 System member (95) 94 1 50 .0  
MNGT89 Contract managed (89) 1 53 8 . 1 
MNGT95 Contract managed (95) 1 06 5 . 6  
SUNITS95 Maintains a separate 340 1 8 . 1  
nursing home or long-term 
care unit i95) 
PUB89 Public hospital (89) 264 14 . 3  
N=1 843 
PUB95 Public hospital (95) 256 14 . 1 
N=1 8 1 9  
FP89 For-profit hospital (89) 328 1 7 . 8  
N= 1 843 
FP95 For-profit hospital (95) 3 14 1 7 . 3  
N=1 8 1 9  
I n  accordance with the study frame, the original community hospitals did not contain a 
1 1 2 
nursing home or long-term care unit . However, if this type of unit were added, the host 
hospital was retained in the analysis. A total of 340 hospitals, or 1 8% of the final sample, 
reported a separate nursing home or long-term care unit in 1 995 .  
1 1 3 
Bivariate Analysis 
Bivariate correlations between the dependent and independent variables from Part 
1 are shown in Appendix D. The original study model contains 1 1  dependent variab les in 
Part 1 .  Correlation values reported at a 0.05 level of significance were used as criteria to 
screen potentially significant relationships among variable pairs. 
Among the variables of interest, the most prominent correlations are shown 
between HMOPEN89 (HMO penetration 89) and DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio) 
(r=-0.092 and p=.OOO I ), Hlll89 (Herfindahl index 89) and DIFOCCRT (difference in 
occupancy rate) (r=0.096 and p=.OOO I ), CSTDISC89 (cost per discharge 89) and 
DIFCMI (difference in case-mix) (r=0.208 and p=.OOO I ), CSTDAY9 (cost per patient 
day 89) and DIFOCCRT (difference in occupancy rate) (r=0. 1 06 and p=.OOO I ), 
C STDISC9 (cost per discharge 89) and DIFFTE (difference in FTEs) (r=0.096 and 
p=.OOO I ), and MORT30 (mortality rate) and DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio) 
(r=0 . 1 23 and p=.OOO I ) .  Other statistically significant Pearson correlations occur for 
difference in RNs, difference in ambulatory visits, and difference in beds. 
All of the dependent variables in Appendix D show some significant correlation 
with continuous and dichotomous control variables, with one exception. The variable for 
difference in preventive services score shows no significant relationship the other study 
variables. 
Appendix E summarizes correlation statistics for dependent and independent 
variables in Part 2. There are four dependent variables, all of which are based on hospital 
costs. The 1 1  dependent variables from Part 1 now assume the role of independent 
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variables of interest. HMO data, market variables and performance variables from 1 989 
are retained in the model as well as standard control variables of hospital size, affiliation, 
and strategy. 
The most prominent correlations among variables of interest in Part 2 occur 
between the following variable pairs : DIFBED (difference in beds) and CSTDAY5 (cost 
per patient day 95) (r=-0. 1 05 an p=.OOO I ), DIFBED (difference in beds) and DIFCSTDY 
(difference in cost per patient day) (r=-0. 147 and p=.OOO I ), and (DIFOCCRT) (difference 
in occupancy rate) and DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per day) (r=-0. 1 46 and p=.OOO I ) .  
The variable DIFCMI (difference i n  case-mix index) shows significant correlations with 
all dependent variables with the exception of CSTDISC5 (cost per discharge 95) .  
Correlation statistics also show strong associations between both Herfindahl 
values and CSTDAY5 (cost per day 95) (r=0.096 and p=.OOO I ), as well as the number of 
general hospitals in the MSA and DIFCSTDS (difference in cost per discharge) (r=-0. 1 1 2 
and p=.OOO l ) .  The variables CSTDAY9 (cost per patient day 89) and CSTDISC9 (cost 
per discharge 89) are significantly correlated with all dependent variables in Part 2, with 
the exception of one pair: CSTDISC9 (cost per discharge 89) and CSTDAY5 (cost per 
day 95) (r=0.029 and p=.220). 
The most prominent correlations between control variables and the dependent 
variables occur among size characteristics, system variables and nursing home indicators. 
Dichotomous control variables showing significant association with dependent variables 
are particularly noteworthy, since their presence is probably underreported in data 
surveys. 
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ANOV A Analysis for Region and Ownership/Control 
Table 1 1  portrays the effects of two categorical variables upon all dependent 
study variables. The variable REGION (Region 89) is an AHA category applied to the 
hospital sample, both in 1 989 (Part 1) as well as 1 995 (part 2). Variables for 
ownership/control, CNTRL89 and CNTRL95, were collected from HCF A for 1 989 and 
1 995 .  These variables were applied to the hospital sample in Parts 1 and 2 . 
Although many significant associations are found between the dependent 
variables and hospital region, the most prominent involves the variable CSTDA Y5 (cost 
per day 95), with an R-square of 0 .084 (p=.OO I) .  In contrast, the variable CSTDISC5 
(cost per discharge 95) carries a lower R-square of 0 .025 (p=.OO I ). The variables DIFRN 
(difference in RN FTEs) and DIFBED (difference in beds) also show formidable 
association with hospital region, with R-square values of 0.034 (p=.OO I )  and 0 .03 1 
(p=.O I ), respectively. In addition to confirming that hospital cost per day is affected by 
region, these results specifically l ink propensity for change in RN staff and bed size to 
geographic location. 
In tandem with these results, the effects of hospital ownership/control are found to 
be strongest on the variables DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per day) (r-square=0. 04 1 ,  
p=.OO I ), CSTDISC5 (cost per discharge 95) (r-square=0.064, p=.OO I ), and DIFCSTDS 
(difference in cost per discharge) (r-square=O.077, p=.OO I ). 
In response to these results, dichotomous variables for public/private ownership 
and profit/not-for-profit control were developed and tested in separate regression models .  
Table 1 1 . ANOV A Results for Regional and Ownership/Control. 
Variable 
Part 1 
DIFFTE 
(Difference in full-time equivalents, 89-95) 
DIFMD 
(Difference in full-time equivalents, doctors and 
dentists, 89-95) 
DIFRN 
(Difference in full-time equivalents, registered 
nurses, 89-95) 
DIFLPN 
(Difference in full-time equivalents, licensed 
practical nurses, 89-95) 
DIFNURS 
Difference in ratio of FfERN!(FI'ERN+FfELPN), 
89-95 
DlFAMB 
(Difference in ambulatory visits, 89-95) 
DlFSURG 
(Difference in outpatient surgical procedures, 89-
95) 
DlFPREV 
(Difference in preventive service score, 89-95) 
DIFBED 
(Difference in staffed beds, 89-95) 
DlFOCCRT 
(Difference in occupancy rate, 89-95) 
DlFCMI 
(Difference in Medicare case-mix index, 89-95) 
Part 2 
CSTDAY5 
(Cost per patient day, 95) 
DlFCSTDY 
(Difference in cost per day, 89-95) 
CSTDISC5 
(Cost per discharge, 95) 
DlFCSTDS 
(Difference in cost per discharge, 89-95) 
*Slgnificant p < . 10 level 
**Significant p < .05 level 
***Significant p < .0 1  level 
****Significantp < .00 1 level 
REG89 
R-sQuare F-value 
0.020 4.75**** 
0.003 0.68 
0.034 8.24**** 
0.0 1 3  3 .07*** 
0.030 7. 1 9**** 
0.010 2 .3 1 **  
0.005 1 . 2 1  
0.0 14  3.22*** 
0.03 1 7 .55*** 
0.007 1 .65 
0.026 6.26*** 
0.084 20.33**** 
. 0.02 1 4.65**** 
0.025 5 . 8 1  **** 
0.02 1 4.68**** 
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Ownership! 
Control 
R-Nuare F-value 
0.026 4.49**** 
0.0 16 2 .67*** 
0.024 4. 1 1  **** 
0.0 1 5  2.62*** 
0.022 3 .69**** 
0.020 3 . 39**** 
0.0 1 7  2 .90**** 
0.005 0 .80 
0 .010 1 . 7 1  * 
0 .010 1 . 7 1  * 
0.028 4 .88**** 
0.028 4 .7 1 **** 
0.04 1 6 .83**** 
0.064 1 1 . 16**** 
0.077 1 3 .29**** 
I I? 
ColIinearity Diagnostics 
In the multiple l inear regression model, collinearity can occur when two or more 
predictor variables display a very high correlation. Problems arise when collinear 
variables offer redundant information and cause ambiguous regression results (Canavos 
and Miller, 1 995). Appendices F and G display correlation statistics for the study' s  
original set o f  independent variables. For study purposes, a correlation value of .45 was 
used to screen for potential collinearity among independent variables. A second method 
used to confirm suspected collinearity was applied from the SAS regression procedure. 
When two variables were found to be collinear, they were individually evaluated for their 
statistical significance in the model as well as their theoretical and conceptual importance 
to the study. In more complex cases, regression analysis was performed and results 
reviewed to determine whether collinearity was distorting regression coefficients. 
Because of the large number of variables already included in regression models and the 
potential for collinearity, variables offering redundant information were not retained. 
In Part 1, the following variables were immediately eliminated due to potential 
problems in collinearity: MSASTGH9 (the number of short-term general hospitals in a 
hospital ' s MSA), HHIPD89 (the Herfindahl index calculated with patient days as market 
share), CUMDIFF (the hospital-specific excess in mean survival over 1 80 days), and 
BDTOT89 (the hospital ' s  number of staffed beds reported for 1 989). These eliminations 
were fairly straightforward because their correlations were relatively high, and because 
other measures in the study could provide similar, if not identical, information. 
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Two sets of correlations in Part I posed more of a challenge. MAPP889, 
indicating whether a hospital was a member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, 
correlated with ADC89 (average daily census ' 89), with an "r" value of 0.495 and p­
value of . 000 1 .  Collinearity was verified in the SAS regression procedure. A reasonable 
discovery is that among the sample community hospitals, larger hospitals had a tendency 
to include a teaching mission in their departmental activities. Since hospital size has 
proven to be critical as a control variable, both in the literature and in the preliminary 
analyses of this study, ADC89 was retained as an independent variable in the regression 
model and MAPP889 was eliminated. 
The second problem correlation occurred between MHSMEM89 (member of a 
hospital system in ' 89) and LOCSYS89 (member of a hospital system shared by at least 
one other hospital in the MSA in ' 89). Logic dictates that some redundancy exists in the 
variability provided by these measures. The "r" value for their correlation was 0 .498 
with a p-value of . 000 1 .  Again, the SAS regression procedure verified collinearity in 
this relationship. Since the data collected for local system membership was more specific 
and considered more relevant to hospital management decisions, the LOCSYS89 variable  
was retained for regression analysis instead of the MHSMEM89 variable. 
In Part 2, potential collinearity arose in correlations detected between the 
following variables : DIFFTE (difference in FTEs) and DIFRN (difference in RN FTEs), 
DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio) and DIFLPN (difference in LPN FTEs), 
BDTOT95 (total staffed beds reported in '95) and ADC95 (average daily census in '95) ,  
MAPP895 (membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals, '95)and ADC95 (average 
daily census in '95), and HMCR_95 (Medicare portion of hospital discharges) and 
HMCD _95 (Medicaid portion of hospital discharges). 
The SAS procedure for detecting collinearity did not confirm loading problems 
with all these variable pairs, however. In response to this information, the regression 
model for Part 2 was run several times to test specific variable effects on parameter 
estimates. A revised regression model for Part 2 was developed without the variables 
DIFFTE (difference in total FTEs), DIFNURS (difference in nursing ratio), BDTOT95 
(total staffed beds reported in 1 995), and MAPP895 (membership in the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals, '95) .  Variables for DIFRN (difference in RN FTEs), DIFLPN 
(difference in LPN FTEs), HMCR_95 (Medicare portion of hospital discharges) and 
HMCD_95 (Medicaid portion of hospital discharges) were retained for analysis. 
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In findings similar to Part 1 ,  the variables MHSMEM95 (member of a hospital 
system, '95) and LOCSYS94 (member of a hospital system shared by at least one other 
hospital in the MSA in '95) showed some degree of correlation (r=.3 82, r=.000 1 ). In 
order to maintain consistency and avoid collinearity, MHSMEM95 was deleted as a 
predictor variable and LOCSYS94 was retained in the regression model for Part 2 .  
Transformation of  Variables 
All study variables were analyzed using the SAS univariate procedure. Tests for 
normality appeared acceptable for all variables, with the exception ofDIFMD (difference 
in physician and dentist FTEs). This variable was found to be deficient. Subsequent 
transformation of the DIFMD variable did not improve its normality nor its regression 
results .  Since it was deemed unsuitable for the regression model, the variable DIFMD 
was retained for ANOV A analysis only. 
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Preliminary regression analyses were performed, using revised models for Part I 
and Part 2 as discussed. Residuals were plotted against the corresponding X-values to 
test the first assumption of the regression model : that a linear association exists between 
response and predictor variables. With the regression model appropriately applied, 
residuals should exhibit no pattern when graphed against any variable. Secondly, 
residuals were plotted against the predicted Y-values to test the second regression 
assumption: that the error variance is constant (Canavos and Miller, 1 995) .  
Residual plots were acceptable for the most part; however all  regressions did not 
generate residuals with completely random errors. Further investigation identified 
individual variables exhibiting regression model deficiencies .  
After several trials, it was found that transformation of selected dependent and 
independent variables would remedy these apparent violations of model assumptions. 
The following dependent variables from Part 1 were transformed : DIFFTE (difference in 
FTEs), DIFLPN (difference in LPN FTEs), DIFBED (difference in staffed beds), 
DIF AMB (difference in ambulatory visits), and DIFSURG (difference in outpatient 
surgical procedures). Regression models were also improved with the transformation of 
the following independent variables: HMOPEN89 (HMO penetration, ' 89) and 
HIllDC89 (Herfindahl index for hospital discharges, ' 89). The transformation method 
consisted of taking the square root of each variable' s absolute value, and then putting 
back in its sign. 
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With transformation of selected variables, desirable residual plots (with no 
discernable pattern) were obtained for all regression models in Part 1 and Part 2. At this 
point, the third and fourth regression assumptions were tested for each analysis 
performed. These assumptions state that random errors are independent and normally 
distributed (Canavos and Miller, 1 995). Residuals were analyzed with the SAS 
univariate procedure, and their normality was found to be acceptable. 
Model Estimations, Part 1 
Tables 1 2  through 14 summarize model estimates and their significance for the 
study' s  ten dependent variables of change in Part 1 .  All models have statistically 
significant F-values. 
Table 12 describes staffing statistics. The average change in hospital FTEs was a 
positive one. Among the variables of interest, the HMO penetration rate carried a 
negative association with DIFFTE. In a similar observation of change, the average 
difference in RN FTEs was accomplished through adding personnel. HMO penetration 
rate was also negatively associated with DIFRN. Hospital mortality ratio for 1 989 was 
significant in the DIFRN regression as well, showing a positive association with 
increased RN staff. 
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Table 12. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Staff 
Variable Standardized Standardized Standardized Standardized 
Estimate for Estimate for Estimate for Estimate for 
DIFFTEt DIFRN DIFLPNt DIFNURS 
N= 1 8 1 6  N= 1 8 1 8  N=1 8 1 8  N= 1 8 1 8  
HMOPEN89t -0.076* * *  -0.077* * *  0 . 008 -0 .052* 
HHIDC89t 0 .036 0 .004 -0.049* 0 .0 1 7  
CSTDISC9 0 .0 1 3  0 .001 0 .036 -0.0 1 4  
MORTJO 0.033 0 .085 * * * *  -0.032 0 . 1 22* * * *  
ADC89 0 . 1 1 9* * * *  0 .206* * * *  
HMCR 89 -0.089* * * *  -0 .059* *  
HMCD 8 9  -0 .002 0.030 
ALL89 0.036 -0.0 1 5  
CONPHY89 0 .0 14  -0. 0 1 7  
MNGT89 0 .005 -7 . 593 x 1 0·' 
LOCSYS89 -0 .067* * *  -5 . 1 58 x 1 0-4 
PUB 0.066* * *  0 .082* * * *  
Intercept 0 .000* 0 .000 
R-square 0 .056 0 .073 
Adj . R-square 0 .050 0 .067 
F-ratio 8 . 996* * * *  1 1 . 865 * * * *  
Notes :  t Vanable I S  transformed through square root. 
*Significant p < . 10 level. 
**Significant p < .05 level. 
***Significant p < .01  level. 
****Significant p < .00 1 level. 
-0 .227* * * *  0 .00 1 
-0.0 1  I 0.060* *  
-0 .023 0 .074* * *  
-0 .054* *  0 .020 
-0.024 0 .007 
-0 .008 0 .05 1 * *  
0 .002 -0 .035  
0 .062* *  -0. 0 1 0  
0 .000 0 .000 
0 .064 0 .034 
0 .058 0 .027 
10 .265 * * * *  5 .232* * *  
The difference i n  LPN FTEs, which was significant as a staff reduction, was 
negatively associated with HHI , indicating that increased competition promoted change 
in this area. The difference in hospital nursing ratios, significantly positive in the sample, 
was negatively associated with HMO penetration rates and positively associated with 
mortality rates. 
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Therefore, these analyses show that when HMO penetration was relatively low 
and poor performance was demonstrated through slightly higher mortality rates, sample 
hospitals tended to change overall staff, and specifical ly add RN staff, between 1 989 and 
1 994. The direction of change was to increase staff members, on the average. On the 
other hand, conditions of a competitive market were associated with a movement toward 
change (reduction) in the number of LPNs working in the sample hospitals during the 
study period. 
Among the control variables, ADC89 (average daily census) and PUB (public 
ownership/control) displayed significant positive association with staff changes in FTEs, 
RNs and LPNs; while HMCR_89 (Medicare portion of discharges) was negatively 
associated with FTE and RN staff increases. The variable for hospital membership in a 
local system was also negatively associated with overall change in hospital FTEs. 
In regard to hospital capacity in Table 1 3 ,  the difference in hospital beds reflects a 
significant reduction in staffed beds over the study period. The difference in beds 
between 1 989 and 1 994 is positively associated with cost per discharge in 1 989.  
Difference in occupancy rate, also a negative change on the average, is not significantly 
associated with the variables of interest. Case-mix index in 1 994, which shows a 
significant increase over the study period, is positively associated with hospital cost per 
discharge, HHI, and mortality rates in 1 989. 
To interpret these results, poor performance factors in the form of relatively high 
' 89 costs and high mortality rates were associated with a hospital ' s  propensity to change 
its bedsize and its case-mix index. Additionally, it appears that hospitals in a less 
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competitive MSA, with fewer HMO enrollees, were more prone experience change in 
their occupancy rates over the study period. One may observe that reduction of beds and 
reduction of occupancy rate constituted the general direction of change. Final ly, low 
competition (in the form of a higher HHI) was associated with a higher change in CM!, 
consisting of an overall movement toward more complex cases.  
Among the control variables, average daily census showed strong negative 
association with hospital cuts in beds and occupancy rate, suggesting that hospitals with 
smaller patient volumes were more prone to make these changes in capacity. The 
proportion of Medicare and Medicaid patients carried a significant negative association 
with the upward shift in hospital case-mix index, indicating that cases from other 
insurance sources were becoming more complex over the study period. 
Table 13. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Capacity. 
Variable Standardized Estimate for 
DIFBEDt N- 1818  DIFOCCRT N; 1818  
HMOPEN89t -0.043 -0.044** 
HHIDC89t -0.035 0.046 
CSTDISC9 0.066*** 0.0 18  
MORT30 0.029 0.0 1 1  
ADC89 -0.096**** -0.061** 
HMCR 89 -0.006 0.038 
HMCD 89 0.044* 0.020 
ALL89 -0.033 0.002 
CONPHY89 0.032 -0.040 
MNGT89 0.024 -0.0 1 8  
LOCSYS89 -0.036 -0.035 
PUB 0.046* -0.002 
Intercept 0.000 0.000** 
R-square 0.023 0.020 
Adj. R-square 0.0 17  0.0 13  
F-ratio 3 . 586**** 2 .990**** 
Notes: t Vanable IS transformed through square root. 
* Significant p < . 10 level. 
**Significant p < .05 level. 
** * Significant p < .0 I level. 
****Significant p < .00 1  level. 
DIFCMIN; 1 8  1 7  
0.002 
0.082*** 
0. 140****  
0.045** 
0 .3 14**** 
-0 .049** 
-0.047** 
0.004 
-0.0 1 3  
-0.0 18  
0.005 
-0 .036 
0.000* 
0 . 143 
0. 1 38  
25. 1 39**** 
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Table 14  displays the results of  regression analysis between ambulatory workload 
and independent study variables. Changes in hospital preventive service scores, which 
had significantly decreased between 1 989 and 1994, are negatively associated with HMO 
penetration rates. The variable measuring difference in ambulatory visits, which 
generally increased over the study period, displays a positive association with HHI and a 
negative association with HMO penetration. The difference in surgical procedures, 
DIFSURG, increased among the sample hospitals, shows a negative association with 
HMO penetration rate. 
Table 14. Standardized Estimates for Change in Hospital Ambulatory Workload . 
Variable Standardized Estimate for 
DIFPREV N- 1818  DIFAMBt N- 18 16  
HMOPEN89t -0.094··· -0.056·· 
HHlDC89t -0.039 0.060·· 
CSTDISC9 0.0 12  0.0 1 l  
MORT30 0.002 -0.002 
ADC89 0.046 0.236···· 
HMCR 89 0.020 -0.062·· 
HMCD 89 -0.046· -0.042· 
ALL89 -0.0 13  -0.035 
CONPHY89 -0.044· 0 .019 
MNGT89 -0.038 0.005 
LOCSYS89 -0.032 -0.072··· 
FP89 -0.046· -0.069·" 
Intercept 0.000 0.000··· 
R-square 0.0 17  0.090 
Adj. R-square 0.010 0.084 
F-ratio 2.554** 14.896·*·· 
Notes :  t Vanable IS transformed through square root. 
·Significant p < . 10 level. 
· ·Significant p < .05 level. 
*.·Significant p < .01  level. 
• • •  ·Significant p < .00 1 level. 
DIFSURGt N- 1 8 1 7  
-0.060·· 
0.0 1 3  
-0.0 10 
-0.0 1 1  
0. 174···· 
-0. 123····  
-0.095···· 
0.057·· 
-0.007 
-0.007 
-0.017  
-0.488* 
0.000···* 
0.07 1 
0.065 
1 1 . 5 1 1  ....  
These results indicate that hospitals in areas with less HMO penetration were 
more prone to change their preventive services, often by removing some of the measured 
1 2 6  
services. Additionally, these hospitals showed more change in their ambulatory visits 
and surgical procedures during the 1 989- 1 994 interval. Furthermore, less competition in 
the MSA was associated with greater increase in ambulatory visits during the study 
period. 
Control variables display several notable associations. Average daily census, the 
variable indicator for hospital size, is positively associated with changes in ambulatory 
and outpatient surgical workload. Medicare and Medicaid patient volumes are negatively 
associated with expansion in ambulatory services. Results also indicate a negative 
relationship between hospitals '  local system membership status and their associated 
increase in ambulatory workload. Additionally, for-profit ownership is negatively 
associated with hospital change in ambulatory services during the study period .  
Results of  Interaction Models, Part 1 
Regression analysis was performed for the interaction models proposed in Part 1 .  
Results from this series of analyses are listed in Appendix H. Generally, results from 
regressions using interaction terms were similar to their independent variable 
counterparts. One important exception was found : the interaction between cost per 
discharge in 1 989 and competition (CSTDISC9*HHIDC) displays a significant positive 
relationship with the dependent variable for difference in ambulatory visits 
(DIFAMB(T» . 
Model Estimations, Part 2 . 
Table 1 5  summarizes regression results for Part 2, where dependent variables for 
hospital financial performance are analyzed against independent variables of environment 
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and change from Part 1 .  The dependent variables are DIFCSTDY (difference in cost per 
patient day) and DIFCSTDS (difference in cost per discharge). Each model is run twice 
in order to include dichotomous variables for ownership/control, PUB5 (public hospital) 
and FP95 (for-profit ownership). All four regression models display significant results. 
For interpretation purposes, low values for DIFCSTDY and DIFCSTDS are 
considered good performance. The variable DIFCSTDY is significantly associated with 
several independent variables. Positive associations occur with DIFRN and DIFLPN(T). 
Negative associations occur between DIFCSTDY and the variables DIFBED(T), 
DIFOCCRT, and DIFCMI. These relationships carry a p-value of 0 .05 or lower. 
These results indicate that hospitals which did not change their RN or LPN FTEs 
between 1 989 and 1 994 were associated with good performance in 1 995 .  Additionally, 
those hospitals which experienced change in bed size, occupancy rate and case-mix index 
were associated with good performance. 
The independent variable for cost per discharge in 1 989 is negatively associated 
with all four of the dependent financial variables, suggesting that hospitals with a history 
of high costs were more likely to control their growth in spending from 1 989 to 1 995 .  
Table 15. Estimates of Hospital Performance. 
Variable Standardized Standardized 
Estimate, Estimate, 
Difference in Difference in 
Cost Per Day Cost Per Day 
N=1 767 N=1 767 
DIFRN 0.074* * *  0 .069* * *  
DIFLPNt 0 .055 * *  0.05 1 * *  
DIFAMBt 0 .0 14  0 .0 1 9  
DIFSURGt -0 .0 1 3  -0 .0 1 0  
DIFPREV 0.020 0 .025 
DIFBEDt -0 .267* * * *  -0 .275 * * * *  
DIFOCCRT -0 .258* * * *  -0 .260* * * *  
DIFCMI -0 . 1 27* * * *  -0. 1 27* * * *  
HMOPEN89t 0 .0 1 0  0.0 1 6  
HHIDC89t 0 .040 0.033 
CSTDISC9 -0.236* * * *  -0.260* * * *  
MORTJO 0.024 0 .02 1 
ADC95 -0. 009 0 .0 1 5  
HMCR 95 0 .0 1 6  0 .026 
HMCD 95 0 .099* * * *  0 .089* * * *  
SUNlTS95 -0 .074* * * *  -0 .080* * * *  
ALL95 0.053 * *  0 .068* * *  
MNGT95 0 .046* *  0 .049* *  
LOCSYS94 -0 .042* -0 .054* *  
PUB95 0 .060* * *  
FP95 -0 .095* * * *  
Intercept 0 .000* * * *  0 .000* * * *  
R-square 0 .22 1 0 .2 1 8  
Adjusted R-square 0 .2 12  0.208 
F value 24. 826* * * *  24.280* * * *  
Notes :  t Vanable I S  transformed through square root. 
* Significant p < . 10 level. 
**Significant p < .05 level. 
***Significant p < .01  level. 
****Significant p < .00 1 level. 
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Standardized Standardized 
Estimate, Estimate, 
Difference in Difference in 
Cost Per Cost Per 
Discharge Discharge 
N=1 767 N= 1 767 
0 .050* *  0 .039* 
0 .0 1 2  0 .002 
-0.034 -0 .026 
-0 .055 * *  -0 .050* *  
0 .0 1 3  0 .02 1  
-0 .006 -0 . 0 1 9  
0 .048* *  0 .043 * 
-0 .053 * *  -0 .052* *  
-0 .022 -0 .0 1 0  
0 .040 0 .023 
-0 . 353 * * * *  -0. 395 * * * *  
0 .004 -0 .005 
0 .050* 0 .09 1 * * * *  
0.078* * *  0 .099* * * *  
0 .07 1 * * *  0 .047* 
0 .007 -0.002 
0 .004 0 .026 
0 .059* * *  0 .06 1 * * *  
-0 .065 * * *  -0 .078* * * *  
0 . 1 56* * * *  
-0. 1 5 5 * * * *  
0 .000* * * *  0 .000* * * *  
0 .220 0 .2 1 9  
0 .207 0 .2 1 0  
24.007* * * *  24.462* * * *  
In Table 1 5, the variable DIFCSTDS i s  positively associated with the variables 
DIFRN and DIFOCCRT; and negatively associated with the variables DIFSURG(T), 
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DIFCMI, and CSTDISC9. All of these variable relationships are significant to at least a 
0 .05 level . 
To interpret these statistics, hospitals which did not change their staff RN FTEs or 
occupancy patterns are associated with good performance in controlling cost per 
discharge. Also, hospitals which did change their workload in the form of outpatient 
surgical procedures are associated with good performance. Hospitals with smaller 
change to occupancy rates over the study period are associated with lower difference in 
cost per discharge in 1 995 .  Finally, hospitals experiencing a relatively large change in 
CMI are associated with good financial performance over the study period. 
When the dependent variable is  difference in cost per discharge (generally 
reflecting an increase between 1 989 and 1 995), hospitals showing high costs in ' 89 
appear to have contained their cost growth during the study period. . In the area of poor 
performance, changes to increase staff, and specifically RNs, are associated with higher 
hospital cost" differences over time. Decreasing occupancy rate is associated with bad 
performance, a result which differs from analysis measuring cost per patient day. 
Alternatively, increasing outpatient surgical procedures and increasing case complexity 
are associated with reducing operational costs. 
Control variables in these regressions are particularly noteworthy. The proportion 
of Medicare patients is significantly associated with growth in cost per discharge.  The 
proportion of Medicaid patients is positively associated with both dependent variables, 
indicating poor performance outcomes in hospitals with more Medicaid patients. The 
SUNITS95 variable for nursing home capability is  negatively associated with 
DIFCSTDY, suggesting that those hospitals which adopted a nursing home service 
controlled their costs better than those which did not. 
Under the category of external affiliations, the variable ALL95 is positively 
associated with DIFCSTDY, an indicator for poor financial performance. Those 
hospitals which were contract managed are also positively associated with the 
DIFCSTDY and DIFCSTDS variables, suggesting poor performance. In contrast, 
hospitals in local systems are significantly associated with good performance through 
their negative regression estimates with both financial variables. 
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Of particular interest among the control variables, public hospitals are 
significantly associated with the dependent cost variables in a positive direction, 
indicating poor cost performance. For-profit hospitals have a significant association in a 
negative direction, indicating hospitals with good cost performance. 
Summary of Findings in Comparison to Study Hypotheses 
Tables 1 6  and 1 7  review general aspects of the hypothesized and observed 
relationships between variables of interest in the study. Only associations with statistical 
significance (p-value of 0 . 1 0  or less) are listed. The change variables in Part 1 and Part 2 
are interpreted in reference to the magnitude of their change (small to large) as well as the 
direction. The variables DIFBED and DIFOCCRT were hypothesized and observed as 
reductions, while DIFRN was originally hypothesized as a reduction and observed as an 
increase. Other change variables were observed as increases, with the exception of 
DIFPREY. This variable was expected to increase, but it was observed to decrease over 
the period of study. 
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Table 16. Comparison of Hypothesized and Observed Variable Relationships, Part 1 .  
Dependent HMOPEN89 HHIDC89 CSTDISC9 MORT3 0 
Variables of 
Change 
DIFMD 
DIFRN - + 
Supported in Supported, but 
hypothesized opposite of 
direction the 
hypothesized 
direction 
DIFAMB - + 
Supported, Supported, but 
but opposite opposite of the 
of the hypothesized 
hypothesized direction 
direction 
DIFSURG -
Supported, 
but opposite 
of the 
hypothesized 
direction 
DIFPREV -
Supported in 
hypothesized 
direction 
DIFBED + 
Supported in 
hypothesized 
direction 
DIFOCCRT -
Supported, 
but opposite 
of the 
hypothesized 
direction 
DIFCMI + + + 
Supported, but Supported in Supported in 
opposite of the hypothesized hypothesized 
hypothesized d irection direction 
direction 
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Table 17. Comparison of  Hypothesized and Observed Variable Relationships, Part 2 .  
a .  
Dependent DIFRN DIFSURG DIFBED 
Variables 
DIFCSTDY + -
Supported in Supported in 
hypothesized hypothesized direction 
direction 
DIFCSTDS + -
Supported in Supported in 
hypothesized hypothesized 
direction direction 
b .  
Depel).dent DIFOCCRT DIFCMl CSTDISC9 
Variables 
DIFCSTDY - - -
Supported in Supported in Supported in 
hypothesized hypothesized hypothesized direction 
direction direction 
DIFCSTDS + - -
Supported, but Supported in Supported in 
opposite of the hypothesized hypothesized direction 
hypothesized direction 
direction 
CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the study' s  hypotheses and how they compare to 
significant relationships observed between selected variables. Research questions are 
revisited in reference to analysis and broader study implications for health services 
management. Limitations of the study are discussed. Future research projects are 
suggested, based upon findings from this study. 
Hypothesis Testing and Interpretation 
Regression models in Part 1 indicate that HMO penetration in 1 989 was 
significantly associated with sample hospitals that did not make changes. Specifically, 
hospitals involved with managed care appear to have kept their RN FTEs relatively stable 
and did not add ambulatory visits, outpatient surgical procedures, or additional preventive 
services. This series of observations is  in opposition to Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 .  It was 
hypothesized that HMO penetration would stimulate reduction in RNs and growth in 
outpatient services. 
In considering the RN staffing hypothesis, however, the observed results bear 
some relation to the original hypothesis in respect to curbing growth. In other words, 
hospitals located in areas of high HMO penetration did not expand their RN staff between 
1 989 and 1 994, in contrast to the trend observed in other institutions. It is possible that 
surveys of staff reductions after 1 990 would have supported Hypothesis 1 in terms of 
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actual reductions in nursing personnel, because additional RN staff in the year 1 989 may 
have offset overall reductions taken later in the study period.  
In the area of hospital performance, mortality ratios have a positive association 
with RN staffing changes, supporting Hypothesis 1, yet reversing the expected direction. 
S ince mortality is a measure of quality and cost per discharge is  a measure of financial 
success, it seems reasonable that these performance variables display opposite 
relationships with hospital change in RN staff. Unfortunately, the financial variable is  
not significant in regression testing for DIFRN. 
A possible explanation for results in outpatient services is that hospitals greatly 
involved in HMO contracting were not focused on expanding their outpatient util ization. 
In fact, HMO contractors might seek inpatient services exclusively from hospitals, and 
obtain ambulatory services elsewhere. On the other end of the spectrum, those 
community hospitals which had not experienced an influx of HMO opportunities were 
free to develop product lines other than acute inpatient care. 
It was hypothesized that hospitals in areas of high HMO penetration would 
experience a reduction in their patient occupancy rates, presumably due to more emphasis 
on outpatient procedures in the managed care environment. On the contrary, study 
results indicate that hospitals in areas of low HMO penetration were the most likely to 
see a reduction in occupancy rates. Once again, the arrival of HMO organizations 
appears to have stabilized hospital util ization rather than stimulated monumental change. 
Hypotheses that market competition would promote hospital change were 
supported in association with variables for difference in ambulatory services and case-
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mix index, but the directions of these relationships were not as  expected. According to 
these results, conditions of greater competition were associated with hospitals which did 
not raise their ambulatory workload over the study period. Possibly, these hospitals 
responded to competition in other ways, such as emphasizing core inpatient services. 
Maintaining a more sedentary case-mix index may have been another method for 
competitive hospitals to "stick to what they know," instead of venturing into more 
complex and extraordinary treatment regimens. With the onset of greater technological 
capabilities and DRG reimbursement practices, hospitals which were somewhat 
unchallenged in their MSA were more prone to produce a more complex patient episode. 
The transition to a higher case-mix index was also displayed, as hypothesized, in 
hospitals experiencing poor performance in 1 989. The variables for cost per discharge 
and mortality ratio exhibit significant associations with change in case-mix index in Part 
1 .  These results are supportive of the theoretical framework linking poor performance 
with organizational predilection for change in structure. 
Further empirical support for structural contingency theory is found in the 
positive significant relationship between hospital cost per discharge and subsequent 
change in bedsize. Higher costs in 1 989 are associated with hospitals '  reduction in bed 
capacity between 1 989 and 1 994. 
In Part 2, several significant associations are found between dependent variables 
of cost and the independent variables of hospital change. Hospitals which changed their 
staffing by adding RN FTEs were associated with higher costs, including difference in 
cost per patient day and difference in cost per discharge. This finding is in support of 
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 5 is supported with respect to outpatient surgeries only: 
hospitals which succeeded in expanding their outpatient surgeries were associated with 
lower costs. Changes in preventive services and ambulatory visits did not show 
significant relationships to the dependent cost variables. 
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Hypothesis 6, regarding the association between change in hospital capacity and 
good performance, is extensively supported. Significant relationships are found between 
bed reductions and desirable cost performance. Hospitals with greater increases in case­
mix index were also associated with lower cost differences, both in cost per patient day 
and cost per discharge. 
In reference to Hypothesis 6, hospitals which experienced greatly reduced 
occupancy rates exhibited mixed results with dependent financial variables. In these 
models, reduced occupancy was associated with good performance in cost per patient day 
and poor performance in cost per discharge. Although patient length of stay was not 
measured, descriptive statistics indicate that average occupancy rate decreased and 
average case-mix index increased over the study period. If occupancy rate was reduced 
by eliminating unnecessary hospitalizations and retaining inpatients in need of more 
complex services, then improved control over cost per patient day could possibly coexist 
with higher cost per patient discharge. 
In Part 1, 1 1  statistically significant relationships are detected among a total of 3 2  
hypothesized associations. Five of these associations are in the expected direction. Of 
the 14 variable relationships hypothesized in Part 2, 7 associations are confirmed in the 
expected direction, and one is supported in the opposite direction from expected. 
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I t  i s  also found that hospitals with higher cost per discharge figures in  1 989 were 
significantly associated with better cost performance, or lower cost increases, over the 
study period. This result is in support of the SARFIT theory, where previous poor 
performance stimulates structural response and improved performance on the part of the 
organization. 
Responses to Research Questions 
This study presents three basic research questions. The first question is whether 
community hospitals exhibited significant structural change in the years following the 
implementation of Medicare prospective payment practices. Descriptive statistics for 
change variables indicate that change did indeed occur: in staff size, outpatient services 
and hospital capacity. The direction of change was not always as expected, however. 
Instead of reducing RN FTEs, the average trend was for hospitals to add RNs to the staff. 
Additionally, results indicate that community hospitals did not expand preventive 
services. For the services measured, the average change was to eliminate preventive 
health programs. 
The second research question searches for the strongest environmental influences 
on structural changes within the community hospitals . In comparing HM:O enrollment 
(as an indicator of managed care penetration) with the Herfindahl index of market 
competition, results suggest that managed care is a prominent force in keeping internal 
hospital structure stable. It seems evident that with the establishment of managed care 
insurance sources, community hospitals are being relegated to a specific acute-care 
capacity, rather than the regional health center that was envisioned by a few industry 
analysts. 
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Consistent with the SARFIT contingency theory, variables for poor past 
performance show significant positive relationships with structural variables in the study. 
In other words, past performance may be considered a substantial influence in promoting 
structural change in hospitals. 
The third research question seeks to link organizational change with subsequent 
performance. The study carries some empirical evidence that, at least from an economic 
standpoint, community hospitals which conducted specific changes in ambulatory 
services and inpatient capacity were found to be better performers over a defined period 
of time ( 1 989- 1 995) .  
Theoretical Implications 
The SARFIT (Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit) theory was solidly supported 
with regard to the inclusion of poor past performance as a substantial factor in promoting 
structural change among hospitals. However, the theoretical relationship between 
interaction effects and structural change was supported in just one application. In that 
test, a variable for hospital cost per discharge '89 interacted with the corresponding 
Herfindahl value for market competition. Their interaction held a stronger effect upon 
difference in ambulatory visits than the cost per discharge variable alone. 
Of the three elements of hospital structure selected for the study, professionalism 
and inpatient capacity were more consistently related to the other theoretical constructs. 
Although hospital change in ambulatory and preventive services can be accurately 
measured, in this study outpatient service scope was not successfully linked with the 
managed care environment. 
Implications for Health Services Management 
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The results of  this study indicate that hospitals have indeed begun to  make 
internal changes in response to the managed care revolution. However, the direction of 
these changes was not always in accordance with study expectations. 
In this sample of community hospitals, HMO penetration was significantly 
associated with more change variables than market competition. In the hospital 
environment, competition for acute care patients has been fairly stable. Recently, post­
PPS challenges for various ambulatory services have appeared from other sources, such 
as clinics, doctors' offices, laboratories, and home health care agencies (HCIA, 1 995) .  
Managed care is  a relatively new phenomenon as well .  A longitudinal look at both 
market competition and managed care penetration could possibly reveal more about 
hospital response to contingencies. 
In summary, the community hospital was expected to become more things to 
more people in order to survive. The reasoning was that the managed care system 
delivers health at all levels, not just the traditional acute care episode. In one scenario, 
hospitals could be expected to expand in ambulatory and preventive services in support 
of the HMO concept. In an alternative scenario, hospitals would be splintered off as 
smaller pieces of an integrated network of patient care. 
This study found that higher HMO penetration brought some stability in hospital 
nursing staffs. Possibly, hospitals involved with managed care found that HMO contracts 
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brought more predictable workload requirements. Additionally, hospitals located in areas 
with high HMO penetration almost exclusively maintained their acute-care inpatient 
focus. Clearly, study results suggest that the future direction for community hospitals is 
to move from the center to the periphery of the health care spectrum. 
In relation to hospital performance, reduction in utilization was beneficial to 
facil ity costs per patient day, but damaging to costs per patient discharge. Assuming that 
future reimbursements will be made according to the individual admission rather than by 
the patient ' s  length of stay, full util ization of the facility will become desirable in the 
future. 
Although study models in Part 1 showed limited support for the SARFIT 
suggestion of interaction in structural readjustment, independent variables representing 
the contingency (HMO penetration), environmental i l l iberality (HHI) and past 
performance (mortality at 30 days) demonstrated significant associations with the 
hospitals' propensity for change. Further application of the SARFIT theory and 
refinement of test models could possibly provide more insight into hospital change in 
staffing patterns and capacity. 
The initial sample of community hospitals was selected based on specific stand­
alone properties. These hospitals were not units of larger institutions, nor did they 
include nursing home services. With 568 1 general medical and surgical hospitals in the 
AHA survey base for 1 989, the study sample comprised approximately 3 1% of the total, 
with specific features as stated above. 
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Therefore, the generalization of  study results t o  a larger population of  American 
hospitals should only take place with these features in mind. Additionally, study results 
confirm the dynamic nature of acquisitions and mergers among hospitals (HeIA, 1 995), 
indicating a trend toward "systemness." In the future, the loss of a unique identity will 
probably render the stand-alone local hospital extinct. 
Study Limitations 
The most prominent limitation to the study is loss of the initial 255 hospitals in 
the original population. These hospitals underwent the ultimate structural change by 
losing their identity between 1 989 and 1 995.  This loss occurred through hospital closure, 
merging with other hospitals or occasionally by demerging into smaller organizational 
units. The remaining population held some bias with respect to representation in region, 
ownership/control, and bedsize. 
In the New England region, for example, the expected number of attritions was 1 6  
hospitals, but the actual number was 28 hospitals .  While 1 5  state or county hospitals 
were expected to be lost to the population, only 6 actually disappeared. In the category of 
size, more of the smallest hospitals (6-24 beds) were lost while larger-sized hospitals  
(300-399 beds) were retained beyond their proportionate predictions. 
Other limitations to the study are related to variable measurements and their 
imprecision as indicators in the models .  A second source of error is the aggregation of 
county data into MSA market areas. Thirdly, missing data necessitated reduced sample 
sizes and occasional substitutions in measurement. The effects of these l imitations are 
variable in themselves; and in some instances they are offset by the panel study design or 
the large sample size. A fourth limiting element in the analysis is the absence of data 
regarding the relationship between medical staff and their hospitals. 
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The study measure for HMO penetration, which was the number of HMO 
enrollees per population (in 1 00s), is somewhat nonspecific to the dependent variable of 
hospital change. In other words, a more ideal measure would be more directly related to 
hospital issues. Examples of more accurate measures are the proportion of discharges 
who were enrolled in HMOs, or the number and size of HMO contracts held by sample 
hospitals. 
The range of the study' S variable for HMO penetration was 0% to 1 27. 8%, rather 
than 0% to 1 00.0010. This statistical artifact is due to Interstudy reporting methods. 
According to Interstudy, all membership for a particular HMO is included in the county 
where the HMO address is located. HMO enrollees could actually be located in 
surrounding counties (Area Resources File, 1 996) . Furthermore, Interstudy data did not 
report HMO addresses prior to 1 99 1 ,  thereby allowing for possible inaccuracy in HMO 
enrollment figures. 
The study' s  aggregation of county HMO enrollment data to the MSA level served 
to alleviate, but not eliminate, these sources of bias. The single MSA where HMO 
penetration reached the maximum value ( 1 27 .8%) was Los Angeles, where HMO 
concentration is historically dense. Other MSAs carried an HMO penetration rate of 
1 00%. They were located in the San Francisco Bay Area, also highly infused with 
managed care plans. 
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The study variable for market competition, HHI, utilized hospital share of 
admissions for nonfederal medical-surgical hospitals in every MSA. Other competitors 
for ambulatory care, such as freestanding clinics, laboratories, doctors' offices, and home 
health services, were not accounted for. Greater detail in the assessment of the health 
services market might have allowed for more significant findings in the formulated 
models of change. 
The aggregation of HMO penetration and market competition data to the MSA 
level had positive and negative effects upon the study' s results. Primarily, the 
combination of geographic information from multiple counties eliminated the error 
associated with patients who cross county lines in order to obtain medical care. 
Secondly, the study was concerned with competition inside urban centers of health care 
delivery, and so MSA assignments were appropriate. Problems arise, however, when 
MSAs are too big to adequately represent the travel distance between potential patients 
and the sample hospitals. For example, the MSA for Washington D.C .  includes 
Baltimore and all areas in between. Geographic measures for local hospital markets have 
been developed in more detail (Phibbs and Robinson, 1 993), and would probably present 
a more specific picture of the sample hospitals. 
When particular data were unavailable for a target year, the closest possible data 
set was substituted. Specifically, hospital cost figures from 1 995 were adjusted with their 
1 994 case-mix index. The variable for each hospital ' s  local system membership was 
collected from 1 994 survey data in place of 1 995 data. Data sources for mortality rates 
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had been discontinued since 1 992, and no substitutes were found. Similarly, the control 
variable for hospital contracting of a physician liaison was discontinued since 1 993 . 
Although other data sets were present and appropriate for the timeframe of the 
study, missing observations degraded the financial analysis to a minor extent. Out of 
1 882 hospitals retained in the sample, only 1 767 were analyzed due to missing data 
elements. Many of the missing observations were in HCFA' s cost data, however AHA 
had some observations missing in the categorical control variables. A relatively large 
sample size allows for study conclusions to be made despite these imperfections. 
An interesting problem arose when the variable DIFMD was not found suitable  
for regression analysis. Lack of information regarding the hospital ' s  medical staff 
remains an important limitation. Admittedly, the physicians and dentists who were 
hospital employees could not be considered as proxies for independent medical 
practitioners. However, the increase in medical FTEs was being investigated to 
determine whether hospital employment was a viable option for physician-managers. 
These individuals were professionals who could help manage decision-making among the 
medical staff. The variable indicating a contracted position for a physician liaison is the 
only measure for physician involvement in the regression models. 
Study Population Compared to National Hospital Trends 
Several important national trends faced hospitals just prior to 1 994. Prominent 
issues included concern over health care expenditures, the steady rise of uninsured 
Americans, and projected expenses from Medicare and Medicaid, where beneficiary 
populations were growing as well .  Concurrently, the health care industry was forming 
integrated networks, ambulatory care centers, and home-based alternatives to hospital 
stays. At the local level, many hospitals went through activities with mergers, HMO 
alliances, and PHO (physician-hospital organization) formation (HCIA, 1 995) .  
145 
From a broad sample of more than 4000 hospitals, HCIA ( 1 995) reported that by 
1 994 inpatient utilization continued to decline, with an average occupancy rate of 46%. 
Hospital profitability was rising, however, and hospital staffing levels were being 
curtailed. The combined portion of Medicare and Medicaid patients discharged from the 
typical U .S .  hospital reached 55 . 7%, up 7.3% from 1 990. 
Some of these trends are reflected in the sample hospitals, where the occupancy 
rate fel l  from 63% in 1 989 to 5<)010 in 1 994. A close resemblance occurs in the sample ' s  
combined Medicare and Medicaid statistic of 53 .6% i n  1 995 .  Also a close match, the 
average cost per discharge in the HCIA survey for 1 994 (wage and case-mix adjusted) 
was $3924 . Hospitals in the study sample reported an average 1 995 figure of $387 1 .  
Unlike HCIA' s summation of hospital trends, the study at hand finds l imited 
evidence of reduced staffing. Across the nation and probably across the sample, the 
greatest reduction in hospital FTEs occurred after 1 990, only partially offsetting increases 
in 1989 and 1990. Since the study period includes 1989 to 1 994, some staffing changes 
apparently cancel each other out. This understanding makes the prominence of staff 
increases even more powerful in the study. 
Future Research Projects 
Since this study could best be described as an exploratory one, possibi l ities in 
further investigations are numerous. For example, a separate analysis could examine the 
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attrition set of hospitals, and determine what environmental factors caused closure or 
merging behaviors. With the current study as a base, a more extensive model for hospital 
fit could be developed and empirically tested. A shift in the period analyzed, to 1 99 1 -
1 996, could also provide more definitive results with regard to the hypothesized change 
in staffing patterns. 
In another direction, the elements of the current study could be applied to a larger 
hospital sample, including hospital units acting as subsidiaries. Although previous 
research has compared hospital performance on the basis of control and ownership, this 
study' S  elements are clearly applicable to hospital performance evaluation under 
changing environmental pressures. 
In an ideal study, the constant shifts and alliances in hospital organizations could 
be controlled in order to analyze their performance over time. This study and its 
references also illustrate the importance of medical insurance sources in the structural 
responses of health service managers. 
The economic impact of an inpatient stay cannot be denied in terms of national 
health care expenditures. This study has provided interesting evidence that the presence 
of managed care insurance has actually frozen community hospitals into their acute-care 
role. Yes, hospitals are changing; and yet in this study period their approach toward 
internal organization has stayed curiously the same. 
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DAPCD 
Appendix A: HCFA Diagnostic and Procedure Codes (DAPCD)* 
00 
0 1  
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
NAME 
OVERALL 
ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION 
CONGESTIVE HEART FAILURE 
PNEUMONIA / INFLUENZA 
CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY DISEASE 
TRANSIENT CEREBRAL ISCHEMIA 
STROKE 
FRACTURE OF NECK OF FEMUR 
SEPSIS 
ANGIOPLASTY 
CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT 
INITIAL PACEMAKER INSERTION 
CAROTID ENDARTERECTOMY 
HIP REPLACEMENT / REVISION 
OPEN REDUCTION OF FRACTURED FEMUR 
PROSTATECTOMY 
CHOLECYSTECTOMY 
HYSTERECTOMY 
* Source: HCFA Public Use Files, MORTAL90. 
1 6 1  
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Appendix B: Scoring Method for Hospital Preventive Services, Variable DIFPREV 
Survey results for five hospital services were combined into a 1 989 composite 
score. These services were patient education, fitness center, women' s  health 
center/services, occupational health services, and comprehensive geriatric assessment. If 
a service was reported as hospital-based in 1 989, then the composite score was increased 
by a factor of 1 .  The maximum possible score was 5 and the minimum possible score 
was O.  
For the survey year 1 994, similar information was collected for patient education 
center, fitness center, women' s  health center/services, occupational health services, and 
geriatric services. If the hospital or a subsidiary provided the service, then the composite 
score was again increased by 1 .  Once again, the maximum possible score was 5 and the 
minimum possible score was O. 
The variable DIFPREV was obtained by subtracting the 1 989 composite score 
from the 1 994 composite score. The maximum possible value for DIFPREV was 5 and 
the minimum possible value was -5 . 
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Appendix C: AHA Region Codes, 1 989 
Region 1 (New England) Maine New Hampshire Rhode Island 
Vermont Connecticut 
Massachusetts 
Region 2 (Mid-Atlantic) New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Region 3 (South Atlantic) Delaware North Carolina 
Maryland South Carolina 
District of Columbia Georgia 
Virginia Florida 
West Virginia 
Region 4 (East North Central) Ohio Michigan 
Indiana Wisconsin 
Illinois 
Region 5 (East South Central) Kentucky Alabama 
Tennessee Mississippi 
Region 6 (West North Central) Minnesota South Dakota 
Iowa Nebraska 
Missouri Kansas 
North Dakota 
Region 7 (West South Central) Arkansas Oklahoma 
Louisiana Texas 
Region 8 (Mountain) Montana New Mexico 
Idaho Arizona 
Wyoming Utah 
Colorado Nevada 
Region 9 (Pacific) Washington Alaska 
Oregon Hawaii 
California 
Appendix D: Correlation between Dependent and Independent Variables, Part 1 
Independent DIFFTE DIFMD DIFRN DIFLPN DIFNURS DIFAMB DIFSURG DIFPREV DIFBED DIFOCCRT DIFCMI 
Variable 
HMOPEN89 -0.027 0.05 1 -0.067 0.058 -0.092 -0.004 -0.025 -0.070 -0.036 -0.073 -0.010  
HHIDC89 0.02 1 -0.030 0.0 1 3  -0.038 0.058 0.024 -0.004 0.022 -0.006 0.096 0.0 1 1 . 
HHIPD89 0.02 1 -0.030 0.0 1 3  -0.038 0.058 0.024 -0.004 0.02 1 -0.007 0.096 0.0 1 1  
MSASTGH9 -0.04 1 0.022 -0.043 0.054 -0.086 -0.039 -0.00 1 -0.009 -0.002 -0.050 -0.044 
CSTDAY9 0.040 0.002 0.03 1 0.062 -0.0 1 3  -0.052 -0.00 1 -0.008 0.080 0. 106 0. 1 12 
CSTDISC9 0.096 -0.00 1 0.056 -0.043 -0.036 0.055 0.D38 0.0 14 0.034 -0.006 0.208 
MORT30 0.036 -0.0 12  0.076 0.008 0. 123  -0.040 -0.04 1 -0.006 0.036 0.034 -0.0 18  
CUMDIFF -0.032 0.0 1 3  -0.078 -0.005 -0.092 0.038 0.056 0.006 -0.042 -0.022 0 .016 
BDTOT89 0.248 0.028 0 .2 17  -0.266 -0.026 0.244 0.275 0.024 -0. 160 -0.004 0.350 
ADC89 0.262 0.033 0.224 -0.258 -0.030 0.250 0.275 0.037 -0.092 -0.076 0 .339 
HMCR_89 -0. 155 -0.045 -0. 1 25 0.05 1 0.03 1 -0.084 -0. 132 0.034 0.028 0.067 -0. 102 
HMCD_89 0.082 0.0 1 5  0. 103 -0.034 0.066 0.036 -0.026 -0.040 0.054 0.007 -0.00 1 
ALL89 0.095 0. 102 0.036 -0. 134 0 .000 0. 1 10 0. 1 54 0.022 -0.065 -0.007 0. 108 
CONPHY 0.083 0. 1 14 0.036 -0. 1 18 -0.0 1 2  0. 14 1  0. 1 18 -0.027 -0.000 -0.038 0.095 
LOCSYS89 -0.088 -0.027 .,0.043 0.03 1 -0.030 -0. 126 -0.058 -0.047 -0.027 -0.062 -0.004 
MAPP889 0. 167 0.084 0. 104 -0.084 -0.082 0.206 0. 153 0.02 1 -0.032 -0.003 0.209 
MHSMEM89 -0.036 0.020 -0.005 0.000 -0.058 -0.064 0.033 -0.04 1 -0.032 -0.039 0.076 
MNGT89 -0.039 -0.033 -0.0 1 5  0.050 0.06 1 -0.058 -0.092 -0.044 0.049 -0.006 -0.088 
� 
Appendix E: Correlation between Dependent and Independent Variables, Part 2 
Independent Variable CSTDA Y5 CSTDISC5 DIFCSTDY DIFCSTDS 
DIFFfE 0.026 0.087 0.00 1 0 .014 
DIFMD -0.0 12  -0.020 -O.O I l  -0.0 15  
DIFRN 0 .010 0.070 -0.007 0.028 
DIFLPN 0.038 -0.023 -0.00 1 0.006 
DIFNURS 0.006 0.023 0.0 12 0.046 
DIFAMB -0.0 13  0.049 0.0 17  0.0 1 l 
DIFSURG -0.040 -0.026 -0.043 -0.057 
DIFPREV -0.014 0.028 -0.010 0 .015  
DIFBED -0. 105 -0.004 -0. 147 -O.Q28 
DIFOCCRT -0.082 0.072 -0. 146 0.069 
DIFCMI -0.096 0.025 -0. 162 -0. 1 26 
HMOPEN89 -0.017  -0.073 -0.004 -0.056 
HHIDC89 0 .096 0.026 0.04 1 0.09 1 
HHIPD89 . 0 .096 0.026 0.042 0.09 1 
MSASTGH9 -0.084 -0.043 -0.053 -0. 1 12 
CSTDAY9 0.283 0. 143 -0. 3 16 -0.253 
CSTDISC9 0.029 0.345 -0.295 -0.386 
MORT30 0.085 -0.040 0.054 0 .065 
CUMDIFF -0.064 0.033 -0 .050 -0.050 
BDTOT95 -0. 1 56 0. 124 -0.089 -0.088 
ADC95 -0. 175 0. 144 -0.093 -0.067 
HMCR_95 -O. 1 l9 0.055 -0.023 0.072 
HMCD 95 0 .084 0.058 0.064 0.024 
ALL95 
- 0.037 0.086 0.097 0.068 
LOCSYS94 -0.0 12  -0. 103 -0. 125 -0 . 1 82 
MAPP895 0.047 0.262 -0.023 -0.045 
MHSMEM95 -0.0 13  -0.038 -0.058 -0. 132 
MNGT95 0.080 0.055 0.077 0. 1 16 
SUNITS95 -0. 134 0.0 16  -0. 163 -0 045 
� 
Appendix F: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 1 
HMOPEN89 HHIDC89 HHIPD89 MSASTGH9 CSTDAY9 CSTDISC9 MORT30 CUMDIFF BDTOT89 
HMOPEN89 1 .00 -0.356 -0.357 0.395 -0.016 -0.022 -0.058 0.039 0.020 
HHIDC89 -0. 356 1 .00 0.999 -0.607 0.078 -0.093 0. 1 16 -0.030 -0.093 
HHIPD89 -0.357 0 .999 1 .00 -0.606 0.078 -0.093 0 . 1 16 -0.030 -0.092 
MSASTGH9 0 .395 -0.607 -0.606 1 .00 -0.048 0.096 -0. 133  0.D25 0. 109 
CSTDAY9 -0.0 16  0.078 0.077 -0.048 1 .00 0 .538 0.06 1 -0.038 -0. 148 
CSTDISC9 -0.022 -0.093 -0.093 0 .096 0.538 1 .00 -0. 145 0 . 1 1 1  0.275 
MORT30 -0.058 0 . 1 16 0 . 1 16 -0. 1 33  0.06 1 -0. 145 1 .00 -0.892 -0. 143 
CUMDIFF 0.039 -0.030 -0.030 0.025 -0.038 0 . 1 12 -0.892 1 .00 0. 103 
BDTOT89 0.0 1 9  -0.093 -0.092 0. 109 -0. 148 0.275 -0. 143 0 . 103 1 .00 
ADC89 0.D28 -0. 122 -0. 122 0 . 1 3 1  -0. 178 0.274 -0. 160 0 . 1 10 0.974 
HMCR_89 -0. 140 0 .077 0.078 0. 126 -0. 158 0.003 -0.089 0 . 149 -0.24 1 
HMCD_89 -0.058 -0.005 -0.004 0.078 -0.008 0.022 0.078 -0. 162 0.092 
ALL89 -0. 10  0.022 0.02 1 -0.038 -0.070 0.052 -0.064 0.076 0.305 
CONPHY 0.072 -0.075 -0.075 1 0.049 -0. 128 0. 109 -0.077 0.D35 0.3 10 
LOCSYS89 0. 174 -0.200 -0. 1 97 0.223 0. 1 1 1  0.054 0.046 -0.04 1 -0.050 
MAPP889 0. 1 54 -0. 160 -0. 160 0. 1 52 0.07 1 0.322 -0. 1 5 1  0 . 1 10 0.473 
MHSMEM89 0.047 -0.024 -0.023 0.047 0. 1 18 0. 127 0.053 -0.043 0.064 
MNGT89 -0.029 0.050 0.05 1 -0.048 0.027 -0.058 0.024 -0.008 -0.2 1 1  
� 
Appendix F: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part I (cont .)  
ADC89 HMCR 89 HMCD 89 ALL89 CONPHY LOCSYS89 MAPP889 MHSMEM89 MNGT89 
HMOPEN89 0 .D28 -0. 1 40 -0.058 -0.0 1 0  0.072 0 . 1 74 0. 1 54 0.047 -0.029 
HHIDC89 -0. 1 22 0 . 077 -0.005 0 .022 -0.075 -0. 1 98 -0. 1 60 -0 .024 0.050 
lllilPD89 -0. 1 22 0 . 078 -0.004 0.021 -0 .075 -0. 1 97 -0 . 1 60 -0 .023 0.051 
MSASTGH9 0 . \ 3 1  -0. 1 26 0.078 -0.038 0.049 0.223 0. 1 52 0 .047 -0.048 
CSTDAY9 -0. 1 79 -0. 1 58 -0.008 -0.070 -0. 128 0. 1 1 1  0.071 0 . 1 1 8 0 .027 
CSTDISC9 0 .274 0 . 003 0 .022 0 .052 0 . 1 09 0.054 0.322 0. 127 -0.058 
MORno -0. 1 60 -0.089 0.078 -0.064 -0.077 0 .046 -0. 1 5 1  0.053 0.024 
CUMDIFF 0. 1 10 0 . 1 50 -0. 1 62 0 .076 0.035 -0.04 1  0. 1 \ 0  -0 .043 -0 .008 
BDTOT89 0. 974 -0.242 0.092 0 . 305 0 . 3 \ 0  -0.050 0 .473 0 .064 -0.2 1 1  
ADC89 1 .00 -0.246 0. 1 1 9 0 . 3 1 4  0.339 -0.067 0.495 0 .030 -0.2 1 0  
HMCR 8 9  -0.246 1 .00 -0.332 -0.062 -0.087 -0. 0 1 8  -0 .254 0 .0 1 8  0 .047 
HMCD=89 0 . 1 1 9 -0.332 1 .00 0 .028 0.089 -0. 105 0 . 1 90  -0 . 1 63 0 .070 
ALL89 0 . 3 1 4  -0.062 0.028 1 .00 0 . 1 24 -0.047 0 . 145 -0.056 -0.090 
CONPHY 0. 339 -0.087 0.089 0 . 1 24 1 .00 -0.056 0. 1 80 -0 .003 -0.092 
LOCSYS89 -0.067 -0.0 1 8  -0. 105 -0.047 -0.056 1 .00 -0.025 0.498 0.041  
MAPP889 0.495 -0.254 0. 1 90  0. 145 0 . 1 80 -0.025 1 .00 -0 .075 -0.076 
MHSMEM89 0.030 0 .0 1 8  -0. 1 63 -0.056 -0.003 0.498 -0.075 1 .00 -0.088 
MNGT89 -0.2 1 0  0 .047 0.070 -0.090 -0.092 0.041 -0.076 -0 .088 1 .00 
-
� 
Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 2 
Independent DIFFTE DIFMD DIFRN DIFLPN DIFNURS DIFAMB DIFSURG DIFPREV DIFBED DIFOCCRT DIFCMI 
Variable 
···oiFF'fE··························j":OO················O:)M··············0:Ki'i·············Oj·46·· ············0:0·Os·················0:2"M···············Oj·92""················0·054·················0·
0
322""·············0:047""·················OJ·4·S······ 
DIFMD 0. 344 \ .00 -0.008 0.057 -0.034 O. \ 05 0.022 0.036 0 . 027 -0.004 0 .038 
DIFRN 0.617 -0.008 \ .00 0.041 0.234 0 . 1 38 0 . 1 74 0.060 0 .252 0.056 0. 1 1 7 
DIFLPN 0 . 1 46 0.057 0.041 1 .00 -0. 506 -0.024 -0 .037 -0. 0 1 7  0 . 1 69 0 .042 -0.081 
DIFNURS 0.005 -0.034 0 .234 -0. 506 \ .00 -0.023 -0 004 -0.004 0 .004 -0 003 0.018 
DIFAMB 0.244 0. 1 05 0. \ 39 -0.024 -0.023 1 .00 0 . 1 34 0.046 0 .009 0.040 0.082 
DIFSURG 0 . 1 92 0.022 0. 1 74 -0.037 -0.004 0 . 1 34 \ .00 0.024 0.039 -0.008 0.094 
DIFPREV 0.054 0.036 0.060 -0. 1 67 -0.004 0 . 046 0.024 \ .00 0.024 0.029 0.046 
DIFBED 0.322 0.027 0.252 0. 1 69 0.004 0.009 0.039 0.024 1 .00 -0.293 -0.030 
DIFOCCRT 0.047 -0.004 0.056 0.04::( -0 .00 0 .040 -0 .008 0.029 -0.293 \ .00 -0.055 
DIFCMI 0. 1 45 0.038 0 . 1 1 7 -0.081 O.o J 8  0 .082 0.094 0.046 -0.030 -0 .055 \ .00 
HMOPEN89 -0.027 0.051 -0.067 0.058 -0.092 -0.004 -0.025 -0.070 -0.036 -0.073 -0.010 
HHIDC89 0.021  -0.030 0 .0 1 3  -0.038 0 .058 0 .024 -0.004 0.022 -0.006 0.0% 0.0 1 1  
HHIPD89 0.021 -0.030 0 . 0 1 3  -0.038 0.058 0 .024 -0.004 0.02 1  -0.007 0 .096 0.01 1 
MSASTGH9 -0.04 1 0.022 -0.043 0.054 -0 .086 -0.039 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.050 -0.044 
CSTDAY9 0.040 0.002 0.03 1 0.062 -0.0 1 3  -0.052 -0.00 1 -0.008 0.080 0 . 1 06 0 . 1 12 
CSTDISC9 0.0% -0.00 1  0.056 -0.043 -0 .036 0.055 0.038 0.014 0.034 -0.006 0.208 
MORTJO 0.036 -0. 0 1 2  0 .076 0.008 0 . 1 23 -0.040 -0.04 1 -0.006 0 .036 0 .034 -0 .0 1 8  
CUMDIFF -0.032 0 . 0 1 3  -0.078 -0.005 -0.092 0.038 0.056 0.006 -0.042 -0 022 0.016 
BDTOT95 0 .340 0.030 0.279 -0.237 -0.0 1 9  0.253 0.285 0.034 0 .072 -0 073 0. 344 
ADC95 . 0. 365 0.039 0.304 -0.226 -0.022 0.265 0.282 0.042 0 .065 -0.0 1 0  0. 326 
HMCR 95 -0. 1 5 9  -0.049 -0. 1 46 0.021 0.022 -0 .072 -0. 1 22 0.020 -0 . 0 1 4  0 .082 -0 .081 
HMCD-95 0.088 0.000 0. 1 24 0.009 0.054 0.027 -0 .0 1 8  -0 .03 1 0 .060 0.044 -0 054 
ALL95 - 0 . 1  \0 0.068 0.059 -0. 1 3 1  0.022 0 . 1 64 0 . 1 24 0.069 -0.066 0.0 1 1  0.0 1 1  
LOCSYS94 -0.059 -0.036 -0 .025 0.035 -0 .048 -0. 1 0 1  -0.050 -0.053 -0.02 1 -0 .037 0.058 
MAPP895 0. 1 87 0.077 0. 1 24 -0.093 -0.067 0.207 0 . 1 6 1  0.028 -0.0 1 3  0 . 0 1 6  0.220 
MHSMEM95 0.002 0.039 0.058 -0.039 -0.024 0.007 0.056 0.042 -0 .045 -0 .04 1  0. 128 
MNGT95 -0.056 -0.073 -0 .027 0.025 0.078 -0 .054 -0 . 1 08 -0 . 0 1 9  0.007 0.017 -0 052 
SUNITS95 -0.005 -0.04 1 -0.023 0.0 1 1  -0 .027 0.030 -0.007 0 . 1  \0  0 .047 0.058 0.057 
� 
Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Part 2 (cont . )  
Independent HMOPEN89 HHIDC89 HHIPD89 MSASTGH9 CSTDAY9 CSTDISC9 MORT30 CUMDIFF BDTOT95 
Variable 
DIFFTE -0.027 0.02 1 0.02 1 -0.04 1 0.040 0.096 0.036 -0.032 0 .339 
DIFMD 0.05 1 -0.030 -0.030 0.022 0.002 -0.00 1 -0 .0 1 2  0.0 1 3  0.030 
DIFRN -0.067 0.0 1 3  0.0 1 3  -0.043 0.03 1 0.056 0.076 -0.078 0.279 
DIFLPN 0.058 -0.038 -0.038 0.054 0.062 -0.043 0.008 -0.005 -0.237 
DIFNURS -0.092 0.058 0.058 -0.086 -0.0 1 3  -0.036 0. 1 23 -0.092 -0. 0 1 9  
DIFAMB -0.004 0.024 0.024 -0.039 -0.052 0.055 -0.040 0.038 0.253 
DIFSURG -0.025 -0.004 -0.004 -0.00 1 -0.00 1  0.038 -0.04 1 0 .056 0.285 
DIFPREV -0.070 0.022 0.02 1 -0.009 -0.00 1 0 .014 -0.006 0.006 0.034 
DIFBED -0.036 -0.006 -0.007 -0.00 1 0.080 0.035 0.036 -0.042 0.072 
DIFOCCRT -0.073 0 .096 0.096 -0.050 0. 106 -0.006 0.034 -0.022 -0.073 
DIFCMI -0.0 10 0.0 1 1  0.0 1 1  0.044 0. 1 1 2 0.208 -0.0 1 8  0 .016 0.344 
HMOPEN89 1 .00 -0. 356 -0.357 0.395 -0.0 16  -0.022 -0 .058 0.039 0.0 10  
HHIDC89 -0.356 1 .00 0.999 -0.607 0.078 -0.093 0. 1 16 -0.030 -0.090 
HHIPD89 -0.357 0.999 1 .00 -0.606 0.078 -0.093 0 . 1 1 6  -0.030 -0.090 
MSASTGH9 0.395 -0.607 -0.606 1 .00 -0.048 0.096 -0. 1 3 3  0.025 0. 103 
CSTDAY9 -0.016 0.078 0.078 -0.048 1 .00 0.538 0.06 1 -0.038 -0. 1 14 
CSTDISC9 -0.022 -0.093 -0.093 0.096 0.538 1 .00 -0. 145 0. 1 12 0 .280 
MORT30 -0.058 0. 1 16 0. 1 16 -0. 1 3 3  0.06 1 -0. 145 1 .00 -0.892 -0. 128  
CUMDIFF 0.039 -0.030 -0.030 0.025 -0.038 0. 1 12 -0. 892 1 .00 0 .091 
BDTOT95 0.010 -0.090 -0.090 0. 103 -0. 1 14 0.280 -0 . 1 28 0.09 1 1 . 00 
ADC95 0 .013 -0. 106 -0 . 106 0. 1 20 -0. 1 38  0.280 -0. 146 0.098 0 .968 
HMCR_95 -0. 160 0. 1 24 0. 124 -0. 168 -0. 163 -0. 163 -0.096 0. 156 -0.249 
HMCD_95 -0.052 -0.024 -0.024 0 . 1 4 1  0.039 0.039 0 .073 -0. 162 0.060 
ALL95 -0.053 0.044 0.043 -0.068 -0.090 0.005 -0.07 1 0 .076 0.246 
LOCSYS94 0. 139 -0. 1 79 -0. 1 77 0.202 0. 162 0 . 105 -0 .005 0 .002 0 .0 18  
MAPP895 0. 126 -0. 132  -0. 1 3 1  0. 128 0.090 0.3 1 5  -0. 1 38  0 . 100 0.452 
MHSMEM95 0.050 -0.028 -0.028 0.024 0.055 0. 1 1 3 0 .001 0.002 0. 1 38 
MNGT95 -0.042 0.047 0.047 -0.043 -0.003 -0.076 0.025 -0.016 -0. 1 75 
SUNITS95 -0.007 -0.029 -0.027 0.04 1 0.048 0.080 0 .046 -0.037 0.073 
$ 
Appendix G: Correlation Matrix of lndependent Variables, Part 2 (cont . )  
Independent ADC95 HMCR 95 HMCD_95 ALL95 LOCSYS94 MAPP895 MHSMEM95 MNGT95 SUNITS95 
Variable 
DIFITE 0.365 -0. 159 0.088 0. 1 10 -0.059 0. 187 0.002 -0.056 -0.005 
DIFMD 0.039 -0.049 0.000 0.068 -0.036 0.077 0.039 -0.073 -0.04 1 
DIFRN 0.304 -0. 146 0. 124 0.059 -0.025 0. 124 0.023 -0.027 -0.023 
DIFLPN -0.226 0.02 1 0.009 -0. 1 3 1  0.035 -0.092 -0.039 0.026 0.0 1 1  
DIFNURS -0.022 0.022 0.054 0.022 -0.048 -0.068 -0.024 0.078 -0.027 
DIFAMB 0.265 -0.072 0.027 0. 164 -0. 101  0.207 0.007 -0.054 0.030 
DIFSURG 0.282 -0. 122 -0.0 1 8  0. 124 -0.050 0. 16 1  0.056 -0. 108 -0.007 
DIFPREV 0.042 0.020 -0.03 1 0.069 -0.053 0.028 0.042 -0.019 0. 1 10 
DIFBED 0.065 -0.0 1 5  0.060 -0.066 -0.02 1 -0.0 13  -0.045 0.007 0.048 
DIFOCCRT -0.010 0.082 0.044 0.0 1 1 -0.037 0.016 -0.04 1 0.0 17  0.058 
DIFCMI 0.326 -0.08 1 -0.054 0. 1 1 5 0.058 0.220 0. 128 -0.052 0.057 
HMOPEN89 0.0 13  -0. 160 -0.052 -0.053 0 . 139  0. 126 0.050 -0.042 -0.008 
HHIDC89 -0. 106 0 . 1 24 -0.024 0.044 -0. 179 -0. 132 -0.028 0.047 -0.029 
HHIPD89 -0. 106 0. 1 24 -0.024 0.043 -0. 177 -0. 132 -0.028 0.047 -0.027 
MSASTGH9 0. 120 -0. 168 0 . 1 4 1  -0.068 0.202 0. 128 0.024 -0.043 0.04 1 
CSTDAY9 -0. 138 -0. 163 0 .039 -0.090 0. 162 0.090 0.055 -0.003 0.048 
CSTDISC9 0.279 -0.025 0.047 0.005 0. 105 0.3 1 5  0. 1 1 3 -0.076 0.080 
MORT30 -0. 146 -0.096 0.073 -0.07 1 -0.005 -0. 138 0.00 1 O.oz5 0.046 
CUMDIFF 0.098 0. 156 -0. 162 0.076 0.002 0. 100 0.002 -0.016 -0.037 
BDTOT95 0.968 -0.249 0.060 0.246 0.0 1 8  0.452 0 . 1 3 8  -0. 175 0.073 
ADC95 1 .00 -0.243 0.080 0.259 -0.0 13  0.473 0. 1 16 -0. 17 1  0.054 
HMCR_95 -0.243 1 .00 -0.446 0.0 1 8  -0.089 -0.222 -0.0 1 3  0. 120 0.040 
HMCD_95 0.080 -0.446 1 .00 -0.020 -0.099 0. 141  -0. 102 0.016 -0.014 
ALL95 0.259 0.0 1 8  -0.020 1 .00 -0.092 0. 184 0.063 -0.060 -0.003 
LOCSYS94 -0.013 -0.089 -0.099 -0.092 1 .00 -0.037 0.382 -0.042 0.036 
MAPP895 0.473 -0.222 0 . 1 4 1  0. 1 84 -0.037 1 .00 0.0 10  -0.072 -0.062 
MHSMEM95 0. 1 16 -0.013  -0. 102 0.063 0 .382 0.010 1 .00 -0.088 0. 1 3 5  
MNGT95 -0. 17 1  0 . 120 0 .016 -0.059 -0.042 -0.072 -0.088 1 .00 -0.007 
SUNITS95 0.054 0.040 -0.0 14 -0.003 0.036 -0.062 0 . 1 3 5  -0.007 1 .00 
--:a C> 
Appendix H: Parameter Estimates for Interaction Terms in Study. Standardized 
Estimates of Change in Hospital Staff. Interaction model. 
Variable Estimate for Estimate for 
DIFFTEt DIFRN 
N; I S I 6  N; I S I S  
�OPENS9t*HlilDCS9t -0.040 -0.032 
CSTDISC9*llliIDCS9t 0.033 0.024 
MORT30*IllIDCS9t 0.063 0.054 
ADCS9 O. I I S**** 0. 1 97**** 
�CR S9 -O.OS6****  -0.062* *  
�CD S 9  4 .23 * 10 0.036 
ALLS9 0.036 -0 .017  
CONPHYS9 0.0 1 3  -0.020 
MNGTS9 0.005 -0.002 
LOCSYSS9 -0.067***  0.004 
PUB 0.06S*** 0.OS7****  
Intercept 0.000**** 0.000 
R-square 0.054 0.065 
Adj. R-square 0.049 0.060 
F value 9.450****  1 1 .449* * * *  
Notes: t Vanable IS transformed through square root. 
* * Significant p < .05 level. 
* * *  Significant p < .01  level. 
* * * *  Significant p < .00 1 level. 
Estimate for Estimate for 
DIFLPNt DIFNURS 
N; I S I S  N; I S I S  
-0. 014  -0.009 
0.0 1 7  -0.053 
-0.077 0 . 1 3 5 * * * *  
-0. 2 1 7* * * *  -0.007 
-0.009 0.054** 
-0.023 0.07S* * *  
-0.055* *  O.O I S  
-0.022 0.004 
-O.OOS 0.047 
0.004 -0.029 
0.06 1 ** -0.002 
0.000 0.000 
0.062 0.022 
0.056 0.0 1 6  
I O. S96* * * *  3 . 779* * * * 
1 7 1  
Appendix I. Parameter Estimates for Interaction Terms in Study. Standardized 
Estimates of Change in Hospital Capacity. Interaction model. 
Variable Estimate for Estimate for 
DIFBEDt DIFOCCRT 
N=1 8 1 8  N= 1 8 1 8  
HMOPEN89t*HHIDC89t -0.026 -0.03 1 
CSTDISC9*HHIDC89t 0 .066 0 .04 1  
MORT30*HIIDC89t -0.056 0.036 
ADC89 -0.09 1 * * * *  -0.06 1 * *  
HMCR 89 -0.007 0 .040 
HMCD 89 0.050 0 .020 
ALL89 -0.036 0 .002 
CONPHY89 0.032 -0.04 1 
MNGT89 0 .022 -0.0 1 8  
LOCSYS89 -0.029 -0.03 5 
PUB 0.049* *  -0.00 1 
Intercept 0 .000 0 .000* * * *  
R-square 0 .020 0 .0 12  
Adj . R-square 0 .0 14  0 .0 1 3  
F-ratio (p-value) 3 .278* * * *  3 . 200* * * *  
Notes :  t Van able I S  transformed through square root. 
* * Significant p < .05 level. 
* * *  Significantp < .0 1 level. 
* * * *  Significant p < .00 1 level. 
Estimate for 
DIFCMI 
N= 1 8 1 7  
0 .0 1 9  
0 . 1 73 * * * *  
-0.054 
0 .323 * * * *  
-0.050* *  
-0.037 
-0.00 1 
-0. 0 14  
-0.02 1 
0 .0 1 6  
-0 .030 
0 .000* * *  
0 . 1 3 7  
0 . 1 3 2  
26.003 * * * *  
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Appendix J: Parameter Estimates For Interaction Terms In Study. Standardized 
Estimates Of Change In Hospital Ambulatory Workload . Interaction 
Model. 
Variable Estimate for Estimate for 
DIFPREV DIFAMBt 
N= 1 8 1 8  N= 1 8 1 6  
HMOPEN89t*HHIDC89t -0.082*** *  -0.03 1 
C STDISC9*HHIDC89t 0.043 0 .078* *  
MOR TJO*HIIDC89t 0 .0 1 5  0. 023 
ADC89 0.046 0 .230* * * *  
HMCR 89 0 .023 -0.060* *  
HMCD 8 9  -0.046 -0.04 1 
ALL89 -0.0 1 3  -0 .035 
CONPHY89 -0.045 0 .0 1 7  
MNGT89 -0.037 0 .006 
LOCSYS89 -0.032 -0.072* * *  
FP89 -0.049 -0.076* * *  
Intercept 0 .000* *  0 .000* * * *  
R-square 0 .D l 8  0 .090 
Adj. R-square 0 .0 1 1 0 .085 
F-ratio (P-value) 2 .735 * * *  1 6.286* * * *  
Notes: t Variable I S  transformed through square root. 
* * Significant p < .05 level. 
* * * Significant p < .0 I level. 
* * * * Significant p < .00 I level. 
Estimate for 
DIFSURGt 
N= 1 8 1 7  
-0.040 
0 .0 1 9  
0 .030 
0 . 1 72* * * *  
-0. 1 1 9* * * *  
-0.097* * * *  
0 .058* *  
-0.007 
-0.006 
-0 . 0 1 9  
-0.052* *  
0 .000* * * *  
0 .070 
0 .065 
1 2 .423 * * * *  
1 7 3  
1 74 
Vita 
